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Abstract
Scholars have explored the United States military from the lens of battles, campaigns,
operations, and leaders with depth and zeal. When discussing the influence of the Army on
education in America, the G.I. Bill is consistently the main topic of conversation. However,
the contributions of the Army to American higher education are much more complicated than
simply the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944. A wide variety of
programs and efforts championed by the Army during the first half of the twentieth century
lack in-depth research and analysis. This study examined the American military
transformation from the American Civil War through World War II resulting from
technological advancements, changes in military and veteran programs, reforms and
partnerships between the Army and higher education, and the American need for manpower
to conduct large-scale operations. The evidence revealed that the Army had a significant
effect on the beginning of literacy and intelligence testing in America, the development of
the standardized General Educational Development (GED) test, and the changes in training
technical experts and leaders in college-level programs. Programs such as the Students’
Army Training Corps of World War I and the Army Specialized Training Program of World
War II not only trained hundreds of thousands of recruits, but they also demonstrate the
influence of the military on post-secondary education in America. Overall, the numerous
Army programs had a significant influence on education in America years before the World
War II G.I. Bill.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (or G.I. Bill of Rights) produced many
life-changing events for those who used the benefits to not only make a better life for
themselves, but to influence the nation. Some scholars conclude that the G.I. Bill expanded
intellectual capacity in America. Others, such as management guru Peter Drucker, attribute
the establishment of the American middle class to the G.I. Bill. In the years following World
War II (WWII), the G.I. Bill program funded the education of thousands of doctors, teachers,
and engineers. It also helped to advance the careers of more prominent public leaders, such
as Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens. After graduating from the University of
Chicago, Stevens enlisted in the Navy on December 6, 1941, the day before the Japanese
bombed Pearl Harbor. After he enlisted, the Navy sent Stevens to the Pacific as an
intelligence officer, where he was part of the team that cracked Japanese radio codes. After
the war, Stevens returned home but was unsure of what to do after he finished his time in the
military. As one of many returning veterans, Stevens became aware of the G.I. Bill and
considered the options it provided. Stevens considered the G.I. Bill a major opportunity to
further his education and, with the encouragement of his brother, who was also an attorney,
decided to enter law school.1 Using the G.I. Bill benefits, Stevens attended Northwestern
University Law School, graduating first in his class in 1947, and began to clerk for Supreme
Court Justice Wiley Rutledge. The G.I. Bill helped to put Stevens on a path that eventually
led him to becoming a Supreme Court justice. While the G.I. Bill was a significant piece of
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John Paul Stevens, Interview by Troy A. McKenzie, New York University School of Law, September
26, October 10 and 31, 2014, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files
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legislation, many other programs may have set the conditions for the bill being drafted by
Senators Warren Atherton and Ernest McFarlane.
Contributions of US Military and Veteran Programs to American Education
There is no doubt the WWII G.I. Bill was important to American education during the
post World War II era, but research shows it was the work of reform-minded leaders and the
implementation of several military programs that set the conditions for the passage of the G.I.
Bill and expanded federal influence on post-secondary education in America during the first
half of the twentieth century. A few leaders proposed changes to training, operations, and
education in the United States (US) Army as early as the American Civil War but lacked any
major support. As the nineteenth century came to an end, military and political leaders
struggled to implement changes in the training and education of servicemembers or veterans.
As American capitalism flourished, private industry exerted a growing influence on the
American workforce and the US military leading to changes in American post-secondary
education. Between 1910 and 1950, the US Army had a considerable influence on colleges
and universities in America through partnerships and programs resulting from the
combination of changing technology, reform-minded leaders coming into positions of power,
and large military operations demanding large numbers of recruits.
The contributions of the US military and veteran programs to American education are
much more complex than simply the passage of the G.I. Bill.2 Examining the transformation
of the US military and researching the factors that influenced the education and training
changes during the first half of the twentieth century may help explain how the G.I. Bill and
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The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 provided federal government aid for the readjustment to
civilian life of returning World War II veterans and was passed on June 22,1944; Enrolled Acts and Resolutions
of Congress, 1789-1996; General Records of the United States Government; Record Group 11; National
Archives, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/servicemens-readjustment-act
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similar US military and veteran programs affected American society. This inquiry documents
the efforts to assist servicemembers and veterans by exploring not only the G.I. Bill, but the
evolution of military training and developmental needs as well by examining changing
technology, reform-minded leaders, and large military operations. Examining whether the US
Congress passed a revolutionary piece of legislation when the G.I. Bill became law in 1944
was an important motivator for further research into the transformation of the military and its
impact on post-secondary education in America. The review of primary sources,
historiography, and thorough analysis identified major training and education changes in the
US military that were already in motion prior to the post-WWII G.I. Bill.
Research Methodology
The research methodology focused on the American military transformation as a
result of technological advancements, changes in military and veteran programs, reforms and
partnerships between the US military and higher education, the American need for manpower
during large military operations, and the impact these combined factors achieved during the
twentieth century. It required an analysis of the demographics of those who benefited from
military and veteran programs and how changes affected areas such as the American
economy and education. Since the research focused on multiple groups including people and
organizations, a multidisciplined examination of the topic yielded insight that the G.I. Bill
was the next step in the evolution of transforming the US military, its related programs, and
post-secondary education. A benefit of this approach was that the research illuminated the
connections between American economic conditions and the influence of the military and
veteran programs on society between 1910 and 1950. There are several major and minor
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research questions that guided the research and yielded insight into connecting the military
transformation, the establishment of programs, and the impact on American society.
To understand this transformation, focusing on the organizational structure of the US
Army during the American Civil War and the reformers who sought to make change
provided insight as to where significant changes in technology began. Leaders such as Emory
Upton demonstrated the intransigence of military leaders to make change to something as
simple as tactical operations, even with the significant increase in casualties amongst soldiers
during battle.3 This research also provided insight into the post-Civil War changes by
analyzing the establishment of post-schools by the US Army, the support from leaders such
as General William T. Sherman, and the lack of consistency or support for any notable
change. Providing this historical perspective demonstrates the significance of the changes
occurring between 1910 and 1950 by comparing them to the limited changes during the 40year period of 1860–1900.
Taking a chronological approach, this work focuses on key reformers such as Army
officer Arthur Wagner and Secretary of War Elihu Root and their efforts to bring about
change at the beginning of the twentieth century.4 While none of these leaders found the
ability to make change easy, the rise of reform-minded leaders into positions of power
eventually led to minor changes prior to the 1916 American Punitive Expedition. An
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Peter S. Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton: Colonel of the Fourth Regiment of Artillery, and
Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885), 1–9.; Emory Upton, The Military
Policy of the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1912).
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examination of large operations beginning with the Punitive Expedition demonstrates the
challenges the Army faced and how the combination of reform-minded leaders, adoption of
technology, and large military operations eventually led to notable change in the way the
Army trained and educated servicemembers. Moving into World War I (WWI), the need for
change in partnerships with post-secondary education became even more evident and
provided the Army an opportunity to influence American higher education in a significant
manner.
Influence of Military Training Camps and Civilian Leaders
The focus on the development of the American population from a military perspective
is seen much earlier than the G.I. Bill. In 1913, the US War Department established military
training camps, which eventually became the Military Training Camps Association of the
United States.5 Attendance at these camps by young men promoted good citizenship and
discipline and provided the US military with a pool of trained men to help safeguard the
national defense. The involvement of university presidents and civilian committees within
this movement helped to develop training material, promoted attendance at the camps, and
allowed for a national scale with camps placed strategically throughout the United States. By
1916, American leaders in the public and private sector promoted the necessity for these
camps as a part of the national defense plan. Community leaders such as social workers,
clergy, and educators testified to Congress, explaining that educational institutions needed to
include classes that assisted young people in understanding and appreciating civic duties,
regard for law and authority, and the need for discipline among the population. There were
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Henry S. Drinker, “The Military Training Camps,” The Military Engineer 23, no. 131 (1931): 448,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/44573659.
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those who argued against these classes being included within educational institutions, and
these advocates urged against any type of military training in fear of militarism being spread
across the country.6 The changes were not always smooth sailing; leaders entrenched in
nineteenth century beliefs came from educational organizations, clergy, civic groups, and
even the military. While progress was slow, programs and activities outside of the military
began to have an influence on how legislators viewed servicemember development while on
active duty.
Legislative Influences
On March 30, 1916, Michael Hoke Smith, a US senator from Georgia, spoke on the
Senate floor, introducing an amendment to the Army reorganization bill under review by the
Committee on Military Affairs. A specific feature of the amendment, which later became
Section 29a, was to allow soldiers on active duty an average of ninety-six hours a month to
study and receive educational instruction not connected directly to military service, but rather
to prepare them for return to civilian life. The amendment language specifically focused on
education and vocational areas such as agriculture and mechanical arts. The amendment also
expressly recommended that civilian teachers be employed by the Army to assist Army
officers, and the specificity of the senator’s recommendation illuminated the growing interest
in preparing servicemembers for reintegration into civilian life.7 Senator Smith’s amendment
provided an example of leaders’ attempts to pass military-related changes almost three
decades prior to the passing of the G.I. Bill in 1944.
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United States Congress, Senate, Sidney Anderson of Minnesota on the Military Establishment,
Proceedings and Debates, 64th Congress, 1st session, March 16, 1916, 4320,
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The 1916 legislative session was a year of momentous change for the military as well
as American universities and colleges. Part of the National Defense Act of 1916 included the
Pomerene-Gard Bill. As part of the Pomerene-Gard Bill, Congress established the Reserve
Officer’s Training Corps (ROTC), allowing military courses to be taught at universities and
colleges across America.8 By 1917, the ROTC program was in full swing at many
universities, such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Ohio State University,
the University of California, and the University of Texas, to name a few. Not only did these
courses focus on military training, but some universities, such as Ohio State, established
schools of Aeronautics as early as 1917.9 These new technical schools benefited the military
as it built a cohort of experts that the American military leveraged during the world wars.
Focus on Literacy
The military training camps, legislative focus on assisting servicemembers and
returning to civilian life, and the National Defense Act of 1916—which expanded the
National Guard and reserve corps—were followed by the US Army’s focus on increasing
literacy among recruits. To shift the US military from a nineteenth- to a twentieth-century
fighting force, the War Department needed a process to educate illiterates and specialized
technicians. The shifting tools of the trade resulted in soldiers who were experienced in
caring for horses and using mules and wagons lacking experience with new equipment while
they attempted to operate and maintain trucks and aircraft. The adoption of mechanized tools
of war became a problem during the Punitive Expedition. By WWI, the widespread use of
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United States Sixty-Fourth Congress, “The National Defense Act of 1916,” 1916,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/64th-congress/session-1/c64s1ch134.pdf.
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Sarah Hammond, Ohio State Prepares for World War I (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University,
2017), https://library.osu.edu/site/archives/2017/04/11/ohio-state-prepares-for-world-war-i/
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technology required potential recruits to be literate, as they would need to read manuals and
instructions on maintaining equipment as part of their duties. In addition, the Army’s
adoption of technology also required specialized technicians, leading to the need for
education on the other end of the spectrum.10 Not only did the Army need to address literacy,
but it also needed to address technical training and education by leveraging the knowledge
housed in colleges and universities across America. By WWII, the US military again found
itself with a significant labor pool problem. Many of the civilians who became fighting men
needed some type of development just to meet the mandated fourth-grade level of literacy.11
During WWII, an estimated three quarters of a million men failed to pass basic literacy
examinations. As a result, these Americans were missing one of the three major educational
components assessed—reading, writing, or speaking at the fourth-grade level. While the
illiterate inductee numbers were not historically unique, the increased adoption of technology
since the Punitive Expedition and continuing during WWI exacerbated the problem.
The US military faced a significant literacy problem during World War I, and military
leaders worked with educators within their academic discipline to develop literacy
assessments in an attempt to address the problem. During WWII, the Army invested even
more resources to address recruit literacy. Military leaders needed significant fighting
manpower for WWII in Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific. In September 1940, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Selective Training and Service Act into law.12 The
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US Army Service Forces, Army Specialized Training Division, “Essential Facts about the Army
Specialized Training Program” (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1943), 1,
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Samuel Goldberg, Army Training of Illiterates in World War II (New York: Bureau of Publications,
Columbia College, 1951).
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Selective Service Act, a peacetime draft in 1940, was a significant legislative and political
move, since the United States was not yet involved in the war. American leaders did,
however, anticipate eventual entrance into the war, and military leaders identified that the
ability to mobilize massive numbers of men to fight the war would place a significant burden
on the War Department and American industry if solutions were not addressed early. If
America entered the war, the War Department would need to examine, classify, and train
men arriving with various levels of intelligence and literacy. The lessons learned during
WWI later enabled actions during WWII to be more effective.
As American military leaders anticipated the need to induct and train a large number
of men, the War Department staff considered how the military might respond to the arriving
illiterate recruits. To address the problem, the Army established special training units to
educate inductees in reading and writing, with the goal of achieving proficiency at the fourthgrade level. While the process was much more complicated, it demonstrated the ongoing
evolution within the US military as it sought to address the impact of technological advances
on servicemembers. While some deferred selectees never achieved the Army literacy
standards, the program was a success, with more than 90 percent of illiterate recruits
achieving the established standards within the first sixty days of being in the program.13 In
addition, the assessments and instructional materials developed as part of the Army’s literacy
training program provided civilian adult literacy programs in communities across America
with an example of a method for increasing literacy amongst the American population and
training materials that were easily adaptable to the civilian population.

13

Deborah Brandt, “Drafting U.S. Literacy,” College English 66, no. 5 (2004): 485–502,
https://doi.org/10.2307/4140731.
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By examining published literature on the G.I. Bill and other military training and
educational programs, scholarly interpretations of the programs explain mainstream
perspectives on the program, divergent views, and research gaps. Generating a significant
background as to the events leading up to the G.I. Bill allows a connection to the
organizational changes that occurred within the US military at the start of the twentieth
century and in American society. Gathering empirical evidence on the US military structure
changes resulting from societal and industrial changes, and how these affected the
development of servicemembers, shows connections between technological advancements,
the transformation of the US military due to reform-minded leaders, the impact of major
military operations on manpower, and methods used to identify and address the development
of servicemembers and veterans. Examining specific events such as the Punitive Expedition
and WWI uncovered the increased demand for training and education of servicemembers to
improve military performance and prepare them to return to civilian life.
Identifying how these changes influenced servicemembers, veterans, and American
education leading to the passage of the post-WWII G.I. Bill shows how previously
unidentified factors influenced the expansion of educational opportunities for
servicemembers and veterans. For example, technological and organizational changes led to
an increased demand for literacy in the military.14 This led to the establishment of programs
connected to educational advancements where the military and post-secondary education
partnered and invested in servicemember education and training. To understand the
significance of the transformation and the effects it had on the military’s investment in

14

United States Selective Service System, “Army to Accept Some Illiterates,” Selective Service, Volume
2, no. 7, July 1942, 1. http://archive.org/details/1selectiveservice11119417.; Samuel Goldberg, Army Training
of Illiterates in World War II (New York: Bureau of Publications, Columbia College, 1951).
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training and education, the research explored the chronological changes between 1910 and
1950 within the military’s organization, equipment, training and education, veteran
programs, and higher education. To relate these changes to why they did not occur until the
reform-minded leaders gained positions of authority, technology was adopted by the military,
and large-scale military operations were present, this research examines the view of
operations during the American Civil War, postwar events, and the establishment of internal
Army schools in the last few decades of the nineteenth century. An example of how the
products of the Industrial Revolution influenced the military transformation through
technology can be better understood by examining literacy.
In response to the need for a more technologically savvy force identified during the
1910s, the military created literacy programs to address the identified need. In 1918, the
Army fielded an intelligence-testing program that identified, trained, and educated recently
inducted servicemembers who had difficulty adjusting to the military life or performing their
duties in a satisfactory manner. During WWI, “the War Department found that 30 percent of
the 1.7 million soldiers taking the Army Beta Test could not understand the form due to their
lack of reading skills.”15 Military literacy and its effect on military operations and American
society is an interesting and infrequently examined topic from the lens of both world wars.
Research shows a connection between these military programs, such as literacy testing and
the partnerships the military created with post-secondary education institutions in doing so.

15

Clinton L. Anderson and Steve F. Kime, “Some Major Contributions of the Military to the Field of
Adult and Continuing Education in the United States (A work in progress),” American Association of Adult and
Continuing Education’s Adult Education Conference (Charlotte: Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges, 1996),
5.
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The GED and University Programs
Improving literacy rates was not the only effort by the US military to increase
educational achievement in servicemembers. Another example of how literacy in the US
Armed Forces initiated change is related to the Testing for General Educational Development
today known as the GED. The US military partnered with educational groups and developed
military-led organizations to address the War Department needs. Examining partnerships,
programs, and the development of participants connects the need for skilled and educated
labor during both world wars to the partnerships between education, the military, and
industry leaders.
As the US entered WWII, the American Council on Education (ACE) promoted “its
general education curriculum and testing for credit agenda within the military through the
Joint Army and Navy committee on Welfare and Recreation.”16 These previous
advancements and successes led to the establishment of the United States Armed Forces
Institute (USAFI) and its reshaping of the field of American education within and outside of
the US military. The institute’s work on developing testing procedures, focusing on
measuring the learning outcomes achieved during the four years of high school, eventually
led to the testing program known today as the GED.17 The USAFI partnered with the
University of Wisconsin for three decades, providing courses related to military duties, selfimprovement, and even college credit for servicemembers around the world.18 This program
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Lois M. Quinn, “An institutional history of the GED” (Milwaukee, WI: University of WisconsinMilwaukee Employment and Training Institute, 2002), 18.
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John M. Persyn and Cheryl J. Polson, “Evolution and Influence of Military Adult Education,” New
Directions for Adult and Continuing Education (Winter 2012): 8.
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United States Armed Forces Institute, Catalog of the United States Armed Forces Institute, 4th ed.
(Washington, DC: Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, 1947).
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showed how learning at a distance could be done on a widespread level. The transformation
and contributions of the US military during the first half of the twentieth century is seen in
specific examples as this research focuses on Southern Methodist University (SMU) and
Baylor University archival documents to provide insight into programs such as the Students’
Army Training Corps (SATC) of WWI and the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP)
during WWII.
Use of Multiple Types of Archival Sources in this Research
Researching archives from universities involved in the expansion of military training
and education provided a unique perspective as to the changes affecting the military and
higher education. Occurring after the passing of the G.I. Bill, an example of the military/
civilian continued partnerships is the 1947 establishment of the University of Maryland’s
College of Special and Continuation Studies. Considering the legacy of the military and
veteran programs, research shows how the organization transformed several times over the
years, with more than a million servicemembers completing college courses with the
organization while pursuing a post-secondary education.19 Understanding how organizations
such as the University of Maryland’s College of Special and Continuation Studies were part
of the military education and training transformation increases the historical understanding of
both organizations. Insight on the influence of the US military on literacy, training, and
education leading to almost 6 million WWII veterans using the G.I. Bill expands the
knowledge of historical changes that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century.

19

Sharon Hudgins, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The First Sixty Years 1947-2007 (Adelphi, MD: University
of Maryland University College. 2008).
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This research gathered primary sources and developed a connection between assorted
topics. It examined military archival records, educational statistics, census records, university
archives, letters to military agencies and congressional leaders, and congressional records.
The research discovered the legacy of the transformation while identifying future areas of
research. To gain insight, an examination of the scholarly research on the topic of the G.I.
Bill, servicemember and veteran programs, and military transformation generated insight as
to the influence of the American military on post-secondary education during the first half of
the twentieth century. This research examined the transformation of military and veteran
programs in a way that demonstrates the connections to post-secondary education by
explaining why technology, the rise of reform-minded leaders, and large military operations
were all needed to generate change within both the military and American higher education.
Historical Sources
Examining the major historical monographs surrounding the major topics of this
research provides insight into the schools of thought as well as the changing perspectives
over time. Historians Alan Millet, Peter Maslowski, and William Feis provided an
overarching understanding of the US military from precolonial times through the global war
on terror.20 They explained organizational structure and critical changes in For the Common
Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012. They explained the
connection between civil and military personnel and the military’s increasing adoption of
sophisticated technologies over time. Taking a similar approach but focusing on doctrine,
Walter Kretchik’s U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror

20

Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History
of the United States from 1607-2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012).
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puts the US Army doctrine in a historical perspective, allowing the reader to understand how
congressional action influenced the military doctrine, organizational structure, and
developmental programs.21
A focus on the education of American military diplomats is found in the work of
historian and expert on American diplomacy Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy: The
Twentieth Century. While the work is not specifically focused on military educational and
training programs, the author provides a unique perspective on the diplomatic efforts of
military leaders. The work of scholars in other disciplines, such as government experts John
Masland and Lawrence Radway’s Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National
Policy, provides a framework to understand the evolution of military education and
development of senior and joint service colleges. They argue that the role of the military
officer transformed as a result of the adoption of technologies during the first half of the
twentith century.
Historians provide insight into how American industrialism shifted from an agrarian
to an industrial economy. American historian and prolific writer of US history H.W. Brands
provided an excellent example of economic changes in his work, American Colossus: The
Triumph of Capitalism, 1865-1900. Connecting the transformational changes during the
Industrial Revolution to the military organizational structure by focusing on the civilian
workforce provided insight into the early twentieth century training and educational changes.
Examining the work of scholars allows specific events to demonstrate the need for
change. For example, in March 1916, Pancho Villa and his forces conducted a raid on the
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town of Columbus, New Mexico. E. Bruce White, in his article The Waters of Columbus,
New Mexico, described the raid, but also put the event into historical perspective. White
highlighted how Villa’s raid showed Americans the unpreparedness of the US military for
large military operations.22 Regardless of viewpoint on the success or failure of the military
on the Columbus raid, understanding the influence of Villa’s raid and other events on the
military is critical in uncovering the factors that influenced education and training changes
during the first half of the twentieth century.
James W. Hurst, in his book Pancho Villa and Blackjack Pershing: The Punitive
Expedition in Mexico, provided the reader details of how the US Army had one foot in the
nineteenth and the other in the twentieth century. Hurst provided a perspective of the US
military being ill-prepared to assemble vehicles for operation and lacking the tools to install
truck bodies onto chassis.23 Agreeing with Hurst on some points, military historian Julie
Prieto, in The Mexican Expedition 1916-1917, provided another point of view. She argued
the Punitive Expedition might be considered a failure, but the military operations also created
conditions in which the environment tested soldiers and equipment, preparing the US
military for successful operations during WWI.24 Connecting this published historiography to
new evidence generated a unique approach to viewing these events and showed how the
convergence of technology, reform, and large military operations created the need for a
partnership between the Army and educational institutions.
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Effect of Military Literacy and the G.I. Bill on American Life
Not only did the military begin to change because of the Punitive Expedition
campaign into Mexico, but American businesses did as well. This research investigated the
effects of the campaign on American industry as the US military continued to adopt
motorized and aerial transport as part of its technical revolution. Connecting the military
campaign to the discussions in American society, as well as in Congress, showed the
transformation within the military between 1916 and 1917 while providing insight into the
need for literate and educated servicemembers, thus creating demand for developmental
programs. Since the US military first used airplanes during a campaign by deploying the First
Aero Squadron as part of the Punitive Expedition, events such as these provide first-hand
evidence as to the changing conditions, along with insight into what was to come during the
world wars.
During the nineteenth century, much of what servicemembers learned was simply
through their first-hand experiences on the job and drill. While not all development occurred
on the job, and the United States Military Academy at West Point developed some officers
during its four-year initial education, historians and scholars Harold Clark and Harold
Sloan’s Classrooms in the Military: An Account of Education in the Armed Forces of the
United States discussed influences on the military from both internal and external changes
and highlighted that the military developed programs and partnerships in the twentieth
century that addressed these changes while influencing American society.25 Much of this
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change was influenced by a literacy problem in America and the Army’s needs relating to
technology, manpower, and reform.
A key contributor to the development, coordination, and supervision of the Army
literacy program during World War II, Samuel Goldberg provided a unique perspective on
how the military sought to deal with the problem of literacy in his 1951 work, Army Training
of Illiterates in World War II.26 He explained the challenges between manpower needs and
literacy as well as the successes and failures of the Army’s efforts. While his document was
written after the program ended, it provided insight into early documentation and
interpretation of the Army’s literacy effort. In a more recent article, scholars from the
educational field John Persyn and Cheryl Polson described the need for soldiers during WWI
to be literate in order to be effective in their military service.27 The demand for literacy
resulted from the explosion in technological advancements that the US Army adopted during
the Punitive Expedition, expanded during WWI, and continued during WWII and beyond.28
Focusing on literacy, Harvard University professor and literacy skills expert Thomas
Sticht offered a useful perspective on the military’s investment in his The Rise of the Adult
Education and Literacy System in the United States: 1600-2000. Sticht provided a historical
perspective from the colonial and early national periods, where the military infrequently
attempted to increase literacy and training for servicemembers in certain fields.29 More
important is his focus on the US Army-sponsored development of the first widespread
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standardized literacy testing, which highlighted the effect these programs had on
servicemembers during and after their military service. To investigate the transformation of
training and education programs in the military, considering the progressive agenda within
literacy movements provided some insight into how societal and political leaders in the
United States came to support the post-WWII G.I. Bill.
Several books and articles in the literature on the G.I. Bill add scholarly perspectives
on the mainstream schools of thought on the topic. Historian Keith Olson, in The G.I. Bill,
the Veterans, and the Colleges as well as his article, “The G.I. Bill and Higher Education:
Success in Surprise,” explained how the G.I. Bill generated an unforeseen demand resulting
in more than two million veterans entering higher education programs after World War II.30
These numbers were much higher than institutions of higher education could accommodate.
From another viewpoint, scholars have provided insight into how the US economy played a
part in the adoption of the G.I. Bill program. The 1929 stock market crash and large number
of WWI veterans out of work led to a political fiasco with the Bonus Army incident,
discussed in detail in Chapter Four. Authors such as historians Suzanne Mettler and Stephen
Ortiz addressed the influence of the G.I. Bill on the American economy and politics and
provided insight into how several factors influenced decision-making regarding the passage
of the legislation in 1944.
Ortiz focused more on veteran politics in the twentieth century in his work, Beyond
the Bonus March and GI Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era, compared to
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the work of Olson. In recent scholarship, historical analysis of the G.I. Bill helps to connect
the transformation of American society based on connections drawn from WWI and the
inadequate preparation of the US military. Ortiz draws a connection between the difficulties
that veterans faced returning from WWI and the investment politicians and other groups were
willing to make in the passage of the post-WWII G.I. Bill. These insights provided
connections that ultimately helped to focus the research. Examining opposing perspectives
led to a critical examination of the events and added depth to the research. Mettler provided
alternative views in some areas as she argued in her book, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill
and the Making of the Greatest Generation, that the successful difference the government
made in the lives of these citizens increased their desire for involvement in the American
democratic process.32 Her research demonstrated the diversity of G.I. Bill beneficiaries,
including civil rights advocates such as Medgar Evers, actors such as Clint Eastwood,
political leaders such as President George H. W. Bush, and Chief Justice of the US Supreme
Court William Rehnquist.
American historians Glenn Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin provided an in-depth
account of the G.I. Bill and its impact on Americans. In GI Bill: The New Deal for Veterans,
the authors focused on the political partnerships to explain the decision-making of key
stakeholders in passing the legislation. The authors also highlighted the challenges that
veterans faced and the benefits they found as they pursued their educational endeavors using
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the G.I. Bill funding. These historians provided an in-depth analysis of the impact of the G.I.
Bill on post-secondary educational institutions.
Political historian Kathleen Frydl provided a historical perspective in The G.I. Bill by
situating the topic amongst the debates regarding social policy, citizenship, and political
legitimacy. She examined historical events that led to the G.I. Bill, explained the challenges
that veterans of all colors faced when navigating its bureaucracy, and argued that many
claims about the benefits of the G.I. Bill should be re-examined with a skeptical eye. Her
work aligns with many of the more recently published historical works that diverge from
standard themes surrounding the topic.
Another divergent view is from historian and Bancroft prize recipient Lizabeth
Cohen. She traced the American transformation from the Great Depression to a mass
consumption society in A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in
Postwar America. She argued that the G.I. Bill contributed to America’s return to pre-war
gender roles and the expansion of consumer culture after WWII.33 Cohen presented evidence
to support this claim, such as how the 1944 G.I. Bill resulted in an explosion of new home
construction, with 25 percent of homes in America in 1960 being built during the 1950s. She
also highlighted the fact that women had limited social and economic power and men’s
ability to purchase homes influenced their credit in a way that was not open to women.
Cohen’s work aligned with that of other historians such as Ira Katznelson and Margot
Canaday.
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Katznelson is an American political scientist and historian with a focus in his research
on liberalism, inequality, and society in the United States. In When Affirmative Action was
White, Katznelson argued that the G.I. Bill increased disadvantages for minorities in
America.34 Katznelson highlighted the social programs established by the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations that transformed America. In his work, he acknowledged that both
White and Black Americans benefited from these programs but presented the argument that
decision-making led to informal exclusion of racial minorities through the use of
decentralized administration of programs. With more than three quarters of Blacks living in
the South and working in domestic service or agricultural jobs, the informal exclusions for
home loans to be guaranteed, college admissions to be approved, and even the receipt of
Social Security benefits were all hamstrung for Blacks in the South. While his work was not
focused entirely on veteran’s benefits, it demonstrated how scholars currently examine public
policy using a historical lens to advance affirmative action today. The author concluded by
offering his own resolutions of how America might compensate those previously excluded.
A similar theme is found in the work of historian Margot Canaday. Her research
focuses on gender and sexuality in modern America. In Building a Straight State: Sexuality
and Social Citizenship under the 1944 G.I. Bill, she argued that the literature fails to
acknowledge that the program included built-in exclusions such as the denial of G.I. Bill
benefits to discharged lesbians and gays.35 Works such as this demonstrate the complexity of
creating a program that affected more than 16 million veterans. These views diverge from the
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more traditional view on the G.I. Bill, such as that provided by Michael J. Bennett in When
Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America.36
Organization of the Remainder of the Study
Understanding the historiography is an excellent starting point from which to discuss
the topics for each chapter in this study. Chapter Two focuses on the structure of the US
military and its development of servicemembers prior to 1916. The chapter examines the
catalysts for education and training changes and how technology changed and should have
played a part in the transformation of the US military’s organizational structure, but due to
the lack of reformers, change was both difficult and rare. The chapter introduces reformminded leaders such as Emory Upton, Arthur Wagner, and Elihu Root. The topic of
professionalization of the Army is introduced and draws a connection to the need for officer
education beyond attendance at the United States Military Academy. The background on
education with the establishment of the Army War College, ROTC, and the Citizens’
Military Training Camps sets the stage for the changes after 1915. Here the focus lays the
foundation for understanding the technological changes occurring in American society,
introduces the influence of the progressive movement, and explains the changes between the
nineteenth- and twentieth-century US military.
Chapter Three focuses on the events just prior to the Punitive Expedition and
continues through WWI. The focus of this chapter is on developing connections to the
changes introduced in the previous chapter, and how these changes further developed as the
changes in technology, labor needs, and reforms affected the US military as well as
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American private industry. A review of the literature related to the G.I. Bill and other
military educational programs during the first half of the twentieth century reveals the
influence of the G.I. Bill as one of the largest and most significant educational programs of
the century. Connections between the US military’s transformation resulting from its leaders
adopting technology and the programs investing in servicemembers begins to form
significantly throughout this chapter. The evidence in Chapter Three presents a compelling
argument that there was already a need for change in the training and education within the
United States and its military. The technological transformations created the need to assess
literacy, education, and technical competence within the US military decades before entering
WWII. This examination of the events of the US military prior to WWI shows that America
dispatched unprepared forces as part of the Punitive Expedition and examines the resulting
lessons learned.
With the United States entering WWI in 1917, the story focuses on the attitudes of
investing in the military and servicemember programs by Americans and lawmakers. Chapter
Three provides a focus on the role of literacy needs, the Army’s need for specially trained
technicians, and the changes these demands imposed on military training and educational
programs. Understanding the use of newly adopted technology during the Punitive
Expedition provides further development on the effect of technological changes on military
programs and the need for literacy and educated specialists during WWI.
The research examines the need for educated recruits during the war and shows how
leaders identified and addressed servicemembers’ literacy as well as critical technical skills.
The research also acknowledges that prior to WWI, the Army created courses to educate and
train military personnel when needed. However, several sources indicate that training and
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education was neither standardized nor universal. Building on the work of scholars and
connecting new primary resources from this research demonstrates how the US military’s
literacy needs eventually affected American society in a much larger way.
Not only did the Army focus on literacy and the need for manpower for front-line
troops, but it also focused on the higher-level skills for technical experts to maintain new
equipment and conduct duties in medicine, engineering, and other fields. The need to focus
on these already educated potential recruits resulted in the creation of the SATC. This
partnership between the Army and colleges and universities across America not only
benefited the military as it sought to fill positions with technical experts, but it also helped to
fill the gap for post-secondary institutions, which saw a significant loss of revenue due to
reduced student enrollments as American men enlisted to fight in the war. To examine the
positive influence of the SATC program, this research focused on the archives at SMU.
Examining the student throughput, the financial aspects, and the benefit to the Army provides
insight into the partnerships and impact the Army had on post-secondary education during
WWI.
Providing educational aid to veterans through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of
1944 may have seemed innovative, but it was simply a continuation of the American culture
of taking care of veterans. For example, during WWI, the US Congress created a system of
veterans’ benefits that also included vocational rehabilitation for the disabled.37 By 1944, the
G.I. Bill went much further in providing benefits. In addition to providing home loans and
establishing medical facilities, the early form of the WWII G.I. Bill allowed veterans to apply
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for a $500 stipend per semester to attend accredited training or educational programs. This
research further develops the connections between the post-WWII benefits and previous
partnerships between the Army and post-secondary education that provided benefits to
servicemembers and veterans.
The period after WWI and into WWII is covered in Chapter Four. The chapter
focuses on continued military transformation and investigates whether the actions by US
leaders during WWI are connected to the decision-making on training and educational
programs for veterans during the interwar period and beyond. The focus in this chapter
begins with the demobilization efforts and the postwar benefits veterans received after WWI.
Several policy changes in legislation occurred after the war, such as the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1918, ensuring that veterans wounded during the war could be provided
an opportunity to retrain so they might be productive members of society in the workforce.
Also provided to veterans was the War Risk Insurance. This additional piece of legislation
was an expansion on the vocational and rehabilitative training for veterans with permanent
disabilities and also provided life insurance. Another key change that happened was the
establishment of the American Legion. This organization fought for the compensation
provided the WWI veterans and had a significant impact on legislation including the World
War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924, which promised WWI veterans interest on money
invested in 1925 from which they would gain a benefit some twenty years later. This
eventually resulted in a problem for politicians with the Bonus Army incident.
Continuing with the theme of literacy, Chapter Four builds on the Army’s advances to
identify literacy and create mitigations during WWII. Many historians have described the
problem of literacy throughout history, but few have connected the transformation of the US
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military and American literacy programs in depth. While literacy in America may have been
a minor problem for the military during the nineteenth century, it was addressed by educating
officers at the United States Military Academy at West Point and other military-focused
institutions of higher education. The problem of educating the military became evident as
technology advanced. The use of trucks and aircraft was introduced into military operations
in the 1910s, and the ability to read technical manuals to service and maintain new equipment
created conditions where it was no longer acceptable for enlisted soldiers to simply follow
orders and shoot, which they learned from drill; soldiers now required additional education
and training. WWI introduced the need for a more technologically savvy force, leading the
US military to develop programs to address these demands. This chapter connects the US
Army’s 1918 intelligence-testing program to the WWII efforts.
Chapter Four also provides an analysis of the peacetime draft and its impact on Army
preparedness. Finally, the chapter also provides insight into the other end of the spectrum
with a focus on educating technical specialists with the establishment of the ASTP.38 To
understand this program, the research examines Baylor University and the financial impact,
student load, and benefit to the Army. The research on the ASTP also examines the
disagreements amongst Army leaders on whether the program enhanced its war fighting
capabilities.
Chapter Five examines the contributing factors leading to the US Congress passing
the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944. Several books and articles in the literature on
the G.I. Bill add scholarly perspectives explaining the challenges faced by those who
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supported the G.I. Bill. In this chapter, this research examines the influence of the Army’s
partnership with higher education as the USAFI was established, how the Institute assisted in
educational development, and the long-term impact of the USAFI.39
To date, few studies have focused on combining the significant contributions of
multiple US military and veteran educational programs in America. None trace the journey of
the military and veteran program changes and connect them to the evolution that led to the
G.I. Bill. Included in this chapter are continuing details of the partnerships between the US
military and American post-secondary educational institutions. While millions of veterans
took advantage of the G.I. Bill, another significant connection is the influence of university
satellite campuses on the US military and local communities. At the end of WWII, there were
numerous military installations across the world. Those military installations influenced and
increased accessibility to education for members of the US military. The expansion of access
to higher education did not stop at the gate of the military camp, post, or station.
After WWII, the substantial number of veterans who began attending universities
across America created conditions in which university and college administrators expanded
their campuses to nearby cities where housing was available and classroom space could be
acquired. As time went on, the next phase of the expansion led to universities establishing
satellite campuses on military camps, posts, and stations. Not only were these established in
the continental United States, but the University of Maryland established a presence in the
European and Asian military theaters of operation as early as the late 1940s.
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Also included in Chapter Five are the details of the ACE and USAFI partnerships,
goals of the educational initiatives, and how these efforts led to successful programs such as
the GED.40 To better understand how the US military developed programs such as these, and
their impact on American society, the chapter explains the factors influencing the
establishment of USAFI, its impact on servicemembers during WWII, and the organizations
created as a result of its influence.
Chapter Six uses the topics to summarize the major takeaways of the research. This
research reveals changes in academics and military investment and increases the
understanding of how past military programs transformed attitudes towards training and
education in America and led to significant changes in achievement such as the passing of
the G.I. Bill. The closing chapter ends by discussing the benefit to future decision-making
towards investment in military educational programs and how this research might better
inform decision-makers of the long-term strategic benefits to American society of
partnerships between the military and educational institutions and thereby foster positive
support from educators, the American public, and legislators for similar programs in the
future.
This chapter leads to an opportunity for further inquiry by researching the effect of
satellite campuses on educational institutions, faculty, and citizens from the local community.
Evidence may show secondary influences of the transformation of the military educational
programs. Data must be gathered from university archives and government records to
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understand the number of military personnel, veterans, and community students who
attended courses at the satellite campuses. Also, identifying whether full-time faculty
provided instruction or whether administrators hired adjunct faculty to fulfill the need may
illuminate how the demand for face-to-face courses taught on military installations in
America may have led to a different hiring model for college and university faculty.
Researching information on satellite campuses may demonstrate the connection between
early programs and the continued evolution of training and education of both US military
servicemembers and veterans.
Although acknowledging that the G.I. Bill was one of the most significant pieces of
legislation passed in the twentieth century, published literature fails to draw the connections
between the G.I. Bill and other programs. Factors such as the transformation of the US
military as it adopted trucks and aircraft during the Punitive Expedition, the WWI efforts to
identify and address literacy problems, the US military establishment of the USAFI, as well
as the expansion of educational opportunities for military personnel worldwide collectively
provide evidence to understand the historical changes. Developing connections to generate
understanding of how technological changes affected the military in early twentieth century,
the influence of these changes on military programs, and how these changes affected
American society produced insight into how the military and veteran programs affected
servicemembers, veterans, communities, educational institutions, and the American mindset
towards the need for higher education.
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CHAPTER TWO: ARMY STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF
SERVICEMEMBERS PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I
Throughout its first hundred years, the US Army relied on a small standing force of
units led by officers trained at the United States Military Academy. In times of war, the
Army could expand and provide commissions to educated men to serve as officers and lead
formations of fighting men regardless of literacy. Officers trained at West Point learned the
technical aspects of engineering as well as tactical-level operations. On occasion, the Army
had small post schools, but most soldiers saw them providing few long-term benefits, and
officers considered they knew best what training their men needed. The Army relied on men
from an agrarian society and was slow to adopt technology even during the American Civil
War. The success the US Army achieved during the Mexican-American War ultimately
influenced Army leaders, entrenching them into the mindset they need not change training or
education, regardless of changing technology. During the American Civil War, reformminded leaders such as Emory Upton sought to influence the “old guard” to change tactical
operations, but even his successful demonstrations of new tactics at Spotsylvania produced
limited support for change. After the war, influential reform-minded leaders such as Arthur
Wagner continued the campaign for change in the Army’s training and development. It was
not until the turn of the twentieth century that other reformers such as Elihu Root, Secretary
of War, rose to power and began supporting reforms which influenced the education of Army
officers and paved the way for future partnerships between educators and the military. Root
championed the creation of a continuation of officer educational opportunities for Army
senior leaders with the creation of the Army War College in 1903. This effort combined with
ideas from reformers such as Leonard Wood and Arthur Wagner, were the start of significant
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change in Army education and training as well as partnerships with post-secondary
educational institutions across America.
Introduction of Military Training Camps
Building on the successes of other reformers, in 1913, Army Chief of Staff Major
General Leonard Wood introduced the idea of hosting summer camps to train men attending
college and universities on military skills. This was the first significant partnership between
post-secondary educational institutions and the American military. Wood identified the need
for leaders to be trained in military knowledge and skills in preparation for a national
emergency. He considered the camps a way to eliminate a risk should America need to raise
a large army quickly. While the American land-grant colleges were required to provide
military tactics training, these lacked uniformity and rigor, which Wood proposed could be
mitigated with the development of the student camps.
As a result of Wood’s efforts, these military training camps opened the door for
expansion into training men in support of national defense. The camps led to future
partnerships between post-secondary education and the American military, and the
formalization of the Citizens’ Military Training Camps program influenced the National
Defense Act of 1916 and the establishment of the ROTC program. While these efforts
showed progress, significant change amongst the training and educational programs where
the military partnered with post-secondary education did not occur during the American Civil
War or the postwar period. It was not until the adoption of technology, increased influence of
reform-minded leaders, and large military operations demanding significant manpower
combined to bring about changes in training and education for servicemembers.
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The Need for Engineers
The engineering impact on the American West by the US Army began in 1802 with
the establishment of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. Until its
creation, the Army did not have an engineering school in America to train its officers.
Creating the school was but one of the many changes that enabled the US military to
influence education and training in America. During the ninetieth and twentieth centuries,
Army engineers had a significant impact on the design and construction of many key
American projects in the West. Additionally, they created many projects in the eastern
American states such as the Brooklyn Navy Yard dry-docks and, later, international projects
such as the Panama Canal.41 During the nation’s expansion, the Army spent much of its time
building roads and making travel in the frontier possible.
During the nineteenth century, changing technologies led to an expanding need for
technical knowledge within the US military. During the American westward expansion era,
providing a secure environment through the use of military forts and patrols required soldiers
to be trained in more than just war fighting. The building of roads by the Army was
financially sound for America; “the soldiers were working on roads and fortifications at five
dollars a month, doing work that would cost thirty dollars a month if done by anyone else,”
and the roads allowed for not only military use, but civilian expansion to the West at a faster
rate.42 The military trained some officers in the technical aspects of roadbuilding, but the
soldiers were generally seen as laborers or simply carrying out the orders of the officers. The
national importance of roads and canals caused much controversy between the military and
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the federal government in the 1820s. The economic and political importance of westward
expansion increased the need for the completion of roads and canals, resulting in pressure
being applied on military leaders to complete the projects quickly. For the Army in the West,
the problem was that “the erection of forts and the construction of military roads were tasks
of indefinite duration.”43 Without a focus on fighting, or the development of post-service
skills, soldiers generally saw the military as providing few long-term benefits for them
personally.
The economic impact of the Army on the West was, however, significant. Small
towns without a source of outside money or trade would not have survived without the
Army’s influence. To the contrary, “army posts offered economic opportunity, often making
the difference between a stagnant local economy and a prosperous one.”44 The building of
forts, camps, and posts infused money into the local economy from soldiers’ salaries as well
as from the quartermaster, who purchased food and supplies for the Army. In 1855, there
were seventy-four posts listed throughout the United States, and each needed supplies to
survive and build.45 The Army required food, cattle, munitions, and other items to sustain the
men. During the winter months, the need for supplies was even more important.
The building, designing, and economic growth the army brought to the West was an
important part of the settlements and westward expansion. Without the input of outside
capital to encourage economic growth, many of these small and remote communities would
not have grown. One of the towns that started small and grew as a result of the Army was
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Fort Worth, Texas. The US Army established a military outpost along the Trinity River to
protect American interests at the end of the Mexican-American War. The Army established
the fort in 1849 and named it after the former commander of the Texas Army, General
William Jenkins Worth, who died that same year. The development of the West and
placement of the West Point-trained army engineers contributed significantly to settling the
West during the early years. The expansion westward required officer training and education,
but little beyond the West Point education was provided. Most of the development for Army
officers, and almost all enlisted development, occurred as on-the-job training. While
technology affected the Army during its first one hundred years, efforts by leaders to make
significant changes were met with resistance.
At times, training and education in the US military moved along at a pace similar to
society’s technological advancements, but this was not always the case. Although scientific
research brought about advancements in the rifle, these changes did not occur immediately
within the US military. During the American Civil War, the US military units still used the
single shot smoothbore musket. While rifled muskets had been around since the American
Revolution, the fact that the Army did not adopt these more advanced weapons during the
American Civil War related both to cost and to the time it took to reload rifled muskets. It
was not until the technological innovation by Claude Minie with the Minie ball that change
came to the Army’s rifles. The Minie ball enabled the US military to adopt more advanced
weaponry, and warfare became more deadly. These increased casualties should have
influenced changes in tactics and training. Looking at the Mexican-American War and the
American Civil War provides perspective on the need for change as well as examples of
change agents such as Emory Upton.
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Of course, changes that should have come rather quickly still took some time.
Consider how units were trained during the American Civil War: Army units lined up in
formation and mass fires were used against the enemy. When using the conical projectile, the
range and accuracy of the rifles increased. In today’s military, this technological adoption
would require a change in tactics, but during the American Civil War there was significant
resistance from military leaders who wanted to continue to use the same approach as they did
during the Mexican-American War, even though the longer range of the rifles increased
casualties. Another problem created as a result of the longer range of the rifle was that it
made the artillery susceptible to rifle fire. During the Mexican-American War, this was not
the case. Understanding the need for military change correlates to the need to also train
soldiers before, during, and after service. To frame the situation, an examination of the
historical drivers of change is needed.
Nineteenth Century Drivers of Change
During the Mexican-American War, the use of mobile artillery to blast a hole in the
enemy’s lines enabled the attacker to have the advantage. Using rifled muskets with conicalshaped projectiles increased the range and therefore allowed the advantage to go to the
defender during the American Civil War. It was much more difficult to rout an enemy from a
dug-in defensive position during the Mexican-American War. The American success during
the Mexican-American War may have taught the wrong lessons. During the American Civil
War, limited change occurred in doctrine. Training was simply focused on drilling soldiers to
ensure that they would have muscle memory during the fight. From the perspective of line
officers, there was little need for educated troops or higher education for officers. This
mindset hampered any potential changes proposed by reform-minded leaders.

37
The years of the American Civil War are a time that many Americans still debate
today. One subject lacking significant analysis is the unchanging tactics of warfighting
through the lens of the significant technological changes that occurred both after the
Mexican-American War and during the American Civil War. Understanding how tactics
followed General Winfield Scott’s model during the Mexican-American War can help
explain the lack of advancement in tactics during the American Civil War. After the
Mexican-American War, officers such as William J. Hardee and Silas Casey published
approved manuals that sought to make doctrinal changes to how the US military fought, but
these changes were simplistic, resulting in well-known leaders such as General Ulysses S.
Grant discounting their usefulness.46 Eventually, as the American Civil War began and
progressed, leaders only minimally adapted their tactics in an effort to try to reduce the
number of casualties. One strategic thinker and tactician, Emory Upton, had a desire to
address the increased number of casualties that fighting produced because of the
technological changes that had occurred in the mid-nineteenth century.
Ultimately, Upton’s demonstrated success at the Muleshoe during the Battle of
Spotsylvania was not enough to influence the American army generals to change tactics.
While it seems that commanders who failed to adopt Upton’s policies during war did so
because these tactics were not validated concepts, and therefore not doctrine, it is also
possible that change failed to be adopted because of ignorance, fear, or a lack of
understanding. Regardless of the answer, the military culture was not open to changes in its
doctrine during the American Civil War. It was not until after the American Civil War that
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leaders responded to the proposed changes of tactical manuals by Emory Upton. Had the
Union Army leaders considered doctrinal changes during the American Civil War, it is
possible they would have been more effective on the battlefield against the Confederates
earlier in the war. The analysis and potential changes in doctrine may have influenced how
troops were trained and educated and allowed for an earlier partnership between postsecondary education and the US Army. An examination of the doctrine and tactics between
the Mexican-American War and the end of the Civil War further illuminates the situation.
Changes in Doctrine and Tactics
Analyzing the failure to change tactics during the American Civil War generates
insight into the Army’s lack of a growth mindset and military leaders’ failure to generate a
vision to train soldiers for the arrival of future technological changes. The situation had
changing technology and large-scale military operations but lacked reform-minded leaders in
positions of authority. Prior to the American Civil War, the US military engaged in a major
conflict known as the Mexican-American War from April 1846 to February 1848. During
this war, Army leaders utilized tactics based on General Winfield Scott’s Infantry Tactics or
Rules of the Exercise of Maneuvers of the United States Infantry, published in 1835.48 The
Mexican-American War was a one-sided victory and the US Army won every major battle.49
General Winfield Scott and other military leaders, such as Doniphan and Kearny,
demonstrated the use of Scott’s military tactics in a way that impressed on the Army that its
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current approach was the way to fight wars. Some other more famous US Army leaders such
as Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee learned their tradecraft during this war. The Army’s
experiences using “Scott’s Tactics” failed to change in order to mitigate the advances in
technology between the Mexican-American and American Civil War. This failure to adapt
brought about enormous casualties on both sides during the Civil War.
William Hardee updated Scott’s 1835 tactics in 1855; however, at the outbreak of the
American Civil War, Hardee sided with the Confederacy.50 This created an opportunity to
change tactics or at least rewrite the tactical manuals for the US Army. Unfortunately, a new
publication, “Casey’s Tactics,” created by Silas Casey, was simply Scott’s tactical approach
with a new author and name, which ensured the Union Army would not be using a tactical
manual published by a now rebel leader.51 The problem with both “Hardee’s Tactics” and
“Casey’s Tactics” is that each publication failed to address the problems of technological
advancements, how these advancements increased the lethality of soldiers, and changes
needed in military tactics; the Union Army failed to take advantage of changing doctrine
even when publishing a new manual. The need to change how the Army was organized and
trained became evident, but the leaders were not willing to make many of the proposed
changes. Significant changes to how the Army trained and educated officers and soldiers
were not yet a priority for Army leaders.
During the Civil War, the advantages of using the longer range and accuracy of the
rifled musket, and later the Sharps and Henry rifles, became a problem that neither the
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Confederate nor Union military leaders were able to counter with current tactics. The
question remains whether military leaders understood the need to counter this type of
technology, or whether commanders simply chose to continue to conduct warfare in a
manner with which they were familiar. These technological advancements, including the
Minie Ball, enabled soldiers to take advantage of the rifled barrels that had been available
since the Revolutionary War but still maintain the same rate of fire that the smooth bore
musket offered.52 Other technological advances occurred in the interwar period. The
advancements in railroads, steamships, and the telegraph all brought about increasing
opportunities for lethality as leaders practiced the art of maneuver. However, it was the
advancements in weaponry that provided a significant challenge for commanders; the range
and accuracy of the rifled musket mandated a change in the behavior of organizational units
and commander’s tactics.
One change that did occur between Scott’s 1835 manual and the American Civil War
tactical manual by General Casey was the rate of march. Scott’s manual mandated a rate of
eighty-four yards a minute. Future tactical manuals, in an attempt to compensate for the
increased accuracy and range of weaponry, mandated 154 yards a minute.53 While this does
seem to address the problem of increased lethality, it fails to make any significant tactical
changes such as those Emory Upton proposed and employed during the Spotsylvania
Courthouse attack by Union forces.54
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There was one additional change between Hardee’s tactical manual and Casey’s
tactical manual that may be considered an approach to dealing with the technological
advancements and their lethality: while Hardee formed the brigade “in-line,” Casey’s
approach was a brigade in depth.55 This change was not enough to transform the Army, yet.
Even Grant commented in his memoirs that Hardee’s tactics were simply the French doctrine
translated into English.56 Casey’s approach was not a significant change to military doctrine;
it simply led the Union to form in a different manner but ultimately receive similar casualties.
The Union generals should have appreciated the obvious need for military doctrinal change,
but it took a leader like Emory Upton to propose significant tactical changes to gain the
advantage over the enemy. The problem seems to lie in the fact that the officers at the time
failed to accept the proposal of this young military mind, either due to their lack of
knowledge or because of their being stuck in one way of thinking. To change the mind of the
collective Army leadership would take significant support and effort. The technological
changes and massive casualties of the war were not enough to motivate educational or
training changes, reform minded leaders had to influence the situation as well.
Emory Upton’s Influence on Doctrine and Tactical Changes
Not every Army officer was stuck in the past; there were some up and coming leaders
with ideas to change the way the Army applied the principles of war. Born in 1839, Emory
Upton grew up on a farm in New York. Upton was a smart and disciplined young man who
spent his first two years in post-secondary education studying under Charles G. Finney, the
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famed evangelist, at Oberlin College in Ohio. At 17 years of age, Upton entered West Point
as a cadet in 1856.57 During Upton’s time as a cadet, his correspondence to his sister and
others demonstrated his increased faith in God, along with his thoughts for the future and
how he might live a worthy life. These had obvious influences on Upton as he departed West
Point a commissioned officer in the US Army.
Historian Mark Grimsley described Upton: “Just twenty-four years old and three
years out of West Point, Upton regarded the profession of arms as a Jesuit did the mission
field.”58 While at West Point, Upton spent much of his time analyzing potential methods of
defeating the enemy. He created his own tactics, which proved to be successful at the
Rappahannock River, and later at the battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse. Upton’s efforts were
not only academic with regard to tactics; he was also a distinguished leader of military units,
influencing the success of battle at Spotsylvania, Fredericksburg, Charlottesville, and
Sharpsburg, just to name a few.59 By May 1864, Upton had seen his share of tactical failures,
and his demonstration of how “numbers prevail” at Spotsylvania failed to significantly
change the attitudes of military leaders of the time.60 The lessons Upton learned on the
battlefield seemed disconnected from the theories he studied at West Point. Even prior to
“the Civil War and Upton’s emergence as a military thinker, the Army’s leadership was not
looking realistically at how to fight an American war.”61 Even though Upton was an
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influential officer among a small group of Army reformers, his ability to influence change on
Army doctrine only occurred after the American Civil War ended.62 The lack of higher
education amongst military officers may have been a roadblock to adopting change during
the war, and the desire to forget the conflict may have influenced the lack of changes
immediately thereafter.
During the American Civil War, Upton had the opportunity to demonstrate how his
tactics could be successful at the Rappahannock station in Virginia six months prior to the
assault on the “Muleshoe” by Union forces during the battle at Spotsylvania Courthouse.63
This provided Upton the confidence to apply his new tactics in Spotsylvania. The conditions
were superb for Upton’s tactics at the Muleshoe. He concealed his forces in a pine forest,
there were few Confederate pickets, and the open ground they had to cover was only a few
hundred yards.64 Historian Brooks Simpson explained the situation and why Upton led the
assault. Since Upton had “experimented with various offensive tactics designed to punch a
hole through Confederate defenses,” he was placed in charge of the attack column and gave
specific instructions to ensure that no Union forces would fire on the Confederates, but have
bayonets fixed to assault their defenses without stopping.65 The change did open a hole in the
Confederate line, but it was not the success needed to convince Army leaders of his
recommended changes in tactical doctrine. While Upton’s plan may have been sound, it
relied on other military leaders and their support for the plan to be successful. General Mott
deserves some credit for the failure, since he did not provide support to Upton during the
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charge. Others influenced Upton’s efforts, such as General Wright, the VI Corps
Commander, who also failed to support Upton’s charge and the Union assault effectively.66
For the Army, adopting Upton’s recommended changes would take a while longer. However,
Upton was an important figure as the Army began to face the need to change its training and
doctrine.
The question of why commanders failed to seek out innovative ways to counter the
technological advancements and weaponry, or to attempt to modify their tactics as a way to
reduce casualties, continues to drive the focus towards Emory Upton. While the military
profession can be slow to change, the organizational structure and administration of the
Union Army during the American Civil War were the two most significant barriers to
change.67 Many senior officers in the Union Army during the American Civil War were
political appointees.68 Politics played such a role in the strategy of both armies; as a result, it
seems plausible that politicians would have to approve changing tactics as well.
A contributing factor to the lack of acceptance for change was the organizational
structure of the Army. The field Army, also known as the “line,” was established as a
separate department and each had both command and staff functions operating with their
own budget, tactical units, and the responsibility to train and develop servicemembers
assigned to the department. This approach led to decentralized Army planning, training, and
changes. Fortunately, there were some forward thinkers in positions of authority who
attempted to make change. While Secretary of War John C. Calhoun established the
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Commanding General of the Army position as part of the restructuring after the war of 1812,
this position was simply an advisor to the Secretary of War and did not resolve the Army’s
structure problem. After the change, “Department Commanders” still felt no need to gain
approval for their decisions or actions from the War Department General Staff or the
Commanding General.69 Even with the new commanding general, the structure continued to
favor decentralized operations without centralized planning. Basically, the organizational
structure inhibited success on the battlefield at times, as well as a transformation in the way
tactics, promotions, education, and other critical efforts in the Army could be improved upon.
In 1863, the US War Department published new doctrine approved by the Secretary
of War, called The 1863 US Infantry Tactics.70 The problem was that the organization,
training, and fighting by the US Infantry units based on this new doctrine failed to contain
any significant changes.71 The result of this failure to change was that Grant’s Overland
Campaign in 1864 produced more than 60,000 union casualties.72 This number equaled more
than half the number of Union casualties during the first three years of the war. While
American Civil War historians such as Mark Grimsley suggest that Grant was finally
prosecuting an effective war against the South, it is possible that Grant could have reduced
his casualty numbers by simply modifying the tactics used by the Union Army. By this point
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in the war, the lack of adaptation to training and advanced officer education had devastating
results for both sides.
The end of the American Civil War brought about a notable change in both Emory
Upton’s influence in military policy and updated doctrine for the US Army. Scholars such as
Stephen E. Ambrose have researched and published at length regarding Upton’s success as
the Commandant of Cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point, his travels
throughout Europe and Asia studying armies along the way, and his “Infantry Tactics”
published soon after the end of the American Civil War.73 Upton’s work demonstrated not
only his dedication to the military profession, but his ideas on what he considered the
American way of war. Upton was a young man during the American Civil War, having just
graduated from West Point as the war began. His ideas and knowledge were based on his
wartime experiences. His first-hand experience of military operations allowed Upton to
analyze current military tactics and develop solutions to overcome the stalemate that
produced enormous casualties on each side. After the American Civil War, Upton “wrote the
first definitive description of American military policy,” and examining Upton and his
proposed changes introduces the question of why Union generals failed to adopt his policies
earlier in the war.74 While this question remains unanswered with absolute certainty, military
historians conclude Upton’s tactics may have benefited the Union Army had they adopted
them earlier on in the war. Had a scaffolded set of courses been in place for military officer
education, the results may have been different. The reflection on past conflicts by leaders
such as Upton ultimately led to a change in how the Army educated its leaders.
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The unchanging tactics utilized during the American Civil War failed to take into
account the significant technological changes that occurred between the Mexican-American
War and the American Civil War. The advances in weaponry created increased lethality on
nearly every battlefield. Continuing to utilize dated French tactics or General Winfield
Scott’s Mexican-American War approach did little except create additional casualties for
units who desperately needed doctrinal change. The Union did have at least one open-minded
strategic thinker and tactician in Upton. Had the military culture been willing to change and
seek to validate proposed concepts, the Army may have taken an improved training and
development approach to educating and training servicemembers. As an organization, the
Army may have discovered doctrinal changes that were more effective on the battlefield
against the Confederates earlier in the war.
Innovations in Education after the Civil War
The American Civil War could be considered the beginning of the revolution of the
Army adopting innovative technology and changing the way its units were organized. The
war saw the use of breech-loading Springfield and other brands of rifles, which were much
improved over the smoothbore and even rifled muskets, but the official adoption of the
breech loaders as standard equipment for many of the US Army units did not come until
1873. After the Civil War, weaponry continued to change. By the 1880s, the US Army
adopted Hiram Maxim’s machine gun, which was recoil-operated and replaced the handoperated Gatling gun, increasing the firepower of military units. These advancements in
weaponry did much more than make it easier for soldiers to inflict casualties on the enemy;
they created a need for better trained and educated soldiers and leaders. To address these
needs, the US Army established schools to train men and units in tactics, the use of artillery,
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and even medical treatment. The challenge Army leaders faced was the competing demands
on the available military resources. At times, Army schools opened and closed at the whim of
whoever was in charge or if the need for resources was more pressing in another area of the
Army. This lack of standardization remained a problem with state militias and Army units
well into the twentieth century. Changes to the methods of training and educating
servicemembers needed specific conditions before America would see the benefits a
partnership between the military and higher education could produce.
To improve the capabilities of specific units, the US Army focused on developing
schools to train servicemembers in specialized areas. In the second half of the nineteenth
century, the Army established, shuttered, and reestablished several schools based on the
perceived immediate need. An artillery school was established at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1869,
and by 1881 the infantry and cavalry had established schools of their own in Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. These schools, however, did not focus on developing servicemembers
for the return to the civilian populace. Instead, the schools focused on providing specialized
instruction on how to operate the new tools of warfare. Soldiers and leaders at these schools
studied topics such as the care of men, the use and maintenance of equipment, and
employment concepts related to specialty areas such as the Signal Corps, Engineer Corps,
Medical Corps, and Artillery Corps operations during peace and war. The problem with
advancements in technology became apparent to Army leaders, who realized that training
soldiers on these new inventions, at least at a basic level, was needed. The establishment of
Army schools was the result.
After the American Civil War, a few forward thinkers lobbied for more Army
education than the United States Military Academy or the Leavenworth schools provided.
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General William Tecumseh Sherman thought that military education at West Point provided
a baseline, but he also advocated for what he called a “war college.” Sherman and others
were instrumental in founding the cavalry and infantry schools at Fort Leavenworth as well
as looking at other professional development opportunities for military officers. Sherman was
critical to the establishment of the Military Service Institution in 1878. This society promoted
the idea that military officers should meet regularly to discuss and develop the specialized
knowledge needed to apply the principles of warfare as an art. The Military Service
Institution advocated for officers to publish articles in its journal and for professional
discussions about topics that enhanced military officers’ understanding of warfare.75 The
Army and its senior leaders began the journey towards improving training and education,
which put them on a pathway to significant involvement in adult education in the twentieth
century. However, not everyone embraced modern technology or changes to the military
business processes.
The changes progressive-minded officers and political leaders sought to impose on
the US military faced many challenges from the intransigence of the old guard. These old
Army leaders felt the military processes were good enough for them, and many of them did
not want to upset the apple cart. Another factor that influenced change was the promotion of
Army officers. After the American Civil War, as it had been during other periods of peace,
the Army based promotions on length of service instead of aptitude and performance.
Therefore, there was little motivation for self-development through education or training.
Additionally, relationships between lawmakers and senior military leaders exacerbated the
problem for anyone seeking to make change. While Sherman had advocated for a war college
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and helped to create the cavalry and infantry schools at Fort Leavenworth, a comprehensive
approach to professional development was still in the distant future.
Arthur Lockwood Wagner, US Military Influencer
To understand the transformation of the military and how programs affecting
servicemembers, veterans, and educational institutions came about, it is critical to look back
at a few of the key influencers at the turn of the twentieth century. Arthur Lockwood Wagner
is one of the lesser-known influencers on the US military during the transformation just after
1900. It is interesting to note that many military leaders are famous for their acts of
bravery—such as Alvin York, Audie Murphy, and Hal Moore—or for leading large
organizations to victory—such as Patton, MacArthur, and Schwarzkopf—but Wagner, the
man who made such a significant and long-term impact on the US Army, seems only a
footnote in history. Former professor of history and Chair of the Division of the Human
Studies at Iowa Wesleyan University Todd Brereton is one of the few historians who focused
on Wagner and his role in changing how military leaders learn. Other than Brereton’s work,
Educating the U.S. Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905, and a few biographical
articles, there is little historiography focused on Wagner’s role in changing military
education except from those published by Wagner himself.
Wagner graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1875—
where he began his military career of deviating from the status quo—with a “staggering 731
demerits.”76 This may have been an early indication that Wagner was not happy with how the
Army conducted business. During his early career, Wagner spent time in the American West
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as a staff officer along with spending time commanding a detachment of artillery with
Company E, Sixth Infantry.77 Wagner’s time in the West provided him experience
completing a variety of duties, including staff work, leading patrols, and other assignments
generally given to lieutenants during the Indian Wars. By January 1880, Wagner was looking
for something other than frontier duty. Working through friends and acquaintances, he
focused his attention on being assigned to one of the thirty officer positions at college and
universities nationwide. His own best advocate, he wrote letters to influential officers asking
for their support in making his transfer possible. Eventually, Wagner’s persistence paid off,
and he received reassignment orders. During Wagner’s three-year assignment at East Florida
Seminary, he found that he enjoyed teaching, and because of his experiences delivering
military history to his students, he decided to put his military ideas on paper. He wrote an
article titled “The Military Necessities of the United States, and the Best Provisions for
Meeting Them” in 1884, which was published in The Journal of the Military Service
Institution.78 This success motivated Wagner to investigate how he might use his talents to
make changes to the way Army leaders learned their craft.
Wagner focused on practical application of how the US Army might improve officer
development and education. Although others such as Upton had previously attempted to
change the Army, they failed to take such a pragmatic approach. Wagner seemed to work
within the system, taking an approach that allowed his recommendations to solve the
problems he and others identified.79 Wagner continued to write, and his work creating The
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Campaign of Königgrätz demonstrated his ability to research and analyze the successes and
failures in the application of the principles of war. He pointed out in this publication that
Prussian Helmuth von Moltke was a genius and his subordinates energetic and intelligent, but
that Moltke and other military leaders failed to learn from events during the American Civil
War. Wagner’s focus on reconnaissance and intelligence gathering enabled him to
demonstrate the ignorance of the Prussians and present an argument that “their success was
solely due to the great blunders of their opponents.”80 Over time, Wagner increased in
prominence and was considered by his superiors for special assignments. Those future
positions allowed Wagner to make significant changes in officer development and education.
These eventually influenced post-secondary education during the world wars.
By the 1890s, Wagner had become quite influential as an academic within the US
Army. His influence began shifting the Army’s educational focus from learning by
experience in war to an organization that focused on development of its officers in schools
and by practicing maneuvers. Wagner may not have been a progressive in the traditional
sense, but his pragmatic approach to change allowed him to view the progressive movement
as a means to achieve some of his goals. Educating soldiers and leaders was not the only
change needed in the US Army in the second half of the nineteenth century; there were other
changes connected to the progressive agenda as well. Historian Alan Millet noted that
progressive officers were seeking a change in how the Army promoted its officers.
Promotion only based on time in service did not benefit the Army, and the best and brightest
officers wanted opportunities to shine. These desired changes attempted to replicate the
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civilian professional model as these progressive officers “sought professional status and
worked insidiously to justify their occupation as a skill oriented, theoretically based, socially
useful, and culturally unique career.”81 Wagner sought to connect the professionalism of
military officers to the progressive reforms by demonstrating that educated leaders in the US
Army could be more effective in reducing casualties and better protect American lives and
resources.
Wagner considered the actions he and other leaders could take so the US Army would
increase in prestige and regain the respect that had waned after the American Civil War. To
do this, Wagner advocated for the adoption of technology and the modernization of training
and education within the military. It is by examining leaders such as Wagner that historical
analysis demonstrates the changes that occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century
within the US military. This analysis generates insight into how the increased demand for an
educated Army led to the influential programs that affected colleges and universities during
and after the world wars. Wagner arrived at a time of significant change. The efforts of a
small core group of reformers within the Army expanded the mindset in which military
leaders valued training new recruits, developing servicemembers, and even preparing as they
reintegrated into civilian life.
Creating training and development programs to ensure the success of members of a
profession has been a long-standing process. Before focusing on the details of Wagner’s
successes, it makes sense to elaborate on whether the military is a job or a profession. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, Wagner and other leaders sought to professionalize the
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military’s Officer Corps. This dichotomy of whether one sees the military as a profession or
simply a job may relate to an individual’s situation. Draftees during the American
involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s might have considered the military as simply
a requirement or job. Examining the history of the concept of a profession in recent years is
valuable in understanding the changes within the US Army during the early twentieth
century. A profession demands significant investment in developing its members. Wagner’s
efforts were part of the ongoing attempt to professionalize the American military.
In 1983, the US Army created the United States Army Center for Leadership and
Ethics. This organization had several name changes and organizational transfers before it
became what is today known as the Center for the Army Profession and Leadership.82 This
organization, as well as many leaders within the US Army, sought to answer the difficult
question of whether military service was a profession, an occupational choice, or both. At the
end of the draft during the 1970s, others sought to answer a similar question. Charles
Moskos, professor of sociology who coined the phrase “Don’t ask, don’t tell” wrote, as part
of his analysis of the all-volunteer US military in 1977, that terms such as profession, calling,
and occupation “suffer from imprecision.”83 In Wagner’s lifetime, many of these critical
questions regarding the professionalization of the US Army were still in their infancy.
Wagner’s efforts to professionalize the Army were an important part of the evolution towards
a better educated servicemember and veteran.
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The question of a professional military force remains a topic of interest to scholars
and military personnel alike. Wagner attempted to influence Army professional development
at a time when senior military personnel still had one foot in the nineteenth century and few
leaders focused on the significant changes required to move the Army into the twentieth
century. As Wagner was promoted through the ranks, the US Army’s promotion process
favored seniority over performance. As a result, Wagner found it difficult to influence
change early in his career. Luckily for Wagner, Elihu Root had become the Secretary of War
in 1899. Root was an outsider who had the knowledge of the political processes in
Washington and the desire to educate and transform the military. This new Secretary of War
masterfully guided the military through the roadblocks of Congress and eventually produced
reforms in the US Army that continue today. Wagner was in the right place at the right time.
Root’s desire to change the military and Wagner’s ideas to educate established many
beneficial changes at a critical time in history. These changes included the creation of the
Army War College and several other officer professional development opportunities.84 This
was a wonderful time for Wagner, as he and other progressive-minded military leaders who
fought for change in the military found an advocate in Root.
Elihu Root became the Secretary of War at a time when the United States was
examining the problems resulting from a failed centralized planning approach to the SpanishAmerican War. As a result, the US Congress established a commission to analyze the
military problems encountered during the war. Appointed by President William McKinley,
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retired Major General Greenville M. Dodge served as the Commission President. The Dodge
commission, as it was called, reported in eight volumes the testimony of numerous military
officers—along with a summary—that the War Department was generally inefficient in the
process to acquire supplies, provide medical treatment, and prepare troops, while
administrative requirements overburdened units with regulations and inefficiencies during
the war with Spain.85 Root identified the need for a modern army in which officers planned
“intelligently” in a centralized manner similar to the German General Staff. He made several
proposals to Congress, including restructuring so that the department heads of the field
armies would no longer report directly to the Secretary of War, but instead through a
proposed Office of the Chief of Staff. According to Root, the then current position of
Commanding General was not appropriate since it created confusion in the chain of
command. Therefore, Root recommended the Army have a centralized military advisor to the
Secretary of War and the President. To establish clear lines of authority, Root proposed this
Chief of Staff would be senior to all other Army officers.86
Secretary Root also understood that officers needed to be exercised and trained in the
application of the principles of war to avoid the same mistakes Wagner identified in his
Report of the Santiago Campaign, 1898; this was an excellent opportunity for Wagner to
wield his influence for change.87 At the time, there were few officers interested in learning
from the past. Fortunately for Wagner, Major General Nelson A. Miles, the Commanding
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General of the US Army, requested Wagner prepare his report on the Army’s performance
during the Spanish-American War. Wagner’s report on the Santiago Campaign examined the
performance of the Army and highlighted those technical advances, such as smokeless
powder, that ultimately led to an advantage for military forces in the defense.88
As part of the Santiago report, Wagner identified the need for military leaders to
participate in practical application in managing larger troop formations as well as classroombased learning. Wagner recommended that learning occur during leaders’ time in educational
institutions and schools to reduce the learning curve during combat operations. In addition,
Wagner advised the leadership on the development of maneuvers that allowed for regular
Army troops, as well as joint maneuvers between regular Army and National Guard troops,
which were eventually conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas. During these maneuvers, Wagner
was the “chief umpire” for the maneuvers; his experience observing these large formations
gave him a wide variety of ideas for future officer development.89
The success of the maneuvers paved the way for other events to be established in
Kentucky and for Wagner to increase his own influence and reputation. Wagner included
ideas such as what is known today as an after-action-review, where officers discussed the
performance of units during the maneuver, what they did well, and how they might improve
in the future.90 While working on planning these maneuvers and his other duties, Wagner
also became a prolific writer. He wrote and lectured on topics such as strategy, combined
maneuvers, and even proper military instruction. His writings added to his previous work on
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an American War College, the “Campaign of Königgrätz,” essays, and reports that increased
Wagner’s influence within the Army.91
Wagner was influential in transforming the education of US Army officers at Fort
Leavenworth by focusing on the development of officers using tactical field exercises. This
hands-on practical exercise approach to solving problems by employing troops, writing
operations orders and plans, and analyzing problems gave junior officers the opportunity to
command larger organizations and learn from their successes and failures.92 Wagner spent
time researching and analyzing historical events to incorporate what the Army learned during
the American Civil War into the scenarios he provided to leadership during training
exercises. In Organization and Tactics, Wagner examined the changes in tactics used by the
Army during the previous century as a way to explain that changes in technology had
disproportionately shifted the advantage to defensive operations.93 Publications such as
Organization and Tactics increased Wagner’s influence and his role in the Leavenworth
schools’ curricula. Over time, he made significant changes to the infantry and cavalry
schools, the Army Staff College, and even the Military Information Division, which collected
and evaluated intelligence.94 These changes put Army professional development on the
pathway to partnerships with post-secondary educational institutions.
At the same time Wagner was working to influence change, Secretary of War Root
was at work supporting transformational efforts at a different level. Root established the
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Army War College in November 1903; it was not simply focused on academics but used the
model of academic study combined with practical application, replicating Wagner’s approach
in the Leavenworth schools.95 Although Root’s time as the Secretary of War lasted little
more than four years, his reforms are well known amongst US Army military leaders and
seen as a significant and transformational time for servicemember development. To the
contrary, Wagner is not well known today. Regardless, Wagner may be as significant as
Elihu Root, Emory Upton, and other reform-minded leaders.
Twentieth Century Drivers of Change
The Industrial Revolution
As America and the world entered the twentieth century, the internal combustion
engine was influencing society, the demand for a skilled labor pool increased, the Industrial
Revolution was in full swing, and the progressive agenda in America found an advocate in
President Woodrow Wilson. The internal combustion engines found their way into
automobiles and trucks with which the US Army conducted a few experiments in 1904, but
Army senior leaders did not see the value in using them.96 The lack of adoption of motorized
vehicles may have been a result of tradition, but evidence shows it can also be attributed to
the lack of literacy and knowledge by the soldiers. Most of the Army was still stuck in the
horse and buggy—or more appropriately, mule and wagon—mindset of the nineteenth
century.
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Henry Stimpson and Leonard Wood
With the Industrial Revolution and corporations demonstrating to politicians the
effectiveness that a centralized approach might have on military and government
organizations, Root’s reforms in the Army continued to move forward even when, in 1911,
Henry L. Stimpson became the Secretary of War. Alongside Stimpson was another reformer,
the US Army Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood. These two reform-minded
leaders sought to change procedures within the US Army, increase efficiency, and
consolidate what they considered a scattered Army into a centralized organization with
uniform programs for training troops, all while improving command and control.
Wood’s Army career provided him a wide variety of experiences outside of his
profession as a medical doctor. While a member of the campaign against Geronimo, Wood
was awarded the Medal of Honor in 1898. This fame, and his political connections as the
personal physician to President McKinley, provided him opportunities not given to other
medical officers. He was given command of the First Volunteer Cavalry and led his men at
the famous Battle of San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War. Theodore Roosevelt,
who is famous for this battle, was Wood’s second-in-command. From 1900 to 1902, Wood
was the military governor of Cuba and later assumed several senior positions of leadership in
the US Army, such as commander of the Philippines Division and commander of the
Department of the East. His experiences gained from these assignments resulted in Wood
challenging the status quo and focusing on increasing the preparedness of the US Army
through training, labor pool analysis, and organizational restructuring.
Historian and former staff member in the US Army’s Office of the Chief of Military
History James E. Hewes provided a summary of the benefits of reorganization by Stimpson

61
and Wood, highlighting that Stimpson was able to mobilize one of the new divisions along
the Texas border by sending a short five-line telegram. Under the old system, Stimpson
claimed he would need to send fifty to sixty telegrams to put together an ad hoc task force.
The changes addressed the chain of command problems and illuminated the need for changes
in other developmental programs.97 The efforts to make change within the military began to
expand beyond simply the active federal force, and transformational-minded leaders sought
to influence the development of reserve officers and the patriotism of young men in America.
Legislative Support
In 1902, the US Congress passed H.R. 11,654, “A Bill to Promote the Efficiency of
the Militia and for Other Purposes,” otherwise known as the Militia Act of 1903.98 Prior to
this, the militia lacked federal support even when activated for federal service by the
president. This was a watershed piece of legislation that not only provided funding for this
new “National Guard” but also aligned the training of these forces with that of the regular
Army. This allowed the reserve forces to attend Army schools, ensured federal funding for
training, and paved the way for the establishment of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
(ROTC). The connection to American higher education and influence of the ROTC opened
the door between the Army and higher education even wider.
The Militia Act of 1903 was a topic of keen interest for both its National Guard
impact as well as its focus on American citizens and the defense of the nation. A 1903
perspective written by James Parker in the North American Review outlined the key points of
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the Act and explained that learning rifle marksmanship was considered at the time to be a
critical part of educating the soldier. The author also made the point that generating interest
in shooting and providing opportunities to American citizens would offset the advantage that
other countries had with their conscription. This turn-of-the-century assessment proposed
that the cost to provide ranges to ensure effective marksmanship skills amongst the National
Guard as well as the male population would be an insignificant investment that “should not
exceed the cost to build a battleship or two.”99 It was not just improving the tactical skills that
Parker and others focused on within the 1903 Act, but also the impact the training would
have on National Guard members in qualifying them to compete for opportunities and
become eligible as volunteer officers. The provisions of this legislative change were
understood in 1903 as increasing the knowledge, skills, and abilities of military personnel
and created a conversation around the entrance examinations for the National Guard and why
they should be similar to those used for a regular Army recruit. This was innovative thinking
in 1903 and by the 1917 American entrance into WWI expanded beyond physical
requirements to include literacy, along with the ability to communicate in the English
language.
Development of the Military Training Camps
As Parker elaborated on in 1903, the focus on investing in young men from the
American population was needed long before the post-WWII G.I. Bill. The US Army needed
a literate, educated, and trained workforce to win wars in the twentieth century. Reformminded leaders were seeking a way to invest in training potential military inductees in the
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skills they would need to be successful, should America be involved in war. One example of
military investment in society was put forth by Wood in the form of the Citizens’ Military
Training Camps. These summer training camps went through several name changes
throughout their lifecycle. Understanding the partnerships between the US Army, American
post-secondary education institutes, and American society illuminates the involvement
amongst these groups long before the G.I. Bill became law. In May of 1913, General
Leonard Wood penned letters to university presidents and, with the backing of the Secretary
of War, set about to arrange for summer camps where men attending universities and
colleges came together in the Students’ Military Instruction Camps.100 These summer
training camps focused on military, outdoor, and civic skills as well as knowledge for young
men.
Attendance at these camps by young men promoted good citizenship and discipline
and provided the US military with a pool of trained men to help safeguard the national
defense. The involvement of university presidents and civilian committees within this
movement helped to develop training material, promoted attendance at the camps, and
allowed for a national scale with camps placed strategically throughout the United States. By
1916, American leaders in both the public and private sectors were promoting the necessity
for these camps as a part of the national defense plan. Community leaders such as social
workers, clergy, and educators testified to Congress, explaining that educational institutions
needed to include classes that assisted young people in understanding and appreciating civic
duties and the regard for law and authority and developed discipline among the population.
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Although there were those who argued against these classes before American involvement in
WWI, programs and activities outside of the military began to have a positive influence on
how legislators viewed servicemember development while on active duty.101
The connections between the military and post-secondary education grew as leaders
from both the military and educational institutions began to collaborate. The desire of Army
Chief of Staff Wood to address the problem he identified as the need for college-educated
men to be trained in military concepts, rifle marksmanship, and physical fitness is considered
the inception of the modern ROTC. Wood saw this as an approach to preparing the United
States militarily without the need for conscription. It is interesting that in 1913, Wood viewed
the lack of trained officers as a problem, but in the 1913 Annual Reports of the War
Department for the Year Ended June 30, 1913: Volume I, the Secretary of War reported that
the regular Army had only ninety-eight officer vacancies out of the total and strength of
4,763.102 This 2 percent vacancy rate seems insignificant compared to the 11 percent vacancy
rate for enlisted men at the time. Wood may have understood America’s manpower problems
from a perspective beyond what was documented in the annual reports. In 1913, the
Secretary also reported the Army was having a problem with accessions and desertions. A 20
percent acceptance rate for the 127,827 men who applied to enlist or reenlist, combined with
the vacancies, demonstrated the problems the Army was having with recruitment and
retention of qualified personnel in the enlisted ranks much earlier than America’s
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involvement in WWI.
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Developing solutions to training and educating the labor pool from

which the Army could draw required agreement amongst a wide variety of stakeholders. Not
only was it a problem to find adequate leaders, soldiers, and specialized technical experts, but
gaining support for programs was equally difficult.
The difficulty in recruiting personnel with special skills for the Army was not unique
to 1913. Nor was it a problem only for the enlisted ranks within the Army. During the April
14, 1916, congressional session, Senator Atlee Pomerene proposed an amendment providing
pay for military officers that would provide members of the US Army Dental Corps
increased rank upon commissioning. The debate on the rank for dental officers led to Senator
William Hughes shifting the conversation to the perceived disparity between the enlisted men
and the officers in the US Army. Hughes focused the conversation on his belief that there
was a caste society within the US military. This perspective led to several senators, including
Senator George Chamberlain, disagreeing. Chamberlain provided an opposing perspective,
stating the enlisted man in the Army is treated like a prince in comparison to other laboring
men in the country. He considered the problem to be utterances from senators and other
legislators who portrayed the military poorly and ultimately influenced the quality of men
who enlisted to serve the country.104 Wood may have anticipated the need for qualified
officers should war come to America, but the problem identified in the 1913 Annual Report
of the War Department and the Senate debate provide a preview of the problems that the
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Army and America had to address during the world wars. The fighting was not limited to the
front lines, with the battle to gain support by political leaders just as important.
As for the success of the military training camps, during the first year, in the summer
of 1913, two camps were organized: one in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and one at the Presidio
of Monterey in California. These were a good start, and after the success during the summer
of 1913, Wood was not the only person to promote these camps. Henry S. Drinker, President
Emeritus of Lehigh University and later Honorary President of the Military Training Corps
Association, organized a committee to further promote the project in the hopes that the
camps would expand. Not only did he have the support of General Wood and other
influential university leaders, but President Wilson also supported the camps, stating in a
September 22, 1913, letter, “I am very much interested in the successful working out of the
idea of these college camps.”105
During the summer of 1914, numerous military training camps provided examples of
how large numbers of college and university students might be provided with an opportunity
to develop their military knowledge and skills in preparation for a national emergency. These
student camps provided an opportunity to develop both physically and militarily for those
seeking an adventure during their summer break from school. Military training was not new
in many universities. The 1862 Morrill Act required land-grant-established post-secondary
institutions to provide “military tactics” training courses. Officially titled “An Act Donating
Public Lands to the Several States and Territories which may provide Colleges for the
Benefit of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts,” the act gave each state 30,000 acres of land
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for each congressional delegate to sell and use the funds to establish public colleges.
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These

land-grant universities ultimately numbered sixty-nine in total, including Texas A&M
University, Louisiana State University, Purdue University, and Cornell University, just to
name a few. What was new was the concept of attending military training camps where
students learned military tactics through application instead of simply classroom principles.
The military training camps focused on good citizenship, and they were intended for
men either in post-secondary education or who could take time off their civilian occupations
in the summer. The camps provided hands-on training in the outdoors, emphasizing physical
activity. These camps needed men who were well educated and quick learners. Many of
those who attended the camps were students receiving training in university classrooms from
military officers such as Arthur Wagner. These military science professors were, and still are,
detailed from the active force to provide instruction in military science and tactics. From time
to time, the US military also allowed retired officers to conduct these activities. The plan for
these military training camps was to place students in a field environment simulating a
soldier’s life while providing instruction. During the first camps, students were required to
fund their own attendance including the cost of a uniform, board, and transportation.107 As
the interest in camps expanded, the military took on an increasingly influential financial
role.108
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By 1915, what is known today as the Plattsburgh Movement began to take shape.
Meeting with business and professional men in New York City, Grenville Clark asked
General Wood about having a training camp for business and professional men. Wood
agreed, and the Plattsburgh Movement enabled students and businessmen to attend these
combined camps. The continued interest and growth resulted in more than 3,400 men
attending camps across the United States in 1915, and more than 16,000 attending in 1916.
The schedule during these camps was quite grueling. The attendees learned military tactics,
weaponry, and the functions of the diverse types of units such as cavalry, engineers, and
artillery. Attendees received hands-on marksmanship training as well as learning-by-doing
while living and conducting military operations in the field environment. While many saw
the value in these military training camps between 1913 and 1916, others pointed out the lack
of attention paid to the Morrill Act at land-grant colleges.109
One man who felt the summer training camps did not accomplish enough was
Edward Orton, Jr., Dean of the College of Engineering at the Ohio State University. Orton
was not only an academic but later a military officer in the US Army Reserve Corps and
contributor to the National Defense Act of 1916. To understand the negative feelings towards
these training camps, an examination of Orton’s address to the Joint Session of the Section
on College Work in Administration and of the Engineering Association of the Land-Grant
Colleges during its afternoon session on November 13, 1913, provides perspective. In his
address to the attendees, Orton referred to the Morrill Act’s words “and including military
tactics” as he pointed out the disparity amongst military departments and the process by
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which different colleges maintained military instruction.
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Orton’s concern regarding the

lack of uniformity and the “wrong mental attitude which most of these colleges assume
toward military instruction” supported his perspective that military drill could and should be
improved to support the needs of the country and the colleges. While Orton supported the
student camps, he pointed out that attendance was voluntary and did not go far enough in
training cohorts of potential military officers. Orton saw the military training camps as
simply a duplicate process, which he considered an ineffective method of producing reserve
status officers for potential active duty. While many business, educational, and military
leaders supported these camps, Orton showed that the support was not universal. Regardless
of complaints, the development of servicemembers remained a growing priority for the US
military.
In the 1915 Annual War Department Report, Chief of Staff General Hugh L. Scott
pointed out that the US Army continued to focus on military training and education. The
report explained that providing military training and educational instruction to prisoners
convicted of military offenses allowed the Army to restore these men back to duty. As for the
military camps of instruction, Scott wrote in the report that three additional camps were
established throughout the year for businessmen interested in learning how to prepare the
country for defense while gaining practical knowledge of soldierly duties. The Chief of
Staff’s personal belief outlined in the annual report was that the benefit of the camps was farreaching. Scott provided insight into the locations selected for these training camps. He
highlighted that the camps occurred on military posts due to a lack of funds available to meet
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expenses. Those conducted on public and private lands required the citizens or communities
to incur the expenses for constructing the camps. Scott’s analysis was that the camps had
“passed the experimental stage,” and he advocated for additional funding, saying the
amounts, while not large, should be allocated to ensure men without the means to furnish
their own uniforms and travel expenses might still show their patriotism and attend.111
Scott also mentioned military instruction in colleges, opining that a dependable
supply of reserve officers might be gathered from these institutions. The need for a focus on
manpower remained a key factor in Army efforts. In referring to the land-grant institutions
receiving endowments from the government and providing instruction in military tactics,
Scott reported, “I regret to say that the successes have not been very encouraging.”112 It was
in this report where Scott outlined what eventually became standard practice for the US
military’s ROTC program. The consistent changes over the first few years of the training
camps may have created some skepticism but provide insight into how the best practices led
to a merging of educational and military hands-on training.
The Military Training Camps Association was a combination of several initiatives.113
The combined efforts of Wood, the War Department, and university presidents resulted in the
Federal Citizens Training Camps or student camps, successfully starting in 1913. The same
year, the men who attended the camps also formed The Society for the National Reserve
Corps and promoted training camps in America. The men who attended the student camps
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merged into an association titled The Military Training Camps Association of the United
States, which allowed attendees at the federal training camps to meet the criteria to join.
There were significant recruiting efforts to publicize the value of the camps and by 1916, the
partnership with the War Department resulted in the National Defense Act of 1916
authorizing the War Department to fund transportation, uniforms, and sustenance for the
training of attendees at the federal training camps.114 Additionally, the Military Training
Camps Association paved the way for the Students’ Army Training Corps (SATC), by which
the War Department’s Committee on Education and Special Training partnered with
universities and colleges across America to provide special military-intensive courses funded
by the government as part of an emergency measure to train college men as military
officers.115
With much of the world watching the Great War unfold, 1916 became a watershed
year for change in American military policy. The National Defense Act of 1916 updated the
Militia Act of 1903 and outlined the expansion of the Army and National Guard while
creating enlisted and officer reserve corps. The 64th Congress, in the National Defense Act
of 1916 (An Act for Making Further and More Effectual Provision for the National Defense,
and for Other Purposes), addressed the composition of national defense forces as authorized
by law, expanded presidential authority over the National Guard, modified enlistments in the
regular army to include furlough into the Regular Army Reserve for enlisted men, and
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provided a detailed explanation of the Officers Reserve Corps.

116

Additionally, the National

Defense Act of 1916 included specific guidance in regard to soldiers’ opportunities to study
and receive instruction to both prepare them in their military occupations and “enable them to
return to civil life better equipped for industrial, commercial, and general business
occupations.”117 American leaders began focusing on the needs of the military,
servicemembers, and American economy collectively.
The 1916 legislative session was a year of momentous change for both the military
and American universities and colleges. The National Defense Act of 1916 included the
Pomerene-Gard Bill. As part of the act, Congress established the ROTC program, allowing
military courses to be conducted at universities and colleges across America. By 1917, the
ROTC program was in full swing at universities such as the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the Ohio State University, the University of California, and the University of
Texas, to name a few. Not only did these courses focus on military training, but some
universities, such as Ohio State, established schools of Aeronautics as early as 1917.118 These
joint programs led the way for technical training soldiers needed during both world wars.
Continued Expansion of the Military Training Camps and ROTC Programs
While expanding beyond the American involvement in WWI, it is worthwhile to
cover the support for the camps beyond the war. During the 1920s, the partnership between
the US Department of War, state leadership, and American universities continued to expand.
The military training camps became more popular, leading to increased involvement by

116

United States Congress, The Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December 1915 to
March 1917, 64th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1917), 166–187.
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llsl//llsl-c64/llsl-c64.pdf.
117

United States Congress, The Statutes at Large, 186.

118

Hammond, Ohio State Prepares for World War I.

73
American political leaders. In his letter to Texas Governor Pat Neff dated September 21,
1921, John W. Weeks, the US Secretary of War, commented on the marked success of the
Texas training camps conducted that summer.119 In his reply, Governor Neff endorsed the
camps and stated that he had visited several times and “was impressed by the splendid
conduct of these young Texans, and the excellent training they were getting which seemed
most conducive to a spirit of reverence for law and order, a desire for right living, and a love
of country.”120 The post-WWI support for the camps demonstrated the success of the
partnerships between multiple stakeholders. The military continued its efforts into 1923,
seeking support from Governor Neff by extending an invitation to visit the summer camps of
the regular Army, reserves, Citizens’ Military Training Camps, and ROTC camps that were
to be held in Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona that summer.121 While
the total number of National Guard troops participating exceeded 13,000, the ROTC
participants—minus reserve officers—totaled 1,084, whereas the Citizens’ Military Training
Camps projections were 3,000 attendees.122 The Eighth Corps Area information flyer on the
Citizens’ Military Training Camps for the summer of 1923 demonstrated the complexity
these camps achieved in ten years. To encourage continued attendance, published
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advertisements informed the public that attendees would receive “a month’s vacation with all
expenses paid by Uncle Sam” and communicated to parents that attendees would be well
cared for, offering them the opportunity to visit to see how these “lads live and learn.”123 By
1923, these camps had transformed into four phases, with attendees learning and growing
over a period of years. The focus on education was evident, as the first two courses required
attendees to read and write in English, the third course required a minimum of a grammar
school education, and the fourth course required a high school education.
One problem with the military training camps was that the enlisted men were the ones
who performed most of the equipment maintenance and fighting during a war. These men
generally did not attend American universities and colleges. Moreover, if these men were
farmworkers, they would not have the ability to attend these camps during summer sessions.
Most of America still had a significant agricultural labor force, and due to the maintenance of
crops, many of those who might be considered for conscription simply did not have the time
to attend the training camps.
Many of the men who did not attend college did choose to enlist in the Army during
wartime. Army leaders acknowledged it was their job to prepare these men to be successful
during combat operations. However, by 1916, there was also a focus on the enlisted soldier
who would eventually leave the military and return to civilian life. To address this issue, on
March 30, 1916, Michael Hoke Smith, a US senator from Georgia, spoke on the Senate floor,
introducing an amendment to the Army reorganization bill under review by the Committee
on Military Affairs. A specific feature of the amendment, which later became section 29a,
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was to allow soldiers on active duty an average of ninety-six hours a month to study and
receive educational instruction not connected directly to their military service, but to prepare
them for return to civilian life. The amendment language specifically focused on education
and vocational areas such as agriculture and mechanical arts. The amendment also expressly
recommended that civilian teachers be employed by the Army to assist Army officers. The
specificity of the senator’s recommendation illuminated the growing interest in preparing
servicemembers for reintegration into civilian life.124 This idea represented the early desire to
support the reintegration of soldiers into American society. Senator Smith provided an
example of how leaders sought to address the transition of servicemembers from the military
back to civilian life much earlier than the passing of the G.I. Bill in 1944.
Summary of the Changes Leading Up To World War I
Many changes occurred in the five years preceding America’s entrance into WWI.
The transformation of organizational structure resulting from the Root reforms and Wagner’s
influence on how military leaders were trained—shifting from what was essentially on-thejob training to exercise-based knowledge development—created the structure to train higher
level military leaders, but there was still a problem with technological changes and a need for
the average soldier to read and write. The Army and American political leaders would soon
realize that the experiences gained from the Napoleonic tactics of the American Civil War
and the ability of the US Army to conduct constabulary operations such as it had in the
Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century would not be enough to avoid the
problems that technological innovations brought. Chapter Three provides an in-depth review
of the difficulties the US Army faced with large-scale military operations in the age of
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technological change. The problems the American Army identified during the 1916–1917
Punitive Expedition into Mexico had far-reaching effects on the training and education of
servicemembers. The actions by American politicians, as well as the Army, were critical in
preparing the United States for entrance into WWI. An examination of the partnerships
between post-secondary educational institutions, the War Department’s transformation from
cavalry to a mechanized force, and the problems with increasing the size of the US military
to fight the war demonstrates the significant demand on the US Army to ensure
servicemembers were both literate and educated.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION THROUGH WORLD WAR I
The Punitive Expedition, focus on literacy, and the Student’s Army Training Corps
program produced significant changes as a result of the Army’s increased adoption of
technology, influence of reform-minded leaders, and large military operations, which had a
significant effect on the relationship between the US military and educational institutions
during WWI. Under General Pershing’s leadership, the Expedition was a significant effort,
requiring thousands of US Army troops to manipulate wagons, pack animals, and motorized
trucks throughout the Mexican desert in the largest maneuver of US forces since the
American Civil War.125 This operation identified many of the flaws within the Army’s
quartermaster system along with the need for additional training for the American state
militia forces. As a result, Congress authorized an increase in the Army size, updated the
status of the National Guard, and created an Army Reserve.126 The mobilization of the
Punitive Expedition helped the Army as it transformed from a cavalry to a mechanized
structure. This not only improved operations during the Expedition, but the significant
changes to the organizational structure of the Army had a substantial effect on the success of
the American forces when Pershing led the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe only
months later.
A continuation of change after the Punitive Expedition into WWI demonstrates how
the strategic goals of the government and military poured money into new equipment and
created conditions under which literacy became a requirement for many in the military
service. This led to a partnership between the US military and educational researchers to
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identify, develop, and educate servicemembers who found it difficult to perform their duties
in a satisfactory manner without the ability to read and write—and, in some cases, without
formal advanced technical training. The examination of literacy rates by the War Department
provided shocking statistics: 25 percent of the men called to duty in the 1910s either had a
literacy rate so low that they were not effective within the Army, or they were illiterate
altogether.127 As a result of the Army’s work with educators, literacy education within the
Army began during the recruitment process when potential men with no other impediments
were assigned to developmental battalions for education. This proved to be successful, and in
a matter of weeks those who would previously have been turned away were educated to a
point at which they would be effective within the Army. While a focus on literacy was
significant, the SATC was at the other end of the spectrum, providing educational
opportunities at colleges and universities across America.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the US Army found itself fighting a
guerrilla force throughout many parts of the Philippines. The Army spent a few years in the
Philippines with leaders including General John J. “Blackjack” Pershing, learning how to
lead soldiers and fight in the jungle.128 The US military forces, including the Army and the
Marine Corps, fought against a motivated insurgency from 1899 to 1902. During this time,
the Army’s leaders learned many lessons as they focused on small unit tactics.129 At the
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beginning of the twentieth century, the Army focused its training on responding to guerrilla
tactics during the American Westward expansion, as well as in foreign operations such as the
Philippines. While not necessarily beneficial for large-scale operations, these experiences
served the Army well during the March 9, 1916, raid by Mexican rebel leader Pancho Villa
on Columbus, New Mexico. The lessons learned by the US Army following the raid, during
the Punitive Expedition, helped the Army identify problems, develop leaders, and prepare the
United States to enter WWI. The literacy problems and programs identified a need to
standardize training and take steps to ensure those brought into the military were placed in
jobs where they could most effectively support the war effort. The legacy of Pancho Villa’s
1916 raid and the Punitive Expedition was far-reaching and provided a lens from which to
see the connection between the changing military and the Army’s involvement in educational
programs.
Mexican Political History
Between 1910 and 1920, Mexico experienced significant turmoil as several
influential leaders attempted to gain power and become Mexico’s president. The competition
for authority and desire to become the president of Mexico by leaders such as Victoriano
Huerta, Emilio Zapata, Francisco Madero, Pancho Villa, and José Venustiano Carranza
created conditions that eventually led to the raid on Columbus, New Mexico.130 The factors
leading up to the event are quite detailed, but a summary can frame the situation and the
influences on the US military. By understanding how the raid influenced the US Army, one
can also see how the raid benefited the US Army as it prepared its forces to enter the
European theater during WWI.
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For a quarter-century, Porfirio Diaz served as the president of Mexico. By 1910, he
had entered his eighth term of office and had grown quite unpopular. Diaz began seizing
power in the 1880s, when the country was in turmoil and sought a political answer to bring
about order.131 While this worked for many years, eventually others such as Francisco
Madero, Diaz’s opponent in the 1910 election, challenged him, calling for him to step down
from the presidency. Madero thought the change in power might occur without bloodshed if
he were to be elected president, but after being nominated for president by the
antireelectionist party, Diaz had Madero arrested.132 Skipping bail, Madero eventually was
exiled to San Antonio, Texas. From San Antonio, Madero called for an armed uprising
against Diaz, and by 1911, Madero had been officially elected president of Mexico. The
desire of peasants in Mexico for land reform, coupled with the aspirations of many key
Mexican leaders, ultimately led to political instability throughout the country. The struggle
for power in Mexico had just begun with Madero’s election. In 1913, forces led by Mexican
General Victoriano Huerta assassinated Madero in an attempt to gain control of the country.
This continued change in leadership exacerbated the political instability, since many
influential men in Mexico, such as Carranza, were opposed to Huerta assuming power.
Several leaders rebelled against Huerta, assuming positions of power within their
individual regions of Mexico. As a result, the country became fractured, with political and
military power becoming decentralized in the hands of regional leaders. Regional leaders in
Mexico such as Emiliano Zapata, Francisco “Pancho” Villa, Venustiano Carranza, and
Alvaro Obregon put considerable effort into their goal of ultimately becoming the recognized
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president of Mexico.133 Their efforts forced Huerta into exile in the United Kingdom, Spain,
and eventually the US, and Carranza replaced him as president.134 As a key regional leader,
Villa had a good relationship with Americans and even met with American General John J.
Pershing on a few occasions. Villa considered himself a protector of American interests and
looked out for Americans living in northern Mexico. Villa’s relationship with the Americans
was, however, no guarantee of political support. By October 1915, American President
Woodrow Wilson recognized Carranza as the legitimate president of Mexico.135 Villa saw
this as a betrayal to his loyalty to America.
Of course, recognizing Carranza as Mexico’s president was not the only action that
angered Villa. Carranza and Villa both used their military forces as a means of control and
influence in Mexico. Villa was angered that President Wilson did not just put his voice
behind Carranza, but he also allowed the transport of Carranza’s Mexican military forces on
American railroads. The transporting of Carranza’s troops through Douglas, Arizona, and
eventually back to Agua Prieta, Mexico, created significant losses for Villa. This ability of
Carranza’s forces to maneuver more efficiently than Villa’s forces led to Villa’s defeat by
Carranza’s forces.136 This betrayal by the United States resulted in Villa not only losing more
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than 75 percent of his fighters, but also in a change in his attitude towards Americans and
how he viewed his relationship with the United States in general.137
The 1916 Raid
The headquarters for the Columbus, New Mexico patrol district was Fort Bliss,
located in El Paso, Texas. A few important dates must be recognized before moving forward
with details regarding the actual raid. In April 1914, the Regiment’s headquarters and five
Troops from the 13th Cavalry arrived in Columbus, New Mexico. A few weeks later, Army
Colonel Herbert J. Slocum was assigned to command the 13th Cavalry Regiment, where his
forces patrolled a sixty-five-mile stretch of the border between New Mexico and Mexico.138
On May 9, 1914, Brigadier General Pershing arrived in El Paso in command of the 8th
Infantry Brigade. He and the brigade had been reassigned from the Presidio of San Francisco
due to the tensions building up along the United States-Mexico border.139 At the same time,
the majority of the 13th Cavalry Regiment was also located in El Paso.
To understand why the United States placed Army units along the border, we must
understand a little more about the conditions in Mexico and the United States’ relationship
with the country in 1914. Since the Mexican Revolution was well underway, many American
authorities, including the Army, had confiscated weapons and ammunition from Mexicans
seeking to cross the border into the United States.140 The context of US Army operations
along the border demonstrated the skills needed by soldiers to support current operations.
Small military engagements continued, preventing the Army from adopting improvements in
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training and educational programs. While the turn of the century brought about some
changes, reform-minded leaders, technological changes, and large military operations were
yet to be combined in a way that led to partnerships between post-secondary education and
the US military. The Mexican Revolution eventually led to changing conditions within the
US Army, which had far-reaching consequences.
The hostilities with Mexico in 1914 were also exacerbated by the Tampico incident,
in which American forces occupied Veracruz.141 According to the account in the 1914 Army
and Navy Journal, on April 21, 1914, when President Wilson was notified that “the
Hamburg-American liner Ypiranga was approaching Veracruz, bearing 200 machine guns
and a large amount of ammunition,” Wilson directed the US Navy to ensure these arms did
not reach Huerta.142 Less than three months later, Huerta, who had assumed office by
overthrowing Madero in a coup in 1913, resigned. His continued losses against the forces of
Carranza and Villa culminated in the Battle of Zacatecas, which led to the destruction of the
Mexican Federal Army and therefore Huerta’s ability to maintain his position of power. As
for the Americans in Veracruz, Villa was the only rebel leader who did not condemn the
occupation of Veracruz, or the seizing of the German-supplied weapons.143 This
demonstrated Villa’s earlier loyalty to the United States.144
Returning to the 13th Cavalry Regiment, the organization of its men on the night of
Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico is an important consideration. At the time of the
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attack on Columbus, the 13th Cavalry had seven troops with a total of approximately twentyfive officers and 650 men.145 It is important to note that in the camp itself, there were only
about 350 men at the time of the raid. The fact that almost half of the soldiers were not in the
camp was a result of Colonel Slocum’s security plan. He had mounted patrols that traveled
along the border at irregular intervals as well as fixed stations in a few of the nearby
ranches.146 With about sixty-five men at the Columbus border gate and roughly 125 men
fifteen miles away at a local ranch, he had a plan to “screen” the border for illegal crossings.
However, Villa was able to circumvent the patrols and checkpoints through his own
intelligence gathering but Villa’s information was not always accurate. The failure of the
Mexican forces during the raid were also influenced by Villa’s poor intelligence gathering
regarding the number of soldiers currently stationed at the camp in Columbus. Villa believed
there were only about fifty soldiers at the camp just prior to the attack.147 The difference
between 50 and 350 was a problem Villa’s men did not expect.
Unlike the other key leaders in the story of the Mexican Revolution, Villa played a
significant part in influencing the US Army prior to the American entrance into WWI. Villa
was born in the Mexican state of Durango and given the name Doroteo Arango.148 During his
teenage years he changed his name to Francisco Villa and in 1911 was commissioned a
captain in the Madero Army.149 This experience would ultimately lead to him being loyal to
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Madero and coming out of retirement to fight against Huerta.150 Some say that Villa saw
himself as a larger-than-life character. Technology influenced both Villa and the US Army,
although in different ways. Villa capitalized on motion pictures to improve his own publicity.
The New York Times reported in 1914 that Villa sold “the Mutual Film Corporation of New
York exclusive film rights to all Villista battles.”151 As time went on, being filmed in battle
may have influenced Villa’s military decisions. For instance, Villa wore uniforms provided
by the film company, and the mayor of El Paso even accused the El Paso Times of selling
favorable coverage to Villa for $10,000 in gold.152 Villa may have been ahead of his time in
using the social media of the day to promote his popularity and achievements; however, his
influence on the US Army was much more significant.
Villa was a powerful leader in northern Mexico in 1914. While Villa continued to
project his friendship for Americans, he also entered El Paso, Texas in late April 1914 with
thousands of armed men, prepared to fight in Juarez, Mexico or El Paso, Texas.153 This was a
time when Villa was at his most powerful. In battles after 1914, Villa fought against Obregon
at Celaya, losing somewhere between 6,000 and 8,000 men, who were difficult to replace.154
In the 1915 battle of Agua Prieta, Villa was defeated by Carranza’s forces, who had logistical
assistance from the United States. By the time Villa and his forces were planning their attack
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on Columbus, he had roughly 800 men, and his friendship towards Americans had turned to
bitterness.155
During Huerta’s time as the Mexican president, President Woodrow Wilson sent
envoys to meet with Villa and report back to the Wilson administration.156 While some of
these men, such as Gregory Mason, viewed Villa as a bandit, they also added validity to his
position of power and authority simply by meeting with him. Villa may have seen this
outreach as potential support for him personally. Later, when Wilson provided support to
Carranza’s forces, Villa’s understanding of Wilson’s position became clear. As a result,
Wilson was influential, even if only by a small part, in Villa’s raid on Columbus, New
Mexico.
The conflict surrounding the support of Carranza’s forces by President Wilson
exacerbated the situation with Villa. While in the past Villa had sought to protect the interests
of Americans both personally and from a business perspective, times had changed, and Villa
found himself losing prestige and in need of supplies. In the early morning of March 9, 1916,
Villa and his forces moved north from his southern Chihuahua headquarters towards
Columbus, New Mexico.157 Some say that Villa was looking to exact revenge on the
Americans for supporting his enemies and causing him to lose the battle at Agua Prieta.
Ronald Atkin provides a more pragmatic interpretation, saying, “Though Villa never
explained his reasons for attacking Columbus, there seems little doubt that the prime object
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was to pick up guns, horses, money, and as much incidental booty as possible.”158 Other
authors highlight the fact that Villa had previously purchased firearms and ammunition from
Sam Ravel, a local merchant, and that prior to the raid Ravel had taken payment for a
shipment he had yet to deliver.159 The 13th Cavalry’s dispersal patrolling sixty-five miles of
the border between the United States and Mexico left an opportunity for Villa to enter the
United States in between the fixed cavalry unit outposts. Villa’s forces simply needed to
avoid the patrols.
By March 1916, Colonel Slocum had been in command of the regiment in Columbus
for more than a year. During that time, few exciting events occurred and, as soldiers do,
everyone fell into a routine. The small town of Columbus, with only a few hundred citizens,
was twice the size when considering the soldiers of the 13th Cavalry. These numbers affected
the town, and soldiers interacted with the citizens in official and unofficial capacities
regularly. Many of the Army officers who brought their wives to Columbus lived within the
town, while the soldiers and unmarried officers lived on the south side of town between
Columbus and the border gate marking the United States and Mexico. By 1916, as there was
concern that Villa might attempt to travel to Columbus, Slocum sought out information on
Villa’s movements. Slocum was under orders not to enter Mexico, and therefore paid
Mexican “scouts” to provide information on Villa’s whereabouts.160
The terrain was beneficial to Villa. Late in the evening of March 8, Villa and his
forces crossed the border, entering the United States, and hid in an arroyo.161 There they
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waited until the moon went down and at approximately 4:15 AM on March 9, Villa’s forces
attacked the 13th Cavalry. First Lieutenant John P. Lucas, who incidentally would later
become a division commander in WWII, was one of the first to be engaged by Villa’s forces.
Lucas commanded the Regiment’s machine gun troop, and after being engaged by Villa’s
men, he quickly rallied his forces along with other officers of the 13th Cavalry. Regardless of
whether Villa’s forces wanted to acquire fresh horses, meet up with Ravel for the weapons
they had paid for, or loot the stores within the town, the Mexicans were surprised by the
number of American soldiers in the cavalry camp. Over the next two hours, the forces of
Villa and the 13th Cavalry engaged each other as the cavalry troops defended the town and
routed Villa and his forces towards the southwest.
The Punitive Expedition
The raid on Columbus, New Mexico was the first military action against an armed
enemy on American soil since 1812. While Villa and his forces lost an estimated 150–200
men during the raid, the actual numbers are disputed. Compared to eight troopers from the
13th Cavalry, the long-term impact of Villa’s actions ultimately benefited the US Army. As a
result of American media and encouragement from leaders such as Major General Frederick
Funston, the Commander of the Army Southern Department at Fort Sam Houston in San
Antonio and medal of honor recipient, the US War Department directed the Army to send
forces into Mexico “for the purpose of crushing General Francisco Villa.”162 This directive
led to the establishment of the Punitive Expedition, and American officials notified the
Mexican ambassador to the United States to inform General Carranza that the US
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government was taking action and did not need any cooperation from the Carranza
government to enter Mexico or pursue Villa.163 Before moving on to a discussion of the
Punitive Expedition, this mentality may provide insight into the mindset of not only the
American leadership, but of the American military. The confidence of American military and
political leaders to enter another sovereign nation without any local support is not unique.
The same approach can be seen with the entrance of American forces into the European
theater of war during WWI. Pershing did not relinquish control of American forces for the
British and French to use as replacements for their own units. His staunch belief that
American fighting men belong above the ground with a focus on the war principle of
maneuver, and under the command of American leaders, seems to be a continuation of the
approach the American government took in informing the Mexican government regarding its
actions during the Punitive Expedition.
Instead of focusing on the reasons why the American leadership decided to send
military forces into Mexico to chase Villa, this focus is on the aspects of how the Punitive
Expedition benefited the US Army. At the time, Major General Frederick Funston was senior
to Pershing, but was not selected to lead the expedition for political reasons. The decision
was ultimately beneficial to the United States, since Funston died just prior to the United
States entering WWI. Proximity to the Mexican border may have also been a factor, since
when Pershing was selected to lead the expedition, he was in command of the 8th Infantry
Brigade at Fort Bliss, Texas, just ninety miles from Columbus. Pershing’s selection to lead
the Punitive Expedition would have far-reaching influence on the future changes in training
and education of servicemembers during and after WWI.
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After political decisions were made regarding American military forces entering
Mexico, the United States put significant effort into logistical processes to support the
substantial number of troops moving into Mexico. The United States did have between
18,000 and 19,000 regular Army troops on the border with Mexico in March 1916.164 The
Secretary of War, along with military generals, took the number of available soldiers into
consideration, and according to a 1916 article in the Army and Navy Journal, American
leaders planned that approximately “8,000 men will be sent on the expedition.”165
Brigadier General John J. Pershing was placed in command of the Punitive
Expedition, with specific instructions to round up Villa and—more importantly—eliminate
the Villistas who supported him. Pershing organized his forces so they could operate within
the harsh desert conditions of northern Mexico, but he also factored in that Mexican
President Carranza had denied the use of Mexican railroads to American military forces.166
This was a significant constraint for the American Army, and it required the Army to use
wagons, pack animals, and obtain motorized trucks to move supplies.167 The vast size of
American forces, combined with the limitations of maneuvering within Mexico, exposed
many of the flaws with the United States Army’s quartermaster system of the time.
As a commander, Pershing allowed decision-making freedom through decentralized
operations, using multiple columns while moving south into Mexico.168 The lack of
intelligence due to the locals siding with Villa, the unavailability of maps, and consistent

164

“Mexican Bandit Raid on US Territory,” Army and Navy Journal, March 11, 1916, 896–897.

165

“Mexican Bandit Raid on US Territory,” Army and Navy Journal, 896–897.

166

Prieto, The Mexican Expedition 1916-1917, 25.

167

Julie Irene Prieto and Roger G. Miller, The Mexican Expedition 1916-1917: The Punitive Expedition
against Pancho Villa and the Mexican Revolutionaries (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United
States Army, 2017), 51–57.
168

Prieto, The Mexican Expedition 1916-1917, 30.

91
sustenance issues highlighted problems with the Army’s systems and processes. These
problems also required the Army to develop solutions over the several months of the
expedition. Another major influence on the US Army of the raid in Columbus was
congressional authorization to increase the Army in size, approve a dual state/federal status
for the National Guard, and create an Army Reserve.169 While Congress did not officially
authorize these changes until June 1916, there was an obvious connection to the Columbus
raid. Julie Prieto cited that President Wilson declared “a partial mobilization for a ‘punitive
expedition’ and to defend the border” after the raid.170 The correlation between that
declaration and Congress’s authorization to support military changes just a few months later
is straightforward. The need for more soldiers and modern equipment identified literacy and
skill gaps amongst the ranks and potential recruits.
At the beginning of the Punitive Expedition, the Army owned a few trucks but was
not the mechanized organization it would be just a few years later.171 The Army purchased
vehicles in an effort to increase their speed across the desert while chasing Villa.172 Even in
early March 1916, there were only sixteen trucks in the Southern Department and 105 trucks
and fifty-six cars in the entirety of the Army.173 The US Army learned many lessons while
using vehicles on a large scale for the first time. Early in the expedition, when the few
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vehicles the Army was using would run out of fuel, units had to wait for the mules pulling
wagons to arrive with the fuel canisters. The expedition assisted the Army in identifying
issues that hampered successful operations and provided an opportunity for the Army to
develop solutions prior to America entering WWI. These solutions ultimately required
specialized training and literacy, both of which many recruits lacked during the Punitive
Expedition and as America entered the First World War.
In 1916, the US Army forces stationed in the western part of the United States were
mainly a cavalry-based organization. Columbus, New Mexico, as well as northern Mexico,
generally lacked the vegetation needed for a large number of military units and their animals.
Even while the 13th Cavalry was in Columbus, almost all the supplies were shipped from Fort
Bliss. Alfalfa, food stores, coal oil, etc. were all shipped by railway from other parts of the
country. Prior to the raid and subsequent expedition, the Army was generally supported by an
agrarian supply line and could easily integrate illiterate troops.
It is easy to see the significance of the mechanized transition for the US Army during
the Punitive Expedition. During the Expedition’s eleven months, American forces in the
southwestern United States and Mexico began with two truck companies and less than a year
later had seventeen quartermaster truck companies moving supplies from Columbus, New
Mexico to forward operating bases within Mexico. The War Department purchased
numerous equipment, vehicles, and aircraft including 588 cargo trucks, twelve truckmounted machine shops, six tow trucks, and fifty-seven tanker trucks during the
expedition.174 These significant changes to the organizational structure of the Army had a
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tremendous effect on the success of American forces when Pershing led the American
Expeditionary Forces in Europe. Operations during WWI demonstrated how organizational
structure changes and the adoption of technology significantly affected how the Army tested
potential recruits and highlighted the need for specialized technical experts.
The US Army Chief of Staff Hugh L. Scott, in his Report of the Chief of Staff to the
War Department, made several observations on the use of “motor trucks” and “motor
cycles.” While testing motor trucks within the US Army, the military kept detailed records on
whether these vehicles were economically sound, efficient, and durable for operations.175
Scott’s report identified that the use of these vehicles to transport supplies to outlying camps
along the border between Texas and Mexico showed them to be “entirely dependable, even
over difficult roads.”176 The Army considered the trucks to be reliable but in the same report
highlighted that road conditions were a major problem for these trucks. The Army also
examined the idea of using trucks and trailers but still had to contend with the problem of
road conditions. To work on resolving the road concerns, the Army staff from the
Quartermaster Corps in 1916 reached out to manufacturers to discuss the possibility of
developing tractors that could pull several trailers on these unimproved roads.177
This was a time when the United States Army experimented with modern technology
as a means to operate more efficiently and effectively along the Texas border. During the
1916 fiscal year, the Army used twenty-five motorcycles to deliver messages at the
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headquarters as well as along the Texas border camps. It seemed that these motorized cycles
were of significant interest to the US Army Signal Corps. In the 1916 report from the Chief
Signal Officer to the War Department, Brigadier General and US Army Chief Signal Officer
George P. Scriven opined that the motorcycle was reliable and dependable for
communication and recommended the Signal Corps be provided one hundred motorcycles to
assign to sections within the existing organization.178 Scott’s report to the War Department
also considered these motor cycles to be efficient and a quick means of communication.179
The use of trucks, motor cycles, and other mechanical changes was not the only focus for the
Army, but it does seem to have taken center stage during the Expedition.180 Not everyone
wanted to move forward with the adoption of technology; the old Army was still focused on
cavalry. Even with the transition to a mechanized force on the horizon, the Army continued
its breeding of horses for military service and placed considerable effort into cavalry unit
organizational structure, regulations, and equipment.181 In contrast, by 1916, the Army was
also using the aeroplane for observation and reconnaissance and was even experimenting
with “aeroplane bombs.”182
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More than 10,000 American servicemembers were involved in the Punitive
Expedition. The Expedition included the first use of aircraft by the US Army in a military
operation. As a result of this use, the impact of American forces chasing Villa’s men in
Mexico was far-reaching. The small town of Columbus, New Mexico had a population of
about 300 in 1915, which grew to 15,000 less than two years later. This growth was a result
of American forces using Columbus as a staging base for logistics from which the Army
could supply the needed materials for the success of Pershing’s forces. Buildings, tents, and
the rail lines were all enhanced in support of military operations in Columbus. The use of
aircraft added to this expansion, requiring the development of an airstrip on the south side of
town.
While Pershing’s forces had wagons, mules, and soldiers at the beginning of the
Expedition, the addition of trucks was not the only example of the widespread expansion of
technology used by the Army.183 The introduction of aircraft into the Army demonstrated to
leaders how the lack of technical expertise created difficulties in conducting military
operations. While the Army began its school of flight training pilots in Texas prior to the
Punitive Expedition, the fact that it had yet to use this technology in a military operation
resulted in Army leaders failing to invest in significant training, education, and equipment for
aviators.184 The lessons the Army learned during its operations in Mexico eventually led the
combination of reform-minded leaders, large military operations, and the adoption of
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technology to begin investing in aviation assets through partnerships with post-secondary
education. Aviators, however, had a difficult experience during the Punitive Expedition.
The 1st Aero Squadron arrived in Columbus on March 15, 1916 to support Pershing
and the Expedition.185 The leaders of the 1st Aero Squadron faced similar problems to those
of the units attempting to integrate trucks into the Army. Luckily for the Army, the issues it
faced by utilizing the aircraft over Mexico were a benefit in disguise. The aircraft flown by
the 1st Aero Squadron lacked power and were poorly designed and the construction
techniques used to develop them were shoddy at best.186 While the US Army had used
aircraft in the Philippines some four years earlier, the number of aviators even by 1913 only
numbered a handful and the aircraft they flew were experimental. The lack of training for
aviators and technicians led to all the Army aircraft in the Philippines being crashed beyond
repair by 1915.187 By 1916, the need for aviation support during the Punitive Expedition
changed the emphasis on the program, and on March 15 the 1st Aero Squadron arrived in
Columbus, New Mexico. The officer in charge of aviation assets was Captain Benjamin D.
Foulois. He and his men arrived with eight JN-3 “Jenny” aircraft, which at the time were all
the aircraft the US Army could muster outside of those at the aviation school in San Diego,
California.188
Pershing and his forces had crossed into Mexico that same day and spent the next
several months extending the Army’s line of communication and expanding Pershing’s
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forces into what eventually became a group of districts patrolled by the US Army cavalry
regiments. The role of the 1st Aero Squadron was significant but quite different from the way
military aircraft were used during the world wars. During this Expedition, the Army was able
to experiment with bombs and even machine guns, but the majority of the work conducted by
the aviators related to reconnaissance and communications. The Army used the aircraft to
scout for hostile forces and keep track of the location of Pershing’s forces.
The challenges that Foulois and his aviators faced were a result of a lack of funds as
well as a lack of standardization. The Army purchased aircraft from manufacturers on an ad
hoc basis. Additionally, the lack of training within the US Army on how to transport,
assemble, and maintain these aircraft led to the need for the squadron to develop their own
processes without the benefit of an overarching approach from headquarters or education
from attending post-secondary institutions. Fortunately for Pershing, the squadron’s
mechanical expertise extended beyond the use of aircraft. When Foulois and his squadron
first arrived in Columbus, the Army forces on the ground had to rely on the trucks for
logistical support. The problem was that the Army had few people with experience with
motorized transport.189 Fortunately, the 1st Aero Squadron had their own organic trucks and
were able to assist in transporting equipment and men into Mexico. It was not until March 19
that Foulois and his men began conducting flights as they moved to Pershing’s headquarters
at Casas Grandes more than one hundred miles south of Columbus. Once they began, flight
operations during the Expedition yielded numerous crashed airplanes and challenging flight
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conditions and identified significant limitations with underpowered aircraft.190 The aviation
experiences demonstrated to Pershing the value of aircraft during military operations while
also demonstrating to the Army and its aviators that poorly constructed aircraft needed to be
addressed by the manufacturers.
A significant example the Army faced with these early aircraft was a problem with
propellers. The climate in Mexico and the southwestern United States caused the glue
holding the wooden propellers together to loosen, and at times the propellers would separate.
On June 19, 1916, only thirty-five minutes into a flight, the propeller on pilot Lieutenant
Chapman’s plane broke off near the hub, and while he was able to land uninjured, the aircraft
was destroyed.191 Foulois communicated these problems to senior military leaders in the
hopes that action could be taken to improve the quality of equipment and increase the safety
of military aviators. The perspective on whether these Aero squadrons were effectively
equipped and trained is unclear in some instances. On September 10, 1915, the US Army
Chief Signal Officer and Brigadier General George P. Scriven reported that, in addition to
other duties within the Signal Corps,
enlisted men, recruited from intelligent men in civil life, are given severe training and
practical instruction in telegraphy, telephony, and radiotelegraphy; as auto-mobile
and aero motor drivers; and telegraph construction and maintenance; and cable laying
and testing; in the use of scientific electrical and photographic apparatus; in the
service of automobiles; in the inflation and handling of balloon; in scouting and
reconnaissance work of aeroplanes.192
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This perspective seems quite different from that of Scriven’s own words, calling the duties
“far too onerous and difficult to be performed in their full requirement by the men and
officers now allowed.”193 It seems Foulois’ perspective less than a year later demonstrated a
lack of progress in the mechanical arts by the US Army Signal Corps and that the Army had
a need to partner with stakeholders to develop better training and education to fully use the
technology it was adopting.
The adoption of new technology and equipment was challenging at best. The Army
did not have a new equipment training program in which soldiers were trained on the
equipment in a formal manner. While there were civilian pilot schools, and even some postsecondary educational institutions offered courses on mechanical principles, soldiers found
themselves learning much of the needed skills and knowledge from trial and error. While the
Army was adopting technology with the encouragement of reform-minded leaders, without
large-scale military operations demanding significant investment, training and educational
opportunities still lacked the needed support. In addition, recruit literacy remained a problem
that had yet to be addressed.
Dwight Messimer, in his work, An Incipient Mutiny, covers in depth the history of
Aeronautics within the US Army Signal Corps and explains the numerous failures that
ultimately led to Army aviation being separated from the Signal Corps. The events prior to
the Punitive Expedition had already garnered congressional attention, creating problems for
the Signal Corps and its oversight of Army aviation. Information regarding the mechanical
failures of the JN-3 “Jenny” aircraft during the Punitive Expedition eventually made its way
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to the newspapers, creating an embarrassment for the War Department.194 As a result of this
bad publicity, Congress passed The Urgent Deficiency Act, allocating half a million dollars
for the Army to purchase twenty-four new aircraft along with other needed technology in
support of military aviation efforts.195 This approach to solving problems identified during
the Punitive Expedition was not limited to equipment but included manpower problems as
well.
Preparation for Large-Scale War
While there was some effort to prepare America for a large-scale war, it was not
nearly enough. In 1913, Major General Leonard Wood and others began developing the
Citizens’ Military Training Camps. This was a result of military leaders identifying the need
for a trained pool of men in American society from which the Army could quickly assimilate
into its ranks.196 The Punitive Expedition demonstrated how the manpower deficiencies
affected the War Department in a significant way. The continuing changes in technology,
reform-minded leaders such as Leonard Wood, and large-scale military operations such as
the Punitive Expedition created conditions the Army could no longer ignore. The Army
needed to change how it trained and educated servicemembers, as well as recruits.197
In 1916, Major General Frederick Funston had the responsibility of not only
supporting the Punitive Expedition, but also guarding the 1,700-mile United States-Mexico
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border. Due to the substantial number of troops needed to support the Punitive Expedition
while continuing to guard the border, Funston needed additional troops. With the Army
activating units from the National Guard, the lack of available and trained troops became
apparent.
The problems faced by the US Army when calling up the National Guard from the
state militias made it clear that there were neither a systematic approach to coordinate the
instruction provided to troops from the various states nor clearly written laws on the use of
these troops. The theoretical principles and practical application of warfare amongst the
states’ service schools were well documented in the 1914 work by US Army Captain Ira L.
Reeves, Military Education in the United States. The problem seemed to be that policy did
not support the state militias. Reeves cited evidence and provided commentary on the fact
that state governors were responsible for the theoretical and practical instruction of the
National Guard troops within their states and that the relationship between the War
Department and the state militias was not well-defined. Reeves went on to elaborate on the
1913 opinion of the US Attorney General, who believed that “State troops may not be
ordered beyond the limits of the United States.”198 This policy problem created a lack of
trained state militias and confusion on their use at a time when the Army needed assistance.
By 1916, the War Department had called up more than 10,000 National Guard troops
in support of the Punitive Expedition. During several months of the Expedition, leaders such
as Pershing and Funston found themselves limited in the effective use of the National Guard
due to mobilization processes and a lack of standardized training amongst the troops. To
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address the problems faced in raising forces quickly, the US Congress passed The National
Defense Act of 1916 in June.199 This not only supported the National Guard at the state level,
but also provided funding for training to ensure the National Guard units were prepared in
case of call-up at the federal level in the future. By February 1917, the War Department had
ordered Pershing and his forces to leave Mexico and began to demobilize the National Guard
forces on the border. A short two months later, some of the same National Guard soldiers
found themselves training for action in France.
Through analysis, the evidence demonstrates the time chasing Villa through northern
Mexico was well spent. The Punitive Expedition provided an opportunity for the expansion
of the US military as well as the transformation from a nineteenth century mule and wagon
organization to one that had expanded its mechanized force tremendously.200 Luckily for the
US Army, the victory over Villa’s forces during the raid was not enough for American
political leaders or the American public. The desire for action led to the Army operating in
Mexico for months, allowing the adoption and testing of new equipment as well as
integration between the active and state militia forces. Wilson’s attitude towards Carranza’s
government demonstrated that the American president believed he needed no approval from
other world leaders and chose to make his own decision to take action against Villa in
Mexico. The same type of approach applied during WWI, as Pershing chose to keep
American soldiers as part of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe, instead of using
them as individual replacements for English and French units.

199
200

United States 64th Congress, “The National Defense Act of 1916.”

United States War Department, Annual Report of the Quartermaster General to the Secretary of War,
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1917, 69-74. United States War Department, Annual Report
of the War Department, 1916, volume 1, 7-13, 189-191.

103
More importantly, the US Army learned many lessons in regard to logistics,
maneuvers, and organizational structures. At the beginning of the Punitive Expedition, the
US Army was largely a cavalry-based organization. Military units used wagons and mules to
transport supplies when trains were not available. There was a decentralized approach to
military operations. Although the 13th Cavalry was successful in repelling a larger force
during the raid on Columbus, New Mexico, the Army as a whole was not ready for the
Punitive Expedition.
The long-term benefits created from the Expedition were numerous. An
understanding of effective logistics in the mechanized age and the introduction of vehicles on
a large-scale were critical lessons learned by Army leaders.201 The adoption of aircraft and
illumination of the problems the 1st Aero Squadron encountered encouraged the US
Congress to provide funding to move the American military into the twentieth century. One
of the most significant changes that came out of the raid on Columbus was the National
Defense Act of 1916, which allowed for the funding of training in the state National Guard,
so that these organizations would be prepared if called up to operate under the federal
service.202 More than 100,000 America military men were affected by the Punitive
Expedition, but more importantly, this same funding still occurs today.
Overall, understanding how the US Army defeated a small incursion into the United
States by Pancho Villa and his bandits illuminates the numerous benefits that came about as a
result. The tactical success by the 13th Cavalry may have demonstrated to the US Army and
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Americans that the military was prepared to repel an incursion, but more importantly, the
event led to the mobilization of the National Guard and the lessons learned from the Punitive
Expedition, which assisted in preparing America for entrance into WWI.
Reflecting on the Punitive Expedition provides insight into the lack of education and
training the Army provided soldiers as they adopted new technology. The Mexican
Revolution provided an opportunity for rebel leaders such as Villa to seek power, and the
influence of President Wilson ultimately pushed Villa to attack the 13th Cavalry in
Columbus, New Mexico. This event was terrible for the town of Columbus and its residents,
but ultimately provided an opportunity for the US Army. The large forces needed to conduct
operations in Mexico, combined with the adoption of technology, illuminated the lack of
skilled technicians the Army had to conduct large-scale operations.
Prior to the raid on Columbus, the Army had what were called “post schools,” where
some units received training on the use of artillery, horsemanship, and even medical duties in
some areas. The lack of a holistic training program that was standardized across the Army led
to an unprepared reserve force with the National Guard. In addition to the lack of
standardized training, the adoption of technology such as recently purchased trucks, with
little training on their use, created both problems and opportunities for Pershing. The insights
gathered through the use of new technology including aircraft, motor drivers, and other
mechanical arts supported the perspective of Brigadier General George P. Scriven, Army
Chief Signal Officer, in his 1915 report, where he identified that the duties of many men
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were “far too onerous and difficult to be performed in their full requirement by the men and
officers now allowed.”203
The activation of the National Guard and its performance led to the passing of the
National Defense Act of 1916 in an attempt to improve mobilization processes and
standardize training amongst troops across the active component and all states. The policy
problems prior to the passage of this legislation created conditions in which state militia
lacked effective training and therefore created confusion at a time when the active Army
needed assistance most. The large-scale operation of the Punitive Expedition, combined with
action by reform-minded leaders, led to federal funding for training of National Guard units
to prepare for potential activation in the event of national emergencies. The infusion of
technology into Army units, combined with the large-scale operations of the Punitive
Expedition, required not only soldiers to fill fighting formations, but specially trained
technicians to operate and maintain equipment. The need for a change in training and
education amongst these technical experts becomes evident through an examination of the
Army’s performance during the Punitive Expedition. Shortly after the War Department
ordered Pershing and his forces to leave Mexico in February 1917, many of the same forces
found themselves preparing for action in France.
World War I
Examining the First World War provides an excellent opportunity to understand why
wars were an opportunity for the transformation of the US Army as well as post-secondary
education in America. While there are many areas to investigate from the social, political,
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and economic realms, reviewing published literature on WWI highlights two critical
influences of the war. First, WWI created problems for the progressive movement during the
war, but the war itself created conditions in which literacy in America became an issue of
strategic importance. Second, WWI created the foundation for the military-industrial
complex of WWII, which kicked the doors wide open for women in the workplace and
created conditions under which programs such as the G.I. Bill enhanced social mobility,
democratized post-secondary education, and led to postwar prosperity that lasted for
decades.204
Momentous change occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century in America,
and the influence of WWI is seen by examining the contributions of historians within their
major works. The literature illuminates how the war influenced conditions in America and,
moreover, the impact the military had on the country. When considering the question of
whether war influences the population to maintain or transform, or some combination of
both, an examination of the historiography provides perspective. A combination of these is
seen in major works such as Michael McGerr’s A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the
Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920, David Kennedy’s Over Here: The First
World War and American Society, and H. W. Brands’ American Colossus: The Triumph of
Capitalism, 1865-1900. The connection amongst these three works is the connection of
politics, the progressive movement, and capitalism as a theme during the early twentieth
century. Brands provides an excellent perspective on how industrialists such as John D.
Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and J. P. Morgan wielded much more power than the
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legislators and government officials at the beginning of the century. While the elite of the
industrial age made significant efforts to eliminate competition from the market and crush
labor problems, the contributions to American growth by industrial leaders in the capitalist
economy was discounted by those focused on supporting a progressive agenda.205
Kennedy provided a more robust perspective on American society prior to and during
the First World War. He highlighted that the progressive movement had made significant
strides, but the war itself became problematic for the progressive movement. The shift of the
Wilson administration from a less than Herculean effort to support the progressive movement
to a focus on American support for the war seemed to present a loss for the progressives, but
simultaneously allowed the government to expand and invest in partnerships between the
Army and education. WWI was a watershed in the expansion of government into what was
previously the responsibility of the states by using programs focused on Americanization,
education, defense, and information about internal subversives.206 Drawing a connection to
the investment in military and veteran educational programs helps show the growth of the
government and how the military and post-secondary partnerships of WWI influence future
programs such as the WWII G.I. Bill.
WWI influenced the progressive movement in a positive and negative manner. The
war created conditions that influenced the education of the labor force while suppressing
much of the remaining progressive agenda items. While Woodrow Wilson was seen as a
“transformative president” and an advocate for the progressive movement, he was unable to
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maintain a strong position for continued progressive changes once Americans saw entry into
the war as inevitable. The transformation of American society from neutrality into a
nationalistic view where everyone should be “100% American” was a significant challenge
for both Wilson and the progressive movement. Any dissent against the war was viewed as
anti-American. This may have been viewed as an impediment to the progressive movement
at the time, but in hindsight it increased access to post-secondary education for many
Americans.
The Need for Literacy in Army Troops
While the progressive movement waned during WWI, the federal government grew in
power and influence in response to wartime needs. A byproduct of this expansion was the
significant acquisition of mechanized equipment and other technologies in support of the
war. The need to utilize technical manuals to maintain this new equipment created conditions
under which literacy was required for many in the military service.207 Connecting this need to
the strategic goals of the government and military success allowed money to pour in for the
analysis and eventual creation of adult literacy programs in the military. One result was the
Army’s fielding in 1918 of an intelligence testing program so the service could identify,
develop, and educate servicemembers who found it difficult to perform their duties
satisfactorily.208
While the assessment and training of servicemembers by the American military may
not seem transformational, democratizing education by connecting it to a national security
issue provided funding and importance in a way that the progressive movement had yet to
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achieve. Answering the question of whether WWI presented a transformative or stabilizing
force for educational programs is still debated today. To address the need for manpower
during WWI, the War Department began examining literacy rates to ensure that personnel
brought into the Army were able to understand and carry out orders.
A leading researcher and workplace literacy expert, Thomas G. Sticht, supported the
perspective that WWI was a new way to wage war, with mechanized and technical
armaments both on the ground and in the air, that demanded an educated American society.
The horse and rifle military gave way to organizations of men that required technical
training. This transformation seemed to catch American military and civilian leaders by
surprise when they were shocked at statistics that showed that more than 25 percent of the
men called to service during WWI were illiterate, and that literacy rates were so low that
many were classified as nonfunctioning within the Army.209 Research by Clinton Anderson
and Steve Kime showed that by the end of WWI “the War Department found that 30 percent
of the 1.7 million soldiers taking the Army Beta Test could not understand the form due to
their lack of reading skills.”210 Data such as this influenced the US Army to take action to
ensure its manpower needs in this new mechanized and technological age were met.
When considering education in America, what quickly comes to mind is primary,
secondary, and post-secondary education. In addition to those, the United States also has the
Adult Education and Literacy System (AELS), which today is funded in some part by
appropriations from the US Congress and the remainder by state and local governments. An
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examination of where the AELS began illuminates the frequently overlooked role of the US
military in the development of literacy and adult education programs in America. During
WWI, as a need to ensure potential recruits were literate enough to succeed as
servicemembers, the Army sponsored the development of the first standardized intelligence
test focused on literacy and education in America. In conjunction with educators, literacy
education within the Army happened in what was called “development battalions.”211 Here is
where Robert Mearns Yerkes enters the story.
Robert Mearns Yerkes
Yerkes was the son of a farmer in rural Pennsylvania and spent his early years
helping on the farm while using his free time to achieve his goal of becoming educated. At a
young age, Yerkes decided he wanted a career in the medical field. Once he graduated from
college, however, and faced the decision of entering graduate or medical school, he chose
graduate school, completing a doctorate in psychology in 1902. Over the following decade,
Yerkes became very influential in human intelligence studies. He worked on the revisions of
the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale in 1916 and later became the president of the American
Psychological Association. Yerkes was a psychologist with a desire to move the science of
intelligence testing forward, and the Army’s needs during WWI provided just such an
opportunity.
When war broke out in 1917, Yerkes was appointed a major in the US Army Medical
Corps. After his appointment, he was assigned the responsibility of Army recruit testing
while leading a team of forty psychologists. These recruit tests were a significant change in
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the field of human intelligence, and the war gave Yerkes and his colleagues a rare
opportunity for large-scale testing. Under Yerkes’ leadership, the team developed the Army
Alpha and Beta testing models. The Alpha Test was a written examination developed to test
intelligence and predicated on the ability of the individual being tested to read English. The
Beta Test was a series of pictures used to examine the intelligence of either illiterate or nonEnglish-speaking recruits. By the end of the war, the Army had tested more than 1.7 million
recruits and soldiers using the Alpha and Beta tests.212
Of course, Yerkes did not achieve these accomplishments alone. Psychologists Walter
Scott and Walter Bingham were simultaneously developing a military personnel program that
built on their work developing tests for the selection of salesmen.213 Yerkes convinced Scott
they should work together and that by combining their efforts they might have a better
outcome. It also helped that Scott had the support of then Secretary of War Newton Baker,
while Yerkes was finding it difficult to convince even his own psychologists.214 Within a
short period of time, Yerkes became a member of Scott’s Committee on Classification of
Personnel and in 1917, the committee convinced the War College’s Committee on Training
of the validity and benefit of the testing. The evidence even persuaded the Army to establish
the “school of military psychology” to standardize test examiner training to ensure the data
gathered were useful both scientifically and militarily.215
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Not everybody agreed with the value of these tests, with many officers considering
the training and mobilization of the Army to be the highest priority and the testing and
selection of recruits and officers for placement as undermining traditional military
processes.216 While there were many problems with the questions contained in the Alpha
Test, as well as difficulties with language pushing others to the Beta Test, the partnership
between educators and the military was evident. With intelligence testing as a science being
in its infancy, efforts such as the classification of personnel and Alpha and Beta testing had
created significant changes to how the US Army assigned men to units. After the war,
military recruiters continued to administer intelligence tests to potential recruits when they
were uncertain of their literacy.
The long-term impact of the work of Yerkes, Bingham, and Scott extends far beyond
the military. Intelligence testing became practical, and after the war, primary and secondary
schools began using testing more extensively, while universities adopted admissions testing.
Aptitude tests continued to develop during WWII, while the use of academic testing to
measure learning outcomes expanded. Researchers across multiple academic disciplines
today may point out problems with Yerkes’ approach or findings; however, the relationship
between the US military and academia enhanced processes and created an understanding of
how literacy affected servicemembers, the military, and education. Analyzing Yerkes helps
to emphasize this critical point.
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The Effect of Partnerships between the Military and Academic Institutions
While testing in the US Army identified many potential recruits as being illiterate or
non-native speakers, this classification also provided an opportunity for training
servicemembers arriving at different levels of proficiency. Efforts to classify men and
provide them training based on the needs of the Army and the capabilities of each individual
had direct connections to educational and training programs during WWII. The need for
technically proficient and educated men led the Army to quickly establish programs such the
SATC. This program provided both academic and vocational training to thousands of men
during the war. The war showed Americans that there was a significant need to invest in a
combination of military and educational activities. During WWI, the identification efforts of
the Army yielded problems on a scale that few expected. In the US Army, approximately 24
percent of soldiers could not write or read English with enough capacity for it to be useful
within the Army; moreover, approximately one-third of all potential Army recruits from the
21–45 year age group were physically unfit for any military service whatsoever.217 These
staggering statistics highlighted the benefits of classification of personnel and literacy testing.
The partnership between post-secondary educational institutions, the War
Department’s Committee on Education and Special Training, and the SATC is best
understood by looking at the interaction amongst these groups. The relationship between
SMU and the US War Department provides a unique perspective on the number of students
in the program as well as the value it provided to all stakeholders.
The US Congress gave the War Department authority to establish the SATC on May
18, 1917, approximately a month after the United States officially entered WWI. Passing
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what is today known as the Selective Service Act, President Wilson gained the ability to
increase military forces temporarily during emergencies. Although the war ended November
11, 1918, the United States’ manpower investments continued beyond that date, spanning the
military, industry, and educational institutions. The SATC showed how the efforts to train
and educate soldiers continued to advance during WWI. More importantly, this partnership
between the US military and educational institutions provided the foundation on which
training and education was built during WWII. The land-grant colleges, ROTC, and military
training camps were a start, but the WWI SATC took the military and American postsecondary education relationship even further.
The War Department’s Committee on Education and Special Training administered
the SATC with the goal of maximizing the use of post-secondary educational institutions to
train technical experts and officer candidates for the needs of the military. The program was
divided into a collegiate section known as “Section A” and a vocational section known as
“Section B.” Although the military already had ROTC programs in colleges across America,
as well as training institutions as required by the Morrill Land-Grant Act, this program
dwarfed both in the sheer number of men who were part of the program. While changes in
the Selective Service Act lowered the age of men who might be drafted to 18, university
leaders wanted exceptions for the men enrolled in the SATC at universities across America.
This desire was summarized in a memorandum from SMU President R. S. Hyer to the
Adjutant General of the US Army, writing to confirm that “men over eighteen who enroll
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will be members of the Army of the United States, liable to active duty at call of President,
but aim not to call them till twenty-one.”218
Even though the SATC program was short in duration, the program was designed
with significant depth. The goal of the “Section A” instruction was to cover military topics
such as drilling physical training eleven hours a week. Other instruction in what was called
“allied subjects” covered forty-two hours, using the model of two hours of supervised study
for each hour of lecture. The allied subject courses included language, mathematics, sciences,
and engineering, along with a mandatory “war-issues course” which covered the underlying
reasons for the war.219 As part of the agreement, the government would issue property and
uniforms and pay for equipment the universities needed to ensure effective completion of the
program. For a university or college to be eligible to have an SATC program, they needed to
be able to maintain a unit with a strength of at least one hundred men. This limited some
smaller colleges, which did not possess the facilities to dedicate to the program.
As for the “Section B” instruction, it also included the war-issues course as well as
military subjects, with vocational instruction comprising the majority of the week.220 At first
it was problematic for school officials to operate along the specialized technical lines. When
men arrived, they were given an outline of what they would learn and then performed handson activities to learn skills needed to do the jobs of carpenter, blacksmith, auto mechanic, and
mechanical draftsman, among others. The expanded use of technology in warfare created a
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demand for post-secondary education to train men in vocational skills. The view of college as
a place for only liberal arts in deep thinking was being challenged by the demand for trained
men. Apprenticeships were not an option, as the job growth far outpaced the on-the-job
training capacity. By March 1918, the Army had requisitioned more than 85,000 tradesmen,
of which 70 percent would be trained in the “auto trades.”221 Identifying men with the
Army’s new classification system allowed for the assigning of SATC courses to men based
on experience and potential, which gave them an opportunity to produce their best work.
Colleges were able to build on the initial SATC program experiences, and for some
occupations—such as electrician, telephone repairman, and machinist—educators identified
the need for a higher level of intelligence. There were some unanticipated successes. For
instance, sometimes men who were inexperienced in the vocation which they were receiving
training astonished program leaders at how quickly they gained proficiency. As an example,
Channing Rice Dooley’s Final Report of the National Army Training Detachments, Later
Known as Vocational Section S.A.T.C. reported, “Farmers totally ignorant of the tinsmith
trade produced work of commercial quality including the making of their own patterns and
involving principles of descriptive geometry.”222 Rarely seen were men who failed
completely; on the contrary, a significant number of men found they were better suited for
another line of work, while others with no technical trade had found themselves gaining
skills they might use after the war to improve their lot in life.223
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The vocational, or “Section B”, instruction filled the gap that industry within America
needed before the war. The demand for skilled workmen was a critical need in industrial and
commercial activities in American society. The Army’s partnership with educational
institutions in response to the war not only demonstrated patriotism to serve the country, but
also provided an opportunity for more than 140,000 soldiers to complete the vocational
instruction training as part of the SATC program.224 The program did identify some
shortfalls, such as the inexperience of many of the educational institutions in providing
intensive vocational education, but this also provided the opportunity to develop personnel
classification tests for the trade industry along with the development and distribution of
instructional manuals, which were later used at Army training schools on camps, posts, and
stations around the world. Dooley also reported in 1919 that in times of peace, the
coordination of these Army schools and industry would give well-rounded training in the
corresponding civilian trade, and therefore “soldiers honorably discharged at the end of the
term of enlistment would find ready employment in the industries at attractive wages,” thus
increasing the quality of volunteers and morale in the peacetime Army.225 This type of
forward thinking would later have an influence on military training and educational programs
during WWII, as well as on the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.
The SATC program’s influence on the financial status of universities is a principal
factor in the partnering between the Army and higher education. With the United States
entering the war, institutions such as the University of Illinois had more than a thousand men
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withdraw from the university to fight in the war by May 1917. The low enrollment numbers
affected universities across the country financially. This program provided an opportunity for
universities to solicit for men to attend their institutions. The challenge was to gain approval
for and establish an SATC program. On May 8, 1918, Secretary of War Newton Baker issued
a memorandum to the presidents of all institutions of collegiate grade, indicating that the War
Department intended to implement a comprehensive plan in September 1918 to coordinate all
ROTC programs and include them in the broader plan. In response, SMU President R. S.
Hyer drafted a handwritten statement to the Adjutant General of the US Army, highlighting
how SMU was a “great university with 650 students enrolled in the 1917-1918 school
year.”226 In his letter, Hyer elaborated on the new buildings as well as the quality of the
faculty and provided the Army with data supporting its ability to bring on 600 new students
and organize SATC members into six companies, providing them classes in military tactics
by their Canadian officer faculty member in support of the War Department’s efforts.227
After several communiqués back and forth between SMU and the War Department’s
Committee on Education and Special Training, the university established an SATC program
and found itself receiving many requests for information on the program from men across
East Texas. One example is a letter dated August 11, 1918, from N. O. Robbins, the First
Vice President of the Texas State Teachers Association. Robbins requested information
regarding the work between the War Department and the colleges of Texas. In his letter,
Robbins explained that he knew “practically nothing about military training in the Army”—
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mentioning that, should he receive training, he might increase his services to the country—
and asked whether he would be eligible to enlist in SMU for special training.228 Other men
wanted to join the SATC, such as Abie Andrews, a 20-year-old Russian citizen who had been
in the United States for over nine years and James Aimer, an 18-year-old British citizen who
had spent twelve years in the United States. Both students at SMU, the men wanted to join
the SATC but, due to their non-citizen status, required approval from the War Department’s
Committee on Education and Special Training.229 Efforts by the university to maximize
student enrollment in the SATC demonstrated the value the program provided the institution.
While there was significant effort within colleges and universities to support the war
effort, leaders understood that the maintenance of higher education in America had to be
considered part of the war effort. The Dallas News, a local newspaper, reported that the War
Department was “calling on colleges of Texas for 2449 men for the S.A.T.C.” and on the
same page of the newspaper highlighted that “college is not a refuge for slackers.”230 The
attitude towards the war was one of significant commitment. The need for trained men
resulted in many changes to the ROTC program, the National Guard, and the selective
service process.
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In Texas, General John Augustus Hulen had been recalled to active service in 1916
and was patrolling the Texas-Mexico border as the commander of the 6th Separate Brigade.
By June 1917, Hulen was the Commanding General of the Texas National Guard and
between June and July 1917 received hundreds of letters petitioning him for a commission
with the Texas National Guard. Hulen’s perspective on the passing of the 1916 National
Defense Act was demonstrated in his June 18, 1917, letter to the twenty-four speakers for the
National Guard campaign of Texas. In his six-page document, Hulen outlined the benefits of
gaining volunteers immediately to “fill the breach” and stated that any delay waiting for the
draft would “be certain to cause our allies and our own armies a loss in men and munitions
which nothing can justify.”231 Examining documents such as this provides perspective on the
competing demands for manpower for military units and the SATC program. The regular
Army was looking for men to fill its ranks, each state’s National Guard sought to
communicate the benefits of working with their own neighbors, and leaders of colleges and
universities wanted to ensure the continued successful operation of their institutions while
providing support for the war. It was a challenging time indeed.
SMU took advantage of the SATC program and its opportunities in multiple ways.
The institution worked on developing a lecture course on the “Flying Machine,” training
courses on gasoline engines for automobiles including construction and repair, and courses
on practical wireless telegraphy.232 While these supported the military’s need for trained
technicians, SMU also benefited. The university invested in building laboratory facilities in
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support of this effort.233 The financial aspects of the SATC program for SMU demonstrated
the benefits the program provided the university. According to the statement of claim for
reimbursement of costs by SMU dated March 31, 1919, the university president spent twothirds of his time devoted to the SATC program, and therefore the government’s cost was
$1,098.88. The overall financial cost to the government during the school year for housing
was $14,640.99, for subsistence the bill was $18,934.13, and for instruction it was
$17,679.07. Overall, the actual costs incurred by the university based on the SATC program
required the government to pay $51,254.19.234 This is equivalent to $856,534.54 in the year
2022. While this may not seem significant compared to today’s university annual income
statements, SMU’s total annual income between 1915 and 1918 was between $110,000 and
$116,000 each year. Additionally, between 706 and 904 students attended courses of college
and professional grade during these three years. The addition of more than one hundred
students was a significant benefit to SMU, particularly since enrollments across America
were falling dramatically as a result of men joining the military. Ultimately for SMU, the
more than $50,000 paid by the government for the 1918–1919 school year kept the university
fiscally sound while enabling SMU to contribute to the war effort.
With 150 universities across the United States participating in the program, a
significant financial investment in this partnership kept universities afloat at a time when
men were withdrawing from college to take jobs in key industry positions or fight in the war.
By the time the War Department’s Committee on Education and Special Training issued its
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memorandum on the demobilization of the SATC on November 26, 1918, more than 100,000
men had been involved in the SATC program. These men attended technical and liberal arts
courses in colleges and universities across America. The War Department’s financial
investment in colleges and universities in America during WWI may have provided the
foundation for similar partnerships in WWII and beyond.
The SATC program ended as quickly as it began. In November 1919, the War
Department’s Chairman of the Committee on Education and Special Training, Brigadier
General R. I. Rees, issued memorandum A-40, notifying the presidents of all participating
institutions that the telegram they received regarding the notification of demobilization for
the SATC was confirmed and that instructions regarding the Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps would be forthcoming.235 Some organizations, such as SMU, had been operating the
program on the campus for the entire school year, while others, such as Johns Hopkins
University, had requested 708 students be assigned, and by the time of the demobilization
order its SATC students had only been on campus for two months. The benefit to each
organization varied based on the length of time it took to establish the program.
Summary of the Need for Education in the Military in the Early Twentieth Century
As Americans entered the twentieth century, the US Army found itself with one foot
in the past and the other hesitantly stepping into the future. The advances in technology as a
result of electricity, mechanical engineering, and transportation were moving forward so
quickly that military leaders and training programs could hardly keep up. Part of the problem
was the attitude towards tradition and past practices, and the successful prosecution of the
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Spanish-American War may have led to leaders learning the wrong lessons. While this was
not universal, and leaders such as General Leonard Wood and Elihu Root had helped to
institute change with the Citizens’ Military Training Camps, it was Pancho Villa and his raid
on Columbus, New Mexico that forced Americans to take steps towards modernizing its
military.
The Mexican Revolution between 1910 and 1920 created conditions that spilled over
into American towns along the United States-Mexico border. Assigning patrol districts to
organizations such as the 13th US Cavalry Regiment increased security but did little to
reduce tensions between the warring factions in Mexico. The political environment between
President Wilson and Mexican leaders, along with the Tampico and Veracruz incidents, did
little to quell the situation between the two countries. Villa’s 1916 raid on Columbus led to
an expensive but valuable Punitive Expedition.236
Under General Pershing’s leadership, the Expedition was a significant effort,
requiring thousands of US Army troops to operate wagons, pack animals, and motorized
trucks throughout the Mexican desert in the largest maneuver of US forces since the
American Civil War. This operation identified many of the flaws within the Army’s
quartermaster system, and also identified the need for additional training for the American
state militia forces.237 As a result, Congress authorized an increase in the Army size, updated
the status of the National Guard, and created an Army Reserve. The mobilization for the
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Punitive Expedition helped the Army transform from a cavalry to a mechanized structure.238
This not only improved operations during the Expedition, but the significant changes to the
organizational structure of the Army had a significant effect on the success of the American
forces when Pershing led the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe only months later.
During the Punitive Expedition, the Army also tested its first use of aircraft in an
operational environment. The 1st Aero Squadron encountered a wide variety of problems
with aircraft that lacked power and were poorly designed and constructed. The challenges
Army aviators faced led to improvements in the Army aviation program as well as feedback
to manufacturers with the goal of improving quality. Overall, the time spent chasing Villa in
Mexico and operating in the desert was well spent for the US Army. More than 100,000
American military men were affected by this Expedition and the lessons learned helped to
prepare America for entrance into WWI. Moreover, it introduced these changing
technologies in a way that made the Army aware of the need for literate and technically
proficient soldiers to operate and maintain new types of equipment.
The benefits of the Punitive Expedition can be seen through an examination of WWI.
The strategic goals of the government and military poured money into new equipment and
created conditions under which literacy became a requirement for many in the military
service. This led to a partnership between the US military and educational researchers to
identify, develop, and educate servicemembers who found it difficult to perform their duties
in a satisfactory manner. The examination of literacy rates by the War Department provided
shocking statistics: 25 percent of the men called to duty either had a literacy rate so low that

238

United States War Department, Annual Report of the Quartermaster General to the Secretary of War,
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1917, 69-74.

125
they were not effective within the Army, or they were illiterate altogether.239 As a result of
the Army’s work with educators, literacy education within the Army began during the
recruitment process when potential men with no other impediments were assigned to
developmental battalions for education. This proved to be successful, and in a matter of
weeks those who would previously have been turned away were educated to a point where
they would be effective within the Army. While this was significant, the SATC was at the
other end of the spectrum.
The WWI SATC program came about as an expansion of the ROTC program once
the Selective Service Act was passed. The SATC program increased relations and
partnerships between the US Army and American universities and colleges even further. This
program provided collegiate and vocational sections to train men in areas that benefited the
Army. Some men trained as potential officer leaders and others in technical subjects to meet
the Army’s projected needs. While the SATC program was short-lived, it provided an
opportunity for the development of experts should the war last more than a few years. The
benefit the universities and colleges gained from the influx of students ensured their financial
success by filling the gap left when men who would have traditionally attended college
signed up to serve in the war. While there were competing priorities, such as each state
focusing on increasing the numbers of their National Guard units, institutions such as SMU
exemplified how the program was beneficial for the Army, students, and institutions alike.
With more than 150 universities and 100,000 students enrolled, the significance of
participating in the program, where the military partnered with post-secondary education,
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demonstrated to leaders across America how a combined effort might be capitalized on in the
future. While the Punitive Expedition, literacy, and the SATC program were significant, the
relationship between the US military and educational institutions during WWII expanded
even further.
By 1920, America had demonstrated its ability to respond to a global emergency. The
preparation started with General Wood in 1913 with the Citizens’ Military Training Camps
and further developed as the Army encountered manpower problems during the Punitive
Expedition and WWI. The military and civilian efforts demonstrated during the war that the
organized National Guard was useful, but a combination of efforts such as the military
training camps, the National Guard, and the ROTC along with other programs could yield a
much larger impact. The education of recruits continued after the war, and Ralph Perry
described the Army’s impact on literacy in 1921, writing, “On December 1, 1920, there were
4,500 illiterate soldiers receiving instruction at six Recruit Education Centres which graduate
about 1,000 men each month.”240 The legacy of the WWI literacy, training, and
categorization efforts lived on. The partnership and investment between the Army and postsecondary education continued after WWI only to be overshadowed by the WWII education
and training programs.

240

Perry, The Plattsburgh Movement, 255.

127
CHAPTER FOUR: POST-WORLD WAR I INTO WORLD WAR II
The major challenges faced from the time World War I ended through World War II
focused on demobilization and the efforts to address veteran education, rehabilitation, and
compensation. Throughout the interwar period, veterans faced significant challenges that
ultimately led to the Bonus Army incident, in which thousands of veterans marched on
Washington in the hopes of early wartime bonus payments the federal government promised
as part of the veteran WWI demobilization efforts. The slow growth in the American
economy after WWI had a significant impact on America’s ability as it entered WWII. The
increased need for literacy and technical skills in servicemembers, and the lack of widespread
possession of these skills by American men, led to partnerships between the War Department
and post-secondary education developing programs such as the Army Specialized Training
Program as well as a widespread literacy testing program, which expanded on the successes
learned during WWI. The significant increase in technological advancements, the need for
reform, and the large-scale military operations during WWII placed continued demands upon
the American military and post-secondary education to partner in developing solutions to
address the challenges America faced during the war.
During WWI, the United States invested significantly in programs to prepare
servicemembers and potential inductees for military duty. The lessons the Army learned from
the Punitive Expedition and the technological changes it faced at the beginning of the
twentieth century identified problems that leaders sought to resolve while also fighting in the
war. Literacy was a significant problem for the Army when considering the pool of potential
recruits in America. The need to ensure potential recruits possessed the literacy skills needed
to be successful in this new Army demanded partnerships between the War Department and
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educators such as Robert Yerkes. These partnerships extended beyond researchers and into
post-secondary education, as demonstrated in the chapter three example with SMU. Working
with educational institutions during WWI, establishing the SATC, and the early development
of the Citizens’ Military Training Camps before and during WWI was just the beginning. An
examination of the post-WWI into WWII period illuminates how the Army influenced
education in America during WWII by learning from its experience with the Bonus Army
incident, establishing the Army Specialized Training Program, and building on literacy
programs from WWI to meet the demand for personnel and military units across the Army.
Demobilization Issues
At the end of WWI, the United States focused on a rapid demobilization of military
forces. With more than 4.5 million Americans fighting during WWI, and more than 70
percent being conscripted as part of the Selective Service Act, the Great War resulted in
legislation that increased benefits for veterans. This postwar time reveals how organizations
such as the American Legion began to expand the influence of veterans in America. It also
connects to political problems such as the government’s treatment of the Bonus Army in
1932, when veterans, along with many others in America who were out of work and unable
to support themselves or their families, marched on Washington in hopes of receiving an
early payment of WWI veteran benefits. This led to a significant problem when the Army
burned the veteran encampment to the ground, leading to political problems for multiple
American presidents. During the interwar years, political leaders attempted to address
America’s societal problems for veterans. Congress passed legislation such as the War Risk
Insurance Act, providing support for families of servicemembers who died or became

129
disabled while in service, while also providing voluntary life insurance at a very low rate.241
Legislators also passed the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1918, which provided an
opportunity for those men disabled during the First World War to receive training that would
enable them to reenter the workforce.242 Finally, the passage of the Selective Service Act had
a significant impact on Americans, as it required men to sign up and potentially become
conscripted for military service. Each of these pieces of legislation had lasting impacts as
America entered WWII.
The legislation and programs that Congress established to assist veterans during their
transition from the military back to civilian life were similar to General Leonard Wood’s
effort to establish the Citizens’ Military Training Camps in 1912. Each sought to prepare a
group of people for the future. One such effort was the proposal by US Senator Michael
Hoke Smith, who advocated for adding language in the Army Reorganization Bill of 1916
whereby soldiers on active duty would receive ninety-six hours a month to study and receive
educational instruction not connected directly to military service, in preparation for their
return to civilian life.243 American leaders understood the potential problems of recruiting
and the connection to the need for veteran employment opportunities. However, veteran
programs were not the only significant efforts to come out of WWI. Army literacy programs
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continued, as the expansion of technology while waging war created an increased demand for
a trained and educated workforce. The significant investment in training technicians and
educating leaders continued to grow after WWI. While taxpayer-funded adult education
programs had their inception during WWI and continued after the war, the infusion of federal
money for military purposes affected literacy and language as well.
The demobilization of millions of men serving in the US military at the end of The
Great War proved to be a significant challenge for the War Department. Not only were the
men serving overseas part of the demobilization, but many men were still in training while
others had only just taken their oath of allegiance the morning the Allies signed the
armistice.244 Demobilization was a complicated affair. As a result of the armistice, Secretary
of War Newton Baker identified the development battalions at all camps to be the first units
demobilized, starting on November 15, 1918. Baker also stated that
every man who is discharged from the Army has to have a physical examination and
a very careful record made for statistical status, and instead of furloughing them and
then discharging they will be discharged, so that there may be no subsequent claims
against the government.245
Both Baker and then US Army Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March provided an
overview of the demobilization plans, which many in American industry attempted to
influence. Baker and March eventually developed and implemented a demobilization plan
that prioritized military needs. Their efforts to work in cooperation with the Department of
Labor and the War Industries Board were combined with the need to increase processing
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speed to muster out millions of soldiers, and as March informed reporters, ultimately achieve
the ability to discharge 30,000 men a day.246 Many economists and progressive Americans
advised General March to demobilize the Army based on the needs of American industry to
support the filling of critical jobs. March, however, focused on demobilization based on what
made sense for military units. Baker supported the demobilization approach; he considered
this approach as not only efficient, but equitable to the servicemembers.247
In transporting men from Europe back to the United States, the industrial might
utilized originally to move troops into Europe during the war was no longer available. At the
end of the war, the postwar rate of returning men home from the European theater was
affected by the War Department’s transport capacity. Only one-third of the capacity available
during the war was at the disposal of the military immediately after the armistice, creating a
significant problem for the American military. To solve the problem, the War Department
modified naval ships and chartered passenger vessels to increase the troop transport capacity.
By June 1919, the Americans were transporting troops across the ocean at a monthly rate that
exceeded the highest transport numbers during the war by more than 60,000 soldiers.248 The
War Department leaders understood the pressures to “get our boys home” and responded
effectively. This rapid demobilization may have made soldiers happy in the short term, but
the economy and the need for employment would later influence their thoughts on veteran’s
benefits.
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Other concerns with the demobilization were the need for men to continue military
unit operations, the question of who the military would demobilize first, and the impact of
demobilization on the American economy.249 Many officers holding commissions in the
Army wanted to tender their resignation and return home immediately. The presidential
determination under Section 9, Act of Congress, of May 18, 1917, informed officers, except
those holding commissions in the regular Army, that the military would discharge them as
soon as the military could spare their services. Some officers saw this an opportunity to
depart the Army as soon as possible.250 The resignation letters poured in and were
problematic for the Army. As a result, Army leadership issued a directive that the Army
would not accept or consider officer resignations.
The War Department faced significant challenges in the demobilization far beyond
releasing men from service. The military halted multiple construction projects and supply
contracts across the country, as the Armed Forces no longer needed them.251 The
construction of a Radio School in Camp Jackson, South Carolina, as well as cantonment
areas for more than 10,000 men each at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana and Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas demonstrated the complications facing the War Department during
demobilization.252 As men working on these projects were laid off, they were in competition
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with returning servicemembers seeking civilian employment. In addition to construction
project terminations and officer resignations, the War Department’s demobilization efforts
needed to address the uncertainty of veterans returning to civilian life. For those soldiers who
were not immediately discharged, Army leaders invested in their education to keep them
busy and assist them in the transition to civilian life.
Efforts to Address Veteran Education and Rehabilitation Issues
In a continued effort to educate soldiers, those who remained in Europe as part of the
occupying force had an opportunity to attend courses and pursue learning opportunities.
Leaders such as General John J. Pershing and General March, took a top-down approach to
ensure that soldiers stayed busy with military drills such as cavalry, artillery, and infantry
exercises, but the Army also established educational classes to reduce boredom amongst
American soldiers stationed in Europe as an occupying force. Military historians Brian
Neumann and Shane Makowicki explained that “[t]he Army Educational Commission and
the section of the general staff that coordinated education and training managed to secure a
substantial number of textbooks on topics ranging from American history to farm
management and business law.”253 These books supported the Post Schools, enabling them to
provide classes on a wide variety of topics. The success of these classes provided examples
for future Army education and veteran return-to-work programs.254
The effort to reduce the illiteracy rate was a passion of General Pershing. His focus
on these learning opportunities came from his desire to ensure men stayed out of trouble and
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used their free time in a “profitable and enjoyable method.”255 People at all levels within the
Army observed the literacy problems. One chaplain in the 165th Infantry noted during WWI
that there were 200 soldiers in the unit who could not sign their name to the payroll ledger.
Illiteracy continued to be a problem in the Army, but senior leaders saw the occupying force
as a chance to provide learning opportunities and improve educational standing amongst
soldiers before they left the Army.256 In support of this effort, Pershing requested his
commanders identify men from within their formations who could teach educational classes.
Once units identified the men, commanders could request the needed books from the Army
Educational Commission and schedule classes. Efforts towards literacy and educational
advancement in the Army that continued into WWII built on the successes of the WWI and
postwar efforts.
Addressing injuries as part of the demobilization required significant effort by the
Army and was not always appreciated by servicemembers. The Army had more than 250,000
men pending disability compensation for exposure to poison gas, injury, or some other
serious health problem resulting from the war. Many of these men simply wanted to leave the
military and therefore chose not to claim any level of disability. Over time, this quick
departure became a larger problem for soldiers requiring long-term care. The Army had a
policy of keeping men requiring long-term care on the active Army roles to ensure that they
received hospitalization, domiciliary treatment, and even prosthetics. Many men wanted to
exit the military as quickly as possible and return to their civilian life. Therefore, those who
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wanted a quick discharge and could hide the need for treatment, did so. These shortsighted
decisions created problems later and limited access to programs that may have assisted those
veterans in returning to work such as retraining benefits provided by the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1918. Establishing veterans’ benefits that did not require men to remain
on active duty, but still allow them to receive treatment, was still a work in progress. It was
not until 1930 and the consolidation of the Veterans Bureau, the Pensions Bureau from the
Department of the Interior, and the War Department’s Soldiers’ Home that support from a
single dedicated organization was available to veterans.257
Policies to provide veteran benefits were not new to Americans, but WWI saw the
significant expansion of these benefits. Previous veterans’ benefits included the American
Civil War General Pension Act of 1862, which provided disability payments to veterans and
their dependents. Congress modified the 1862 legislation multiple times over the years and
eventually passed the 1912 Sherwood Act, which expanded eligibility and provided a
pension to veterans aged 62 and older. In 1917, Congress debated the War Risk Insurance
Act, which eventually provided life insurance as well as vocational and rehabilitative training
for veterans with permanent disabilities.258 Those who chose to stay on active duty after the
war could claim the benefit of training. With more than 100,000 men dying while in service,
and many more returning with disabilities, this approach helped some but overall supported
only a small number of the more than four million Americans in the service during WWI.
The War Risk Insurance Act of 1917 provided for rehabilitation and reeducation of all
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disabled soldiers. Those the military did not consider disabled still faced the challenge of
having less experience than those who remained in their jobs and industry while others
fought overseas.
A significant difference between WWI and previous conflicts, for America, was that
during WWI, the military conscripted more than 70 percent of Americans who served.259
This was far greater than any previous war. As a result, American leaders saw not only the
problem of disability in veterans, but also the reduction in income from military pay
compared to what a man could have earned had he not served. To address this problem, later
in the war the military increased the basic monthly salary to $30, and when discharging
servicemembers at the end of WWI, the men received $60 and a train ticket home. While that
seemed to help, after the war the American economy was lackluster and by spring of 1919,
more than one-third of veterans were unemployed.
Congress did take action to help veterans with the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act
of 1917. One of the authors of the bill, Senator Michael Hoke Smith, had previously
advocated for servicemembers to receive dedicated time for educational instruction to
prepare them for civilian life. The Smith-Hughes Act was known formally as the National
Vocation Education Act, and it promoted vocational education in industrial and agricultural
trades.260 While this act was not solely for servicemembers or veterans, the authors did write
it to address the needs of the labor force in America and allocate federal funding in support
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of American education. The benefit of this type of legislation was that it paved the way for
additional federal funding in support of veteran programs.
A year after the passing of the National Vocation Education Act, the Soldier’s
Rehabilitation Act of 1918 also passed. This provided not only compensation but also
training for veterans who had been injured in the war and were not able to return to their
previous professions. Many saw this legislation as a way to rehabilitate disabled veterans and
incorporate them back into the civilian workforce and saw the program as being both helpful
and cost-effective.261 During and coming out of WWI, many focused on how modern
medicine might eliminate some of the societal problems that resulted from war. With
appropriate vocational and physical support, along with reconstruction, men who had been
blinded, became deaf, or had amputated limbs could be effective contributors to society.262
Of course, helping veterans was not the only reason for investing in their rehabilitation. It is
estimated that by 1916, the cost of Civil War pensions to the United States was more than $5
billion.263 The fact that modern medicine allowed men who would previously have died from
their wounds to return home caused leaders to anticipate a more significant economic burden
on the nation and determine that action was needed.
The attitude towards disabilities and rehabilitation went through a transformational
change during this progressive era. As the war began, leaders such as US Army Medical
Corps Lieutenant Colonel Harry Mock focused on the Army “mak[ing] plans to reclaim the
soldiers” instead of simply providing homes or pensions that would support but not empower
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the rehabilitation of disabled soldiers.264 Physically reconstructing these veterans, coupled
with retraining them for new work that suited the goals of the men and their disabilities,
became the goal for social and economic reasons.265
The need to focus on industry and putting veterans back to work during
demobilization was a topic of great interest towards the end of the war. William Stoddard,
the 1918–1919 administrator of the National War Labor Board, highlighted in his January
1918 article that statistics from France and Belgium projected large numbers of American
troops returning with disabilities. Stoddard opined that “that the vocational rehabilitation of
disabled soldiers is a very wise business investment” using France as an example, where they
re-educated nearly 1,800 wounded men in four months, ultimately eliminating the need for
the men to receive pension payments.266 This elimination of these pension payments resulted
in France saving $1,930,000.267 The win-win regarding the progressive agenda and federal
economic savings was in the minds of many American leaders involved in policy and
programs after WWI.
Several veteran program changes occurred after WWI, with many of the changes
influenced by veteran organizations. More than one hundred veteran organizations existed by
1920, with the American Legion being one of the most powerful. In 2015, James Ridgway,
Chief Counsel for Policy and Procedure at the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, provided a
historical perspective on the 1919 founding of the American Legion by WWI veterans.
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Ridgway explained that WWI veterans needed a hospital system that could manage the
overwhelming number of veterans returning from Europe.268 Ridgway wrote that “in 1921,
The American Legion helped issue a report that publicized the fact that shell-shocked
veterans were being sent to hospitals for feeble-minded children because there was no other
space elsewhere, and they were forced to sit on infant chairs.”269 While the American
Legion’s report may not have been interpreted as significant compared to other published
reports of the time, Ridgway suggested that the report “was one of the first triumphs of The
American Legion, to bring to light the conditions in the (veterans) hospital system, which led
to substantial new funding to expand capacity of the system.”270 While only two years old in
1921, the American Legion was quickly becoming an influential organization that eventually
used its influence to affect the passage of the post-WWII G.I. Bill.
Legislation Supporting Veteran Compensation
The American Legion also fought for compensation to WWI veterans to make up for
lost wages in relation to salary they received during their war service. For example, the
Legion lobbied for the World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924. This, of course, was
not without conflict.271 American Legion delegate John F. J. Herbert from Worcester,
Massachusetts had a significant problem with the words “Adjusted Compensation Act.”
During the January 1920 American Legion special constitutional convention for the
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Department of Massachusetts, Herbert took issue with the fact that “bonus has come to mean
‘full payment plus,’ and there has not yet been full payment, or anywhere near full payment,
so there cannot be any plus.”272 Some two years later, in the fall of 1922, the adjusted
compensation bill had still yet to be passed. At this point, President Harding took issue with
Congress’s failure “to provide the revenue from which the bestowal is to be paid” and stated
that to “bestow a bonus which the soldiers themselves, while serving in the World War, did
not expect” was not sensible.273 As a result, President Harding vetoed the bill, drawing the
anger of the Legion. In response, the American Legion commander, Hanford MacNider,
published his position in the weekly magazine The Outlook, in which MacNider stated “the
battle for adjusted compensation has only just begun.”274 MacNider was enthusiastic about
achieving these payments for war veterans, publishing his own articles to gain support. His
generalization of earnings that he applied to all veterans, the use of historical precedents, and
details that generated emotional responses were all part of his campaign to ensure the
expansion of veterans’ benefits.275
In 1924, Congress passed the World War Adjusted Compensation Act, which
provided $1.25 for each day of overseas service and a dollar for each day of home service,
with a maximum of $500 for veterans with no overseas service and a maximum of $625 for
veterans who had overseas service. As part of this legislation, the veteran could apply for and
be issued a certificate payable at 4 percent interest compounded annually either twenty years
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after the date of the certificate, with all certificates being dated after January 1, 1925, or upon
the death of the veteran, whichever came first.276 As part of this legislation, the government
set aside $100 million from which they could draw interest for twenty years, and the resulting
proceeds would enable the government to pay for this legislation. This supported President
Harding’s goal of providing revenue streams for programs that Congress initiated, and with
President Coolidge now in office and in disagreement with the legislation, Congress had to
achieve enough votes to override his veto and pass the bill into law. Coolidge considered this
a significant additional investment, with the country already spending $400,000,000 annually
on training, insurance, and hospitalization for disabled veterans.277 Ultimately, this “bonus”
would prove to create additional problems beyond finances for the US government.
The Bonus Army Incident
There were many efforts to enhance veterans’ benefits in the years after the end of
WWI. By 1929, the Great Depression and American economic activity had put fifteen
million Americans out of work. The World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924 soon
became a topic that polarized politics. The veterans of WWI felt the depression affected them
disproportionately to other Americans.278 Between May and June 1932, veterans of WWI,
who had been issued the US government certificates payable in 1945, marched on
Washington, demanding the federal government pay their “bonus payments” immediately.
This “Bonus Army” called themselves the Bonus Expeditionary Forces, growing out of a
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local special interest group from Portland, Oregon and led by Walter Waters. After his time
in the Army, Waters found it difficult to find work, and with about 30 percent of Americans
unemployed, he and his fellow veterans were looking for more than simply a future bonus
payment—they were looking for immediate assistance.
Politically, the Bonus Army was a fiasco for President Herbert Hoover. He had
already vetoed early payment legislation in 1930, and once Hoover ordered Army General
Douglas MacArthur to remove the men and their families of the Bonus Army from the
capital mall, the situation became worse. The Bonus Army began with Waters and others
traveling to Washington, DC to protest for the early payment of bonuses. During the trip
across the country, other veterans joined the group, and by the time they reached
Washington, there were thousands of veterans participating in the protest. In May 1932, the
thousands of men and their families camped in the nation’s capital, sleeping and eating along
the Anacostia River just east of Capitol Hill. During the day, the veterans marched in protest
throughout Washington, passing in front of the White House numerous times in the hopes
that their peaceful assembly would eventually result in passage of early payment of their
bonuses. President Hoover saw them as a mob and considered the veterans vagrants, which
his administration must remove.279 The poor treatment the veterans received as part of the
Bonus Army incident, may have influenced the decision to take care of veterans by providing
educational benefits during and after WWII.
On July 28, 1932, after MacArthur issued repeated orders to the Bonus Army to leave
the city, the situation became volatile. Just seventeen days after Hoover vetoed the GarnerWagoner Relief Bill, which would have paid the veterans the anticipated bonus early,
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MacArthur exceeded his orders from President Hoover to contain the veterans, to the
detriment of Hoover’s political career. Using tear gas, tanks, and portions of infantry and
cavalry regiments, MacArthur not only evicted the veterans from the buildings they occupied
on Pennsylvania Avenue, but he also exceeded his orders to contain the marchers at their
campsite at Anacostia Flats. In what some historians document as overzealous, MacArthur’s
forces employed tear gas into the campsite at Anacostia Flats, injured thousands of veterans,
and burned their makeshift structures to the ground. The political ramifications of this event
ended Hoover’s political career and was one factor that contributed to Roosevelt’s victory in
the 1932 election later that year.280
The destruction of the tents and makeshift living conditions of the veterans created
deep sympathy for the group, which organizations such as the American Legion as well as
supporters of early bonus payments used to their advantage. The destruction of the camp also
left the Bonus Army with little to support their continued stay in Washington, DC, thus
ending the protests.281 A year later, veterans again traveled to Washington, DC in the hopes
of gaining support for early bonus payments. President Roosevelt followed in Hoover’s
footsteps by vetoing the passage of the bill, but eventually Congress overrode Roosevelt’s
veto and veterans received the bonus payments for which they so passionately lobbied.
Through the lens of the Second World War, the connection between the Bonus Army
and American post-secondary education shows the significant impact. At the end of WWII,
millions of servicemembers were set to end their military obligations and reenter the
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American workforce. Since the march on Washington by the Bonus Army was less than two
decades old, American politicians looked to avoid a similar problem. The pressures veteran
organizations such as the American Legion placed on legislators leveraged sympathy from
society, and incidents such as the Bonus Army treatment provided them examples to use.
Some progressive politicians saw this event as an opportunity to increase social welfare
programs, while others wanted to avoid a political fiasco similar to the Bonus Army.
Regardless of their political leanings, the US Congress passed the Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act in 1944.282 The post-WWI period was one of tough times and slow growth
of veteran and servicemember educational benefits, but by the Second World War, progress
and support for veterans had increased significantly.
Changing Demographics
In 1940, literacy and competence with the English language were still a problem for
the US Army’s potential labor pool. The men needed to fight during wartime required
educated officers to lead formations in the Army along with men with technical capacity to
prepare, use, and maintain battle-ready equipment. No longer was the Army an organization
where men simply followed orders, needing only to maintain their rifle and place within the
rank-and-file. The Army needed men who could read, write, and think. The competing
priorities between men serving in the Army and those in support of the military-industrial
complex created a significant problem for the War Department during WWII.
An analysis of the 1940 census statistics provides insight into the makeup of
American society prior to the war. With 131,669,275 persons reported in the United States
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census of 1940, the number of unemployed during the week of March 24–30, 1940, was
5,093,810, as reported by the states collectively. The increase of urban dwellers between the
1930 and 1940 census was 27.3 percent, with the increase in overall population being only
16.1 percent.283 This demonstrated how industry was drawing Americans to urban areas and
correlated to the need for an educated and trained workforce. Those living in the cities were
less able to grow their own food and live off the land, but the workforce was gaining skills in
the use and maintenance of industrial equipment. Without management of the workforce
during wartime, problems would undoubtedly arise.284 While taxpayer-funded adult
education programs began decades earlier, bringing together different groups of people as
federal money became available for local and state programs, the average years of schooling
for Americans 25 years old and over during the 1940 census was only 8.4 years.285 Even with
the Citizens’ Military Training Camps and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps teaching men
military skills, there was still a gap in preparing America for a large-scale war.
Understanding conscription in America and its transformation over time provides insight into
how the US Army arrived at the need for the WWII draft. The historical perspective on
selective service in America connects the changes in technology to the eventual partnership
between the Army and post-secondary education to address the literacy and skills needed to
wage war.
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Conscription
During WWII, the world encountered many significant changes. By the 1940s,
Americans had not only fought for their own land but brought freedom to others in Europe
during WWI during 1917–1918. Americans fought not only for each other and their
principles but to keep others from being oppressed. One perspective on this is by Caspar W.
Weinberger, former US Secretary of Defense, who stated,
For the first hundred and fifty years we generally depended on a small standing
volunteer professional armed force. The first major step away from this practice came
just after World War II with the realization of America’s leadership role. It became
clear then that America needed conscription to achieve the military forces the mission
required. It is important, however, to remember that historically America’s reliance
on conscription has been the exception rather than the rule for staffing the Army.”286
The United States’ reliance on the draft during the world wars had a lasting effect on
American society for decades to come. Understanding the nuances of the draft during both
world wars helps illuminate the need for programs in support of servicemember
development, as well as transitional programs to ready veterans for reintegration into civilian
life.
George Washington laid the foundations for the American draft when, in 1778, he
wrote to the President of the Continental Congress, “I Believe our greatest and only aid will
be derived from drafting, which I trust may be done by the United States.”287 A little more
than four score years later, the United States drafted men to fight during the American Civil
War when, on March 3, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Enrollment Act.288
With the Civil War having no end in sight, the Union needed soldiers. There were countless
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exceptions to the draft during its beginnings, such as the fact that one man could pay another
man to take his place. For example, an owner could send a slave to fight in the draftee’s
place.289 Those types of system failures, where manipulation was common, resulted in more
than simply discontent. Many men in the North had connections to southern businesses and
families and therefore had little desire to fight in the conflict. As a result, in July 1863, four
days of rioting took place in New York City due to the unfair drafting practices. The problem
with using the concept of service to the nation in a system that contained loopholes in the
service requirements meant that well-to-do men were less likely to be drafted. The fact that a
man could pay $300 to avoid the draft essentially ensured that the wealthy would not be
forced to serve. This, along with racial tensions deriving from most Blacks being exempt
from the draft since they were not considered citizens, demonstrated the problems America
faced with conscription during the Civil War.290 Essentially, the policies created a larger
status gap between the rich and the poor, which were revisited after WWI when lawmakers
and members of American society voiced their opinions on whether veterans’ benefits should
be connected to rank and compensation received while in the service.
Of course, there were even more labor problems during the American Civil War. The
result of the draft failures in the North and South during the Civil War led to men being
drafted into the military even when these men were beyond the normal fighting age. Within
the first few years of the war, Confederate President Jefferson Davis had already depleted the
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bulk of men in the South and, by 1863, began drafting men up to 50 years of age. With the
consent of their owners, the South even began to draft slaves.
Regardless of the depletion of men in the North and the South, during the American
Civil War, draftees made up less than 10 percent of all servicemembers. Even so, the draft
was a major undertaking requiring a large administration, which neither the North nor the
South was able to develop quickly. A more important aspect relating to this research was that
the need to take care of those who fought the war was even more important should the
country conscript their service. Since many were fighting based on mandate instead of
choice, the expectation for veterans’ benefits rose after the war. Because of the draft, leaders
felt programs such as war pensions after the American Civil War helped to soften the burden
placed on these draftees and established precedents that American political leaders revisited
after the world wars.
The modern draft took form in 1940, when President Franklin Roosevelt signed the
Selective Training and Service Act (STSA), creating the country’s first peacetime draft.291
The wartime draft was in place during WWI, but as the country prepared for the possible
entry into the European war, the need for a large standing military training program became
obvious. Military leaders were only two decades removed from the 2,810,296 men inducted
through the draft in support of WWI over its fourteen-month period. During the First World
War, America faced a significant problem—developing the military while at the same time
ensuring that key industries in support of wartime production, such as shipbuilding,
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continued to operate at maximum capacity.292 Leaders identified that simply relying on
volunteers for military service may not produce the numbers required for the fighting force,
and allowing anyone to sign up for the military under a volunteer system might result in
wartime industries being affected or even incapacitated.293 As a result, the draft boards and
War Department provided deferments to those with skills needed to operate in critical
industries, leaving the US military with unskilled, and at times uneducated, labor. Prior to
WWI, the United States had a wartime draft policy of recruitment and training. The STSA
solidified the selective service program and made the drafting of men available during both
peace and wartime possible. This program was a complicated system with numerous rules,
workers, and problems administered by an independent federal agency.294 The WWII
program built on the efforts of the WWI process.
The WWI selective service registration process was unique in its scope and timeline.
The US Congress passed the 1917 Selective Service Act on May 18, and President Woodrow
Wilson issued a proclamation to the state governors, along with all men in America, whether
native born or alien, between the ages of 21 and 31, excluding men already in service to the
US military, that “between 7 A.M. and 9 P.M. on the fifth day of June, 1917 in the precinct
where they have their permanent homes,” these men must present themselves and register for
potential service in accordance with the Selective Service Act.295 The attempt to enroll such a
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large number of men into the conscription records was a task of enormous scale. With only
two weeks’ notice, Americans were both supportive and shocked. The centralized approach
focusing on data from the 1910 census and information gathered from local entities as part of
the decentralized execution in such a brief time showed American efforts to leverage its
resources quickly.296
Of course, not everyone was happy with the requirement for draft registration, but the
consequences of not registering during WWI were a year in prison and mandatory
registration once released. American leaders were serious about supporting this war effort
and did not tolerate dissension. Butte, Montana resident John Lennon had moved from
Alaska to Butte six months earlier. In June 1917, the Butte Daily Post reported that when told
by the local registrar Emmet Griffin, “You will have to register now because this is the only
day that registrations will be accepted,” Lennon replied, “Well, I want to think it over
anyway.”297 After being pressed on his decision, Lennon refused to register and was arrested.
The same month, authorities arrested another Butte, Montana resident, James E. Treanor,
Secretary of the Pierce-Connolly Club, and charged him as the ringleader in a conspiracy to
interfere with draft registrations.298 The local Irish society was distributing anti-conscription
literature to men in the town in defiance of the new law. While these incidents show that not
everyone supported conscription during WWI, the significant majority complied with the
conscription requirements. The support and compliance were both overwhelming in many
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parts of the country, with some precincts even encountering a shortage of registration cards.
Other areas pushed back against the conscription law, which ultimately may have later
affected decisions on veterans’ benefits to placate those the law forced into service.
The connection between conscription and veterans’ benefits later became a critical
point of debate for legislators. In previous wars, most men had volunteered for service, with
the conflict’s overall conscription rate being less than 10 percent. In WWI, the American
government sought to manage not only conscription, but enlistments and labor in general. To
ensure industry in America continued to produce the goods and equipment needed to wage
war, voluntary enlistments in all American Armed Forces eventually ended, and all
accessions into the military were through conscription. The government saw this as the best
method to ensure the most effective use of its workforce. As a result, many Americans may
have viewed this as the government mandating requirements for their lives and eliminating
their choices. This management of people may have therefore affected the perspective of
legislators on providing postwar education benefits for veterans. In addition to affecting these
benefits, the method of bringing men into the military during WWII applied the lessons
learned from WWI. The process of the military influencing education in America was a
series of events that continued to build over time.
Prior to America declaring war on Germany, in 1940 the American military drafted
18,633 men to fill the ranks of the peacetime military.299 It seemed that some men understood
America would eventually become involved in WWII. As a result, many men signed up for
military duty just so they could enter their desired branch of service. The actions of these
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men lessened the need for draftees, but overall, the need for trained military men required
numbers far greater than the early volunteers provided. In addition, the advancements in
technology at the beginning of the twentieth century created a need for men with technical
skills. The fact that so many American men were out of work during the Great Depression
exacerbated the military’s problem of building a fighting force capable of maintaining and
employing the equipment and advanced weaponry needed to prosecute the war.300 Men who
were out of work were not gaining the technological skills needed at a time when America
was preparing for potential conflict.
At the start of 1940, the US Army had only 200,000 full-time soldiers.301 America
also had a military reserve in the National Guard, but sadly most Army leaders considered
the National Guard an untrained force. As for the manpower within military units, the
average officer or enlisted man became no longer average. During WWII, the US military
drafted college-educated men into positions where, at times, they may have fought next to a
man with a fourth-grade education. This example shows how the chasm between the wealthy
and the poor closed somewhat during the war. Still, those with enough money or status might
find ways to avoid the draft. Overall, draftees were generally average men who were healthy
and generally did not want to fight or volunteer but waited for their turn and showed up when
called.
The idea that the US military was not prepared to resource the large fighting force
required to win the war in Europe was obvious to the foot soldier who attended rushed
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training where he carried broomsticks to simulate machine guns during training. Examples
from soldiers in 1940 present an interesting perspective on Army training. Edwin Hoyt, in
The GI’s War, described the Army’s lack of preparation to equip and train men for WWII,
saying,
Lieutenant Shebeck, being of an inquiring mind, had some disquieting thoughts about
the future. He saw that a quarter of the men had no weapons. Saplings were cut from
small trees to improvise. His machine gun company only had half its machine guns.
The company was supposed to have 37-millimeter antitank guns, but it had none.
Instead small forked trees were cut, and a small log was put across the crotch to make
a ‘gun.’302
While there were effective training plans, the expansion of military recruit training by the
Army overloaded training center capacity early in the war.
Some combat veterans from WWI were part of the US military in 1940. However,
those men were usually senior military leaders and of little help either in training new
inductees or on the front lines of the battlefield, since the fighting in WWII was much
different from that of WWI. Many WWI veterans were certainly not part of the active force,
and many were most likely too old for military service at all. The policy of drafting men
specifically for war, instead of keeping a standing military, led to the same problem at the
beginning of both world wars—no trained or equipped military. Not only were American
leaders aware of the United States’ problem of military preparedness, but the international
opinion on the status of the American forces confirmed the situation. One of Benito
Mussolini’s journalists, Luigi Barzini, wrote in Il Duce’s newspaper Il Popolo D’Italia,
The United States can never successfully intervene in the European war, the United
States Regular Army consists of 200,000 mercenaries, with a complement of playboy
National Guards who specialize in picnics….American intervention is a race between
a tortoise and an automobile….There is not a single man in the United States today
who would fight for the Poles, the Belgians, the Norwegians and the Dutch, and die
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on the battlefield with the sweet names of Reynaud and Churchill on his lips.
Americans are prepared to do everything to help the Allies without going to war.
Even if the United States openly intervenes, it cannot increase its present mediocre
exportation.303
In 1940, the American Army, including the National Guard, consisted of roughly a
half-million men. The country did not have the trained and prepared military needed to fight
the seasoned German military. As Senator James Murray of Montana protested, “A conscript
Army made up of youths trained for a year or two, compared to Hitler’s Army, is like having
a high school football team going up against the professional teams.”304 There were
significant concerns about the American military, the possibility of war, and the path to
success. The Germans had been at war for some time now, and even though the United States
had the labor and raw materials, it did not possess the necessary supplies and equipment on
hand to outfit and train the military. In August 1940, the Army conducted large-scale training
operations in New York. During the training, men used pieces of stovepipe to represent antitank weapons, beer cans as ammunition, and broomsticks as machine guns. At times, even
soldiers felt they were not prepared prior to and during the war. The mindset of the patriotic
servicemember may have been the image used in broadsides and on the big screen during
WWII, but many soldiers confirmed the ill-prepared American military. Karl R. Bendetsen
gave an in-depth interview weighing in on his perspective of the “inadequate military
posture” of American forces. In 1929, Bendetsen became a member of the Officers’ Reserve
Corps in the field artillery. In his civilian job, he practiced law and as early as 1939 voiced
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his opinion to US senators and congressmen about the inadequate military posture.305 The
state of the military services was considered by some draftees as being ill-prepared for
combat even on a small scale. The US military was not prepared to defend itself at home, let
alone in Europe.306 Considering the perspective of Hanford MacNider, the 1922 American
Legion Commander as he recognized “that our government has the obligation to all service
men and women to relieve the financial disadvantages incident to their military service,” one
can see how men conscripted to serve in WWII may expect benefits at least as much as the
WWI veterans. American lawmakers, the military, and post-secondary institutions would
partner together and not disappoint these servicemembers.307
American leaders and communities knew they could not stay out of the fight forever.
The war in Europe had already begun affecting the country. The support that the United
States provided to Great Britain affected the economy as well. With Europe at war and the
United States looking at the possibility of war, America had to act. In 1940, the campaigning
for peacetime conscription began, not from the president or the military, but from powerful
men outside the military or lawmakers, such as the prominent New York attorney Grenville
Clark and Julius Ochs Adler, the publisher of The New York Times. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and General George Marshall were both against the draft—the president because it
was an election year and Marshall due to the draft’s impact on the War Department and the
military itself.308
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Roosevelt and Marshall were both persuaded to support the cause by Secretary of
War Henry Stimson, who convinced them the draft was becoming more popular to the
people. The later support for the bill came from the American people as well as Congress,
who realized the major impact the war would have on the United States. The world needed
the Americans to come into the war in Europe.309 Both President Roosevelt and Wendell
Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate, supported the STSA bill, and it passed on
September 16, 1940.310 Within the next month, sixteen million men registered for the draft.
The initial rules prohibited the military from stationing those men outside the western
hemisphere and informed the men they would not see combat. Roosevelt later changed the
wording by adding Iceland to what was known as the new world, thereby allowing the
military to send Marines closer to the fight in Europe.311 Eventually, as changes continued,
those men saw combat, some in multiple theatres of war.
The military found itself dealing with bureaucratic issues as it implemented the draft.
Racial discrimination was one of the leading issues, causing tension between Blacks and
Whites in the South. Blacks were drafted to fill Black units, but since there were few Black
units (less than 6 percent, compared to 10.6 percent of the nation being Black), Whites were
taken at a much higher rate from many heavily African-American-populated areas in the
South. When towns in Mississippi where the ratios of Black to White men were similar saw
most of the draft age eligible White males drafted, problems for Black males increased. Since
the military did not draft Black men at the same rate as Whites, racial problems increased in
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the South. The problem did not lie in the fact that Black men did not want to serve, the
problem was that many of the potential draftees failed to meet the requirements for induction
into the service. Literacy in America was again a limiting factor for the pool of serviceeligible men.312
It was the poor men of the nation who were most available for service. The problem
for the US military was that these potential recruits lacked the literacy, and at times language
skills, needed to be effective soldiers. During WWII, America established local draft boards
to facilitate the processing of men into the military. These local boards had the authority to
defer men or exempt them from service altogether. This resulted in many men who were able
to fight, being kept out of the war for a myriad of reasons. The board also had the
responsibility for implementing assessments that identified literacy and language problems
along with the medical examinations.313 The need for qualified men to fill the ranks,
combined with the exemptions, created significant manpower problems for the US military.
Many changes occurred in the draft program during WWII; the draft began with a
commitment of twelve months and extended in 1941 to eighteen months of service, and the
ages of men who were required to register changed from 18–45 to 18–65 later in the war.
Legislators eventually changed the required commitment to six months after the completion
of the war. After the war was over, a new Selective Service Act became law in 1948,
modifying the ages again to 19–26 years old with a mandatory twenty-one months of service.
This time, however, the Act established a five-year commitment of service in the Army
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reserves.314 The draft was one effort to address the nation’s mobilization needs with a
response to the problems of acquiring men who possessed the necessary skills and
characteristics needed for specific positions in the military. The need to ensure men had the
literacy, language, and technological skills to fight the war resulted in a variety of testing and
educational programs that left a legacy on America.
The Continuing Need for Literacy in the Military
Between 1910 and 1945, technological changes increased demands on the US
military to ensure potential servicemembers were healthy, literate, and possessed the needed
skills for success. No longer could the Army simply recruit soldiers, hand them a rifle, and
expect them to be successful. The situation forced leaders to address the lack of literacy,
technological changes, and the demand from servicemembers to address their needs. During
WWII, the US Army put forth a significant effort to address servicemembers’ recreational
opportunities, education and training, and access to information.315 One rationale behind
focusing on these areas was to keep the servicemember’s mind busy on something other than
the great dangers they faced in the wartime environment. As a result, the US Army
established a Special Services Division of the Army Service Forces and later a specific
organization called the Information and Education Division. The goal of these organizations
was to provide information from carefully selected books and magazines to troops in wartime
areas and to distribute movies and athletic equipment to keep servicemembers busy. The
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military also coordinated with the United Service Organizations, today more commonly
known as the USO, and the Red Cross, with its own Military Welfare Services Program.316
Not only was literacy training provided, but the US military also focused on
providing opportunities for advanced study or refresher courses in technical areas. The War
Department went so far as to establish a technical school in Tidworth, England to provide
refresher training on vocational skills for US troops, including the Women’s Army Corps
personnel.317 The technical school had a significant capacity, with a throughput of four
thousand students every two months. For those students who did not meet the entrance
qualification of three or more years of apprentice training, the Army provided an opportunity
for them to complete correspondence courses and even post-secondary education
opportunities.318
Much of the military effort focused on technical skills for military duties during the
recruitment process. Additionally, towards the end of the war, the Army also considered how
it might take advantage of the time servicemembers would have from the end of the war until
they were able to return to the United States for discharge. As a result, the Armed Forces
Institute shipped textbooks for use during the war, as well as textbooks on topics that would
help the servicemembers as they prepared to return to civilian jobs.319 The Army focused on
more than technical schools; it also established the University Center in France as well as
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another in Shrivenham, England. The 1945 report from Army Chief of Staff General George
C. Marshall stated that each of these University Centers offered “a series of five 2-month
courses at college level.”320 With a similar four thousand student capacity as the technical
school, the Army focused on providing instruction at the junior college level in algebra,
history, foreign languages, and other topics. The challenge for the Army was to staff these
technical and educational schools with qualified instructors. To address this need, the Army
chose personnel if they had experience in education, and the military supplemented these
instructors with nonmilitary educators.
Recalling that literacy was a problem in WWI, and even though the United States
took action to address this problem through training programs, by WWII the problem still
persisted. Not only did the military eliminate men from possible service due to physical or
mental reasons, but the Army also rejected men because of a lack of education. The most
critical indicator the military used to identify whether potential recruits met educational
requirements was literacy and education.321 If a man were unable to read and understand
English, induction centers would many times mislabel them as illiterate or a slow learner,
when in fact they may simply have lacked the education or the ability to speak English due to
their limited amount of time in America. Even in WWII, the Army was using the ability to
read and write English as a means for evaluating the ability to learn. This created a problem
for the nation, as the country needed men to fight the war. The need for a program to teach
reading, writing, and language became a priority during WWII.
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An interesting perspective is that the Army standard for literacy was the recruit’s
ability to read English at the fourth-grade level.322 This problem for the manpower demand of
the US Armed Forces during WWII is seen in the example that 347,000 men did not sign
their registration cards, but simply made a mark when registering just prior to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor.323 Finding men to fill the Army’s manpower requirements ultimately
led to the Army changing its literacy classification policy three times throughout WWII.324
By August 1942, the Army chose to accept what testing identified as intelligent illiterates
into the Army.325 The manpower needs generated ideas on how induction centers might
identify the ability to learn, and in June 1943, the Army implemented the Visual
Classification Test. This enabled the Army to assess illiterates and classify those with
sufficient cognitive ability to perform certain military duties, thereby increasing the potential
number of men for induction.326
As WWII continued, the number of casualties increased the pressure on the American
War Manpower Commission and had an influence on policy. In 1942, more than 10 percent
of draftees the Army wanted to induct failed the literacy tests.327 The Visual Classification
Test allowed the Army to induct men and then educate them on reading and writing at a level
that enabled them to perform their military duties. To provide this education, the Army
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created Special Training Units, which gave these inductees instruction focused on improving
their literacy rates.328 Between June 1943 and October 1944, the Army Special Training
Units taught more than 180,000 men to read and write. Almost 150,000 or 85 percent, of
those men were able to continue in the military service by achieving a minimal Army
standard for literacy.329
The Army’s effort to teach men how to read and write English in a Special Training
Unit had a significant impact on literacy rates in America after the war.330 After June 1943,
49 percent of all Black men arriving at Army reception centers and almost 10 percent of
White men were sent to a Special Training Unit, where they received instruction on reading
and writing. A full 3 percent more of the Black troops mastered reading and writing to a level
where they met Army standards than did the White troops.331 The limited opportunity for
education in many of the southern states had a counterproductive impact on the available
labor pool from which the US military could draw. The American educational system
actually hampered the ability to raise a large and effective army through a draft or
recruitment process in the industrial age. The Army Special Training Units not only
mitigated this educational system deficiency, it also provided an uplifting opportunity for
minorities and the poor.
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Literacy was not the only problem facing the American War Manpower Commission.
American military leaders saw the need for educating men beyond those needed to lead
formations at the tactical and operational levels. 332 The ROTC program provided military
and leadership training, but the Army needed technical experts as well. As a result, the Army
developed a program to identify men for training as specialists such as engineers, doctors,
and pilots to fill the technical and specialist positions the Army anticipated needing
throughout the war. While the Army could teach men how to read and write, the capacity to
provide instruction in the specialized topics required partnership with post-secondary
educational institutions across America.
The need for trained specialists resulted in the establishment of the Army Air Forces
Meteorological Training Program, the Navy College Training Program (V-12), and the Army
Specialized Training Program (ASTP), the largest of which was the ASTP, with the desired
end strength of 200,000 men.333 The factors that influenced training and educational
programs during WWII can be related to the available labor pool. The ability to train Army
leaders, deploy reserve forces on active duty during the war, and train technical experts all
found challenges with competing priorities such as college administrators’ enrollments
concerns. In 1941, American colleges had a collective enrollment number of more than one
million students. By 1942, the war had caused the number of men enrolling to drop by 40
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percent, and universities across America found themselves both in financial trouble and
concerned that enrollments would fall even further as the war continued.334
Efforts such as the ASTP have been largely overshadowed by legislation such as the
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, which created what is known today as the G.I. Bill.
Louis E. Keefer, author of Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training
Program in World War II, is one of the few scholars with published literature on the ASTP.
Keefer, however, approaches his writing by telling the story of the ASTP with a focus on the
perspective of individual trainees within the program, thus leaving out the program’s
influence on American post-secondary educational institutions.335 With the drop in
enrollments amongst educational institutions across America during WWII, the war
generated competing priorities, requiring leaders of institutions of higher education to
collaborate with internal stakeholders, the US military, and the federal government
simultaneously.
For higher education in America, enrollment had grown from approximately 250,000
after WWI to 1.25 million students before the start of WWII.336 The rapidly falling
enrollment numbers resulting from WWII caused many universities to examine the situation
and look for alternatives to maintain relevance and financial security. Two examples of
higher education’s partnerships with the Army are Stanford and Baylor universities. Stanford
University leaders recognized the prestige and financial rewards the university might gain by
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supporting the war, and how engaging with the US military units’ training programs would
also address the declining enrollments it faced as a result of the war.337 Baylor University
also felt the impact of WWII, with a reduction in student enrollment from 2345 to 1300 or
about 50 percent between 1940 and 1942.338 Luckily for these two universities, the Army
developed a program that needed the expertise of those in American higher education.
To address the need for technical experts in the Army, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, with the encouragement of Secretary of War Stimson, established the Army
Specialist Corps in 1942.339 The intent of this program was to allow men who worked in
office-type jobs and produced specialist work to wear uniforms different from those worn by
the Army but serve in the Army as a noncombatant performing technical and specialist work.
This program lasted a short 10 months and only appointed a few thousand technical experts.
The Army needed a more effective process to ensure it could produce the numbers of
technical specialists America needed.340 The Army continued to focus on how it would fulfill
its needs by procuring trained and educated officers. While it took some time, by late 1942,
the US Army and post-secondary education had established their partnership.
In November 1942, the Army announced it would enter into agreements with colleges
across America to provide training to servicemembers. The plan was for the War Department
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to collaborate with civilian educators to address what US Army Chief of Staff General
George C. Marshall considered an increasing handicap to fighting the war. Marshall believed
the Army faced a “shortage of men possessing desirable combinations of intelligence,
aptitude, education, and training in fields such as medicine, engineering, languages, science,
mathematics, and psychology, who are qualified for services officers of the Army.”341 Since
the selective service had reduced the draft age to 18, American colleges and universities were
increasingly concerned with the lack of student enrollment.
While on the surface it seemed there was consensus amongst Army leaders after the
publication of the August 30, 1943 pamphlet titled Essential Facts about the Army
Specialized Training Program, the reality was that not everyone considered the ASTP the
best method of solving the Army’s manpower concerns. Lieutenant General Lesley McNair,
the Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, opposed the removal of men from the
induction pipeline into Army Ground Forces and placing them into colleges to receive
specialized instruction. McNair felt that the ASTP should not be implemented unless
American leaders were certain that WWII would extend past 1944.342 The problem for the
Army Ground Forces was that they were already short hundreds of thousands of men, and
McNair was frustrated that this program was asking him to send men to college when his
formations could not even reach their authorized end-strength.
Nonetheless, the Army issued its criteria for eligibility into the specialized training
and began working with post-secondary educational organizations to implement these
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programs on their campuses.343 In developing the curricula these Army personnel would
receive at universities across America, the Army Specialized Training Division collaborated
with the American Council on Education as well as an advisory committee of educators from
renowned universities such as Johns Hopkins University, Fordham University, Stanford
University, and the University of Wisconsin to draft the curricula and courses of instruction.
In developing the program, they created two phases, basic and advanced.344 The basic phase
was sectioned into three twelve-week terms and provided what a traditional student received
in the freshman and first semester of sophomore years. The advanced phase consisted of four
twelve-week terms, which would develop in a trainee enough knowledge to meet the needs
of the Army.345
The Army curricula further detailed which program trainees were best suited, based
on specific educational content. The training and engineering basic phase contained two
separate plans. Plan One of the ASTP focused on the engineering specialties, allowing
trainees to specialize in communications, mechanical topics such as engines, and surveying.
Plan Two of the ASTP consisted of basic studies in general engineering, allowing further
specialization in the advanced phase.346 The Army designed an advanced curriculum for
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student specialization in civil engineering, ensuring these technical specialists received
training in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemical engineering, and even
sanitary engineering. The need for engineers was critical for solving both Army problems
and American industry labor needs. The ASTP also contained curricula for training in
medicine, veterinary skills, dentistry, psychology, and even language studies.347 The Army
anticipated needing experts in these critical disciplines of study throughout the war. 348
The ASTP took a centralized planning approach with a decentralized execution. The
colleges could choose the textbooks from which to instruct groups of trainees, along with
conducting examinations and giving credit according to their own institutional practices.
Where the Army did provide specific guidance was on the trainee’s schedule. The Army
required fifty-nine hours of supervised activity each week, five of which were part of military
instruction and six of which were physical instruction. In addition to the academic
environment, the Army program regimented class times, even documenting reveille and
lights out.349 In support of the military training, post-secondary educational institutions that
did not have an established ROTC unit, such as Baylor University, added Army officers to
their faculty to oversee the program and trainees from a military point of view. Those
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colleges with an ROTC program and a professor of military science and tactics leveraged
those already assigned officers to provide military and physical training instruction.350
Baylor University, in Waco, Texas, provided an example of the coordination between
American universities and the Army Specialized Training Branch. In March 1943, the
American Council on Education, together with a joint committee from the War Department,
Navy Department, and War Manpower Commission, identified educational institutions with
which they might contract for the Army and Navy specialization programs. Emergency
Supplement Number 11, a Bulletin on Higher Education and National Defense identified
post-secondary institutions for the placement of programs covering instructional content such
as dentistry, architecture, language, and even basic training in the ASTP. The bulletin made
no mention of Baylor University as a potential site for inspection for one of these
programs.351 The interest from post-secondary educational institutions in gaining one of these
programs on its campus was significant. By the spring of 1943, 488 colleges and universities
across the country had reached out to the War Department demonstrating their interest in one
or more programs.352 Baylor was no exception. The university leaders at Baylor wanted the
program on the campus and took significant steps to gain a contract with the War
Department.353
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At Baylor, James Mixson, assistant to University President Pat Neff, wrote a letter to
then Congressman Lyndon Johnson on April 1, 1943, emphasizing that Baylor had
continuously renewed its offer to do whatever the university could to serve the country
during the war.354 Mixson explained that the Army Air Corps surveyed the university
regarding the practicality of a pre-flight aeronautics program and establishing a ground unit
there, and why the presence of the Black Land Army Flying School in Waco, Texas may
have been a reason why the Army Air Corps did not select Baylor. As the Black Land Army
Flying School used aircraft that were no longer in the Army’s inventory, providing the
academic courses without the hands-on flying experience did not meet the program
requirements. Mixson went on to explain that Baylor University was on the eligible list for
institutions for Army and Navy programs and that during the on-site inspection, the naval
contingent included a medical doctor who found the facilities to be excellent for a pre-med
and pre-dental program for approximately 450 trainees.355 Baylor University was ultimately
not selected and the communication from W. R. Poage, Congressman for the Eleventh Texas
District, informed Mixson that the reason for the withdrawal of the Navy’s offer was that
Baylor University had been identified for the exclusive use of the Army. This was an obvious
error, as the letter stated the War Department records identified Baylor as having an ROTC
program. Mixson explained with frustration to Johnson that “we do not have and have not
had at any time any military unit even faintly resembling the R. O. T. C. at Baylor University
in Waco.”356 The significant desire by Baylor leaders for a program at their institution is seen
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in the language that Mixson used in his communication to Johnson when Mixson stated, “a
grievous wrong” had been committed against Baylor and “due to this inadvertent error, we
stand a good likelihood of getting nothing.”357 The loss of student enrollment and financial
incentives of an ASTP or other program undoubtedly influenced the desire of Baylor’s
leaders to gain program approval.
The political dynamics and heavy-handed tactics by Mixson are evident in his
communication to Johnson. In an April 1, 1943 letter to Johnson, Mixson stated, “it may be
that I am overestimating, first, your influence in Washington; and second, your interest in
Baylor University and Governor Neff.” Along with his use of language highlighting Baylor
University’s desperate need for the program, Mixson was upfront in asking Johnson to use
his influence to gain some program for Baylor and Texas.358 The significant reduction in
enrollment in post-secondary educational institutions across America had a financial impact
on Baylor. During the first two years of the war, Baylor’s enrollment dropped from 2,345 to
1,300 students.359
Good news eventually came to Baylor’s leaders. In a letter dated April 1, 1943, Army
Colonel Ralph H. Durkee informed the Baylor University president that the Army granted
authority to establish at Baylor, a Special Training Assignment and Reclassification School
(STAR), which would train, test, classify, and assign ASTP trainees and move them “as
sections” to ASTP units for instruction.360 The relationship between Baylor University and
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the US Army, as part of the ASTP, demonstrated the influence of these programs beyond the
instruction that men within the program received. In the letter, Durkee requested a Letter of
Intent be issued by the university as to whether it was open to negotiate a contract with the
Army immediately, and if so, informing Baylor leaders that small groups of men would begin
arriving on April 6, 1943. The problem with the STAR program was the lack of full-time
students and the program’s transient nature.361 This program would not yield the financial
rewards that Baylor’s leaders desired.
The communication between Baylor University and its congressional representatives
continued as Mixson reached out to W. R. Poage on April 8, 1943, updating him on the call
that Baylor President Neff had with Army Colonel E. A. Keyes, Chief of the Army
Specialized Training Unit, Headquarters Eighth Service Command. During the call, Keyes
informed Neff of his opinion that Baylor University was not qualified or prepared to screen
engineering students as part of the STAR program. Keyes also explained the financial
disadvantages—that the War Department would only pay Baylor for each day that a man was
physically at Baylor for processing. Mixson communicated to Poage that both he and Baylor
University President Neff agreed that it was best to turn the offer down and hoped it would
not prejudice them against a future program being offered to Baylor.362 The limited financial
incentives of the STAR program, and the desire of Baylor’s leaders to pass on the
opportunity, provided insight into the priorities of the university leaders. Luckily for Neff
and Baylor, good news eventually arrived.
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On April 14, 1943, Keyes penned a letter to the Baylor University president,
informing him that the War Department had directed a site planning board visit to Baylor on
April 16 to ascertain the viability of having 400 students assigned to Baylor in an Army
Specialized Training Unit.363 While it seemed that all was well with Baylor leaders after
receiving the letter, Congressman Lyndon Johnson acknowledged on more than one occasion
the significant difficulty the university faced in acquiring a program. Even the War
Department acknowledged the difficulties it faced in developing, refining, and implementing
policies and procedures surrounding the program.364 This was not a smooth process between
the Army and the university. The influence of the military on post-secondary education was
more of a series of lengthy processes than a series of events.
By May 1943, Baylor had received the Army curricula, which included a program of
military training for students who did not yet complete basic military training along with a
second course of military training for students with military experience.365 The university
was finally able to begin training soldiers, and on May 10, 1943, Baylor’s program started
with 398 men. The university operated its ASTP over six terms, enrolling 890 individual men
between May 1943 and the end of October 1944.366 The success of the program at Baylor
University brought about financial benefits with increased enrollment, educational benefits to
the men, and a better trained and educated soldier for the Army.
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The soldiers assigned as students at Baylor University represented only a portion of
the tens of thousands of men who participated in the ASTP. The program had both supporters
and critics, but ultimately the need for men to fight in the war was the most significant factor
in the decision on the program’s continuation. In a War Department Memorandum for the
Press, released on February 18, 1944, Secretary of War Stimson announced that as a result of
military necessity, the War Department was transferring to active duty troops participating in
the ASTP, and there would be an overall drastic reduction of the number of students enrolled
in the program.367 While the program was advertised as being of extreme significance to the
military at its inception, since the specialized training these soldiers received was based on
the prediction that the Army would require the specialized technicians to win the war,
reducing the number of participants may have signaled to some that America was either in
dire straits or the war was nearly over.
Although in any conflict, a review of the manpower needs required to achieve victory
is ongoing, the planned operations for 1944 saw opinions on the need for reduction of the
ASTP participants as early as November 1943.368 The competing priorities between postsecondary institutions with enrollment, and military units with men to fight in the war,
provided both an opportunity for education for the men placed in these programs and
financial rewards for colleges and universities across America. The Army reaped its benefits
as well with a large pool of men receiving education in case the war lingered. The success of
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the program may be evaluated differently depending on the lens through which it is
measured. But there is no doubt the men who completed the programs provided an example
of how the military and higher education partnering could achieve results that neither could
produce alone. Baylor University graduated 351 men over the six enrollment terms between
May 1943 and August 28, 1944.369
Baylor produced the largest number of graduates at the end of the third term, in
January 1944. With 280 men graduating, the university demonstrated its value while the
soldiers headed to units across the Army. As the program continued, the 305 men who
arrived at Baylor on February 7, 1944 brought Baylor’s numbers back up to almost 400
students in attendance. These men, however, did not have the opportunity to finish the entire
curriculum before Baylor’s program ended on October 28, 1944. The ASTP at Baylor did
achieve the objectives of reinforcing the basic training knowledge needed for soldiers to
operate in the Army, while also providing technical skills and preparing high school
graduates for military service. The academic instruction provided by Baylor University
professors led to successes on many fronts. Two participants of the program at Baylor were
chosen to attend West Point, and the Army recognized the Baylor ASTP unit for improving
the physical fitness of its participants in a significant manner. The ASTP unit at Baylor was
commended for having the highest rating for physical efficiency of all the Army Specialized
Training Units in America.370 The fact that the ASTP participants had a grueling schedule of
both academic and physical activity, along with their adherence to military protocol, and yet

369

Memorandum summary and highlights of the Army Specialized Training Program at Baylor
University, November 6, 1944.
370

Memorandum summary and highlights of the Army Specialized Training Program at Baylor
University, November 6, 1944.

176
the program lost less than 10 percent of its participants to discipline, academic failures, and
requested transfers combined, demonstrated the commitment by the participants and faculty
to make a success of the ASTP at Baylor University.371
As part of the ASTP, the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program provided an
opportunity for men to enlist in the Enlisted Reserve Corps of a service and receive post-high
school academic training at the federal government’s expense.372 The men selected received
training at universities and colleges across America. The military needed men; therefore, the
Army and Navy partnered with colleges and universities, guiding them to intensify the
educational process so that trained and educated men were available to fill positions in the
war industries as well as in fighting units.373 Programs such as this showed the connection
between the need for labor, higher education, and educational opportunities during WWII.
While not everyone considered the ASTP a success, leaders such as General McNair saw the
ASTP as a program that absorbed many of the best potential leaders, which the Army could
have assigned to the Army Ground Forces but instead placed those men into the program
with little chance the men would return to frontline units. The process for allocating men
seemed equitable on paper, but McNair held a different opinion. While the Army required
McNair and the Army Ground Forces to submit the number of graduates the organization
required from the program, the problem for McNair and his commanders was that they
needed these men immediately. Not only did ASTP trainees come from men pending or
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enrolled in colleges, but the Army also took men from military units already fighting the war
and enrolled them in the program. As these men had identified themselves as being of higher
intelligence and capability, the program affected units such as headquarters elements,
engineering companies, and Signal Corps units the most. Eventually, the Army Ground
Forces collaborated with the Army Headquarters and they were able to limit the number of
men selected for the ASTP from within the military units.374
By February 1944, the ASTP had reached its maximum number of enrollees, with
approximately 140,000 participants enrolled in 227 colleges across America.375 While a
participant’s time spent studying while enrolled in the ASTP did not count towards eligibility
for veterans’ benefits, it did provide a significant benefit to those who would undoubtedly not
have had the opportunity to attend a college or university based on their pre-war income. The
benefits of the program transcended the participants and ultimately demonstrated the
continuing evolution of veterans’ benefits, post-secondary and Army partnerships, and the
democratization of higher education in America.
In addition to the ASTP, by 1943, the War Department had strengthened its focus on
pre-induction training.376 The Army began working with the US Office of Education and
assigned an officer liaison to the National Policy Committee of the High School Victory
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Corps to influence secondary students who were future potential recruits.377 The relationship
between the Army and educational institutions reached beyond post-secondary education
during WWII and moved to influence those still learning in secondary, vocational, and trade
schools.378 To influence educators, the Army even recommended camp visits for teachers and
administrators so they might gain first-hand knowledge on military procedures and training.
The War Department also provided educators information on camp visits, films, and other
programs as they related to secondary school needs and objectives in the 1944 War
Department publication PIT-1, Essential Facts about Preinduction Training.379 The Office of
Education and the War Department provided examples of best practices, citing examples
from specific schools that had made significant efforts to prepare men and women to support
the war after high school. The publication went so far as to highlight how the Women’s
Army Corps inductees would benefit from the technical and professional knowledge they
acquired. These communications demonstrated the widespread partnerships between the War
Department and educational institutions towards the end of the war.
Not only did Texas leaders partner with the Army to educate and train soldiers, as
early as April 1943, Congressman Poage was in communication with Dr. H. Rubin, the
manager of the veterans facility in Waco, Texas. In this communication, Poage demonstrated
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the forward thinking of rehabilitating veterans through training and education at postsecondary institutions in Texas. These leaders began examining the relationship between
servicemembers and higher education and discussing how it might continue after the war.
The Dean of what was then known as the A&M College of Texas had also been working
with Rubin and the veterans facility to outline the details of how his college could support the
Veterans Affairs organization. The Texas State National Guard, Baylor University, and the
A&M College of Texas provided insight into postwar planning of how the facilities at these
universities might assist veterans’ transition from the military and receive rehabilitation from
war injuries.380 In addition to communicating with Rubin, Poage also sought the support of
Baylor University president, Pat Neff.381 Efforts such as this undoubtedly had influence on
the decision-making of postwar veteran educational benefits at the national level.
American leaders invested significantly in partnerships between the Army and higher
education to develop preparatory programs that trained and educated the American
workforce during WWII. Much of this was built on the lessons learned from WWI and the
demobilization after the war. The need for men to return to their communities and find
employment influenced the veterans’ benefits policies after the war. The resulting legislation,
such as the Soldier’s Rehabilitation Act of 1918, which provided funding for training of warinjured veterans, increased the chances veterans would become productive members of
society. Politicians were not the only influencers in demanding the increase in veterans’
benefits. The growing influence of organizations such as the American Legion put pressure
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on Congress to compensate drafted veterans who fought in the First World War. As a result,
in 1924 Congress passed the World War Adjusted Compensation Act, promising veterans
assistance.382 The problem was that the compensation would not be issued until 1945. This
may have seemed an appropriate fix to veterans’ problems in the minds of legislators, but the
stock market crash of 1929 and the following Great Depression resulted in more than fifteen
million Americans out of work. Unable to take care of their families or themselves, many
veterans of WWI considered themselves affected far greater than other Americans by the
Depression and eventually took their problems to Washington, DC.
Incidents such as the Bonus Army of 1932 demonstrated the political sensitivity of
veterans’ benefits and the ramifications politicians might face should they fail to act in the
future. While the World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924 promised payouts in 1945,
the economic fallout of the stock market crash and lack of employment opportunities led to
thousands of veterans and their families marching on Washington demanding an early
payout. While Presidents Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt all vetoed the passage of the bills
to pay veterans early, eventually Congress overrode Roosevelt’s veto, and veterans did
receive the bonus payments for which they lobbied.383 Understanding the connection between
political situations such as this and future military and veteran programs illuminates that
American politicians sought to avoid a similar problem with the demobilization of soldiers at
the end of WWII.
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Summary of Literacy, the Military, and the Wartime Partnerships
The Second World War brought about challenges similar to those of WWI. American
leaders established the modern draft in 1940 when President Roosevelt signed the Selective
Training and Service Act, America’s first peacetime draft. With a world war raging in
Europe, military and political leaders looked to the WWI selective service registration
process and the need to ensure that drafting men for war did not drain the critical industries
of skilled labor. As a result, both the Army and Navy focused on more than their active
components, but military leaders also focused on the manpower reserves in the National
Guard and ROTC programs. One large problem the draft created for the Army was draftees’
literacy rates. As technological changes continued to increase demands on potential
servicemembers, the Army needed to address the problem in a way that allowed illiterate
men to achieve the required military standards. The Army needed literate, healthy, and
skilled servicemembers. While the Army Ground Forces needed intelligent men to lead
others, those in the Army Air Forces and the Signal Corps required technical competencies
and knowledge, which American universities and colleges were in the best position to
provide. Recalling the literacy problem of WWI, the Army collaborated with multiple
stakeholders to identify which draftees lacked literacy and sent them to Army Specialized
Training Units. In these Army-operated units, more than 180,000 men were taught to read
and write. Almost 150,000 men, or 85 percent, continued with military service after
achieving the Army standard for literacy in an Army Specialized Training Unit. This was a
success story for the Army, as it increased the manpower supply while expanding the
opportunities for education for thousands of men. The literacy program supported the war
effort and the efforts of the American War Manpower Commission to keep industry and the
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military supplied with trained labor. Low literacy rates were a problem for which the Army
provided a benefit. After June 1943, almost 50 percent of all Black men arriving at Army
reception centers received instruction on reading and writing. This increased the opportunity
for education for these men, many of whom arrived in the Army reception centers from
southern states.
In addition to literacy, American military leaders identified the need to address the
education of men in technical skills and the needed fundamentals to lead formations at the
tactical and operational levels. As a result, the War Department established the ASTP and the
Navy College Training Program, or V-12. These programs allowed educated men to enroll as
trainees within the program by taking courses at educational institutions across America.
Focusing the on the largest program shows how the Army entered into agreements with more
than two hundred colleges and universities across America, providing both vocational and
educational pathways, with professors focusing on the educational content and military
officers simultaneously preparing these men as soldiers. The program combined military
instruction and physical training with higher education courses to prepare men to lead
formations and successfully serve in technical jobs such as medicine, engineering, and
aviation duties, to name a few.
WWII was a time of momentous change for both post-secondary education and the
US Army. The wide variety of programs established to assist in the war effort provided
examples of successful partnerships that undoubtedly influenced future programs benefitting
the Army, veterans, and higher education. While some may see the development of programs
as simply a reaction to the war and a strategic need, examining the changes in partnership
amongst the stakeholders and the transformation of higher education demonstrates the
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influence of the Army on post-secondary education over time. As a result of the Army’s
need, the expansion of literacy efforts began within the military only to later expand into
governmental programs. The connection, or credit, should not be focused simply on the
efforts of the Army and a few educators, but should acknowledge the conditions created
through a wide variety of influencers. The need for a strong manufacturing workforce during
WWII was not simply a result of the military-industrial complex but of the contributions of
individuals and organizations across the nation. Understanding the expansion of programs
during the war draws a connection to the post-WWII G.I. Bill and beyond.
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CHAPTER FIVE: WORLD WAR II AND BEYOND
The continued transformation of Army education and training during WWII brought
about programs that left legacies on the Army and American higher education far beyond the
world wars. The effort by the US Army to develop servicemembers expanded beyond simply
preparing them for highly specialized jobs as part of the ASTP or providing initial education
in the special training units to raise a recruit’s literacy rate high enough to successfully
perform the duties of a soldier. While focusing on the workforce needed to fight WWII, the
Army built on past practices that had a significant impact on American post-secondary
education. During the war, the War Department established the United States Armed Forces
Institute (USAFI) to address servicemember education while on active duty.384 In addition,
the desire for postwar educational benefits was a significant topic of debate among legislators
and stakeholders, resulting in the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.
While the G.I. Bill of Rights was significant, the continuation of the advancing programs for
servicemember and veterans’ benefits in response to new technologies, reform-minded
leadership, and significant military operations during WWII is equally important in the
historical analysis of the military impact on American post-secondary education. During
WWII, the US Army had a considerable influence on colleges and universities in America
through partnerships and programs resulting from the combination of changing technology,
reform-minded leaders coming into positions of power, and large military operations
demanding large numbers of recruits. The expansion on literacy efforts led to the United
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States Armed Forces Institute, the General Educational Development Test, and post WWII
efforts influencing education far beyond the G.I. Bill.
Military/University Educational Partnerships
The establishment of the USAFI and its reshaping of education in and out of the US
military lasted for decades after the war.385 The USAFI established many educational
initiatives in partnership with educational organizations such as distance education through
correspondence courses, testing, and programs for high school and college credit.386 The
institute’s partnership with the University of Chicago to evaluate the learning of
servicemembers based on the USAFI programs led to testing procedures focused on
measuring the learner outcomes achieved during the four years of high school. This project
eventually became what is known today as the General Educational Development test,
informally called the GED.387
When considering the relationship between the US military and educational
institutions in America, recall that the Morrill Land-Grant College Act of 1862 required
educational institutions financed through the sale of federal lands, under the terms of the act,
to offer military training as part of the standard curriculum. Of course, these colleges
implemented the mandated military tactics training with different levels of rigor. The
rationale behind including military instruction in higher education was that during the
American Civil War, the Union forces faced difficulty staffing Army units with competent
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officers.388 To address this the Morrill Land-Grant College Act was a good start but lacked
enforcement or oversight.
Identifying the risk that America lacked a trained pool of potential officers, General
Leonard Wood advocated for the summer camps where men could learn military skills.
These Citizens’ Military Training Camps were successful and a precursor to the increased
oversight of officer education. Wood’s efforts led to Congress taking action and eventually
passing legislation that formalized oversight and funding of officer education. The National
Defense Act of 1916 included a provision that enabled American colleges and universities to
establish an ROTC unit on their campus. In the past, the preparation of military officers was
achieved either through attending the United States Military Academy or potentially on-thejob training once becoming a servicemember. With the 1916 legislation, the country began to
professionalize its military with a focus on also educating those reserve officers in the art and
science of military operations. While the military training camps and later ROTC units in
colleges and universities were designed to increase knowledge of American citizenship and
to build character, the fact was that the War Department needed to standardize education and
build capacity.
Another partnership that developed between the military and higher education during
WWII was in research. Advancements in technology, specifically with weapons research,
required a collective effort between the military and scientists at research universities. At no
time in history was this more important than at the onset of America’s entrance into WWII.
In June 1941, President Roosevelt, through an Executive Order, created the Office of
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Scientific Research and Development. This government agency worked with universities
across America, focusing on advancing American warfighting equipment. Everything from
bomb sights to the atomic bomb were the focus of military and educator research.389 While
these efforts involved a small number of servicemembers, another program was poised to
influence a far greater population.
Establishment of the Army Institute
In 1941, the War Department authorized the creation of the Army Institute. Leading
the charge to design and implement educational programs in the Army was Frederick Henry
Osborn, who began as the Chief of the Army’s Morale Branch in 1941 and was later
promoted to lead the Information and Education Division. While leading the Information and
Education Division, Osborn established a Research Branch, collecting and measuring
servicemember data in a variety of areas within the scope of educational achievement and
personal knowledge.390 His work influenced not only the educational opportunities for
soldiers, but also the Army’s information campaign in support of servicemembers’ education
on the obligations of Americans to participate in civil society. In partnership with key
educators such as the Harvard School of Education Dean, Francis Trow Spaulding, the Army
began to develop and implement programs of instruction as a means to both educate and
provide opportunities for soldiers.391
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Evolution to the US Armed Forces Institute
By April 1942, the Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation agreed to
transform the Army Institute into a combined organization, the USAFI. This consolidation of
efforts allowed the program to assist servicemembers in any of the Armed Forces. Using
donated office space as a headquarters, in 1942 USAFI began operating in offices and
buildings provided by the University of Wisconsin. The organization’s staff was charged
with developing, implementing, and supervising the educational programs for the US Armed
Forces during the war. This was a task well beyond the military or any college or university;
America needed a joint effort. Not only were educational experts involved, but private
companies, such as the McGraw-Hill Book Company, and a wide variety of colleges,
universities, and high schools offered assistance as well.392
As previously discussed, the literacy of potential recruits was a problem for the
military, as it hindered mission accomplishment. One goal of USAFI was to provide
technical training opportunities and continue to build on improving literacy in
servicemembers.393 The USAFI program started with sixty-four vocational and technical
courses, and the initial response from Army personnel was overwhelming. While in April
1942, the Army Institute opened its doors in Madison, Wisconsin, it was not until September
1942 that the Army Institute program became available to Navy personnel. In addition to the
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initial sixty-four courses, when the Army Institute officially became the USAFI in February
1943, the program expanded its initial offering, continuing to focus on courses offered
through colleges and universities. The Army’s establishment of the Institute assisted in
addressing the military literacy problem while demonstrating the value of military
partnerships with higher education.394
The USAFI provided on- and off-duty educational opportunities to both men and
women, enlisted and officer, in any of the military services.395 The partnership between the
Armed Forces and a wide variety of educational institutions focused on four major types of
learning. First was the Institute correspondence courses developed by USAFI.
Servicemembers taking these courses received text materials and lessons through the mail
and the advice of an educational advisor who provided feedback on their progress. Second
were the university extension correspondence courses, which were similar to the Institute
courses except that college credit could be received based on test scores and the
correspondence material was received directly from the university or college offering the
course. Third were the self-teaching courses. For servicemembers located in remote areas,
these self-teaching courses provided the textbook from the Institute, pictures and diagrams
that one would see on a normal classroom blackboard, and assessments at the end of each
chapter to measure understanding. The fourth type of courses were the off-duty classes. If
servicemembers could form a group of individuals who desired to study a specific subject or
topic, the textbooks and teaching materials would be provided by USAFI, and the students
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could take advantage of the opportunity to learn together. Qualified military personnel could
use the materials to deliver the course to the group.396
USAFI was a full-service program.397 The Institute hired and trained counselors to
work with servicemembers, answering questions regarding their choice of courses and
providing assistance with learning plans. This allowed servicemembers the opportunity to
complete college courses and continue working towards a degree while serving.398 The
demand for higher education grew over time. In 1943, over eighty universities and colleges
across America offered university extension correspondence courses.399 A significant benefit
to the learner beyond the accessibility of these courses was the cost sharing between the
servicemember and the government which continued throughout the twentieth century.400
The government paid half of the tuition and course material fees for university extension
correspondence courses up to a total of $20 per course.401 This allowed those who would
have never had an opportunity to complete a degree or take a college course to do so. The
benefits of the program were not the same for all servicemembers. For Army officers there
was no cost sharing; since the officer salary was much higher, the officers paid the full
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tuition costs. However, military officers still had the opportunity to enroll in the Institute
courses and continue their education.
During WWII, a considerable number of high schools and colleges across the United
States agreed to provide academic credit to servicemembers who could prove their
experience based on training hours.402 This was quite different from the traditional course
credit, which required students to both sit in the classroom and complete assessments
demonstrating competency. The Institute worked with servicemembers, giving them
specially designed tests to measure what they had learned, and then documented those
examination scores, forwarding them to the school of their choice for credit.403 There were a
variety of courses provided by the Institute. Servicemembers could learn a foreign language,
complete courses related to aviation and the automotive industry, and even educate
themselves on topics with no correlation to military duties, such as courses related to the life
insurance industry. For example, on July 18, 1944, USAFI published War Department
Educational Manual-758, life insurance, providing more than 600 pages of content on the
principles, types, and rates of life insurance.404 The course book was designed for use as an
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off-duty self-learning course and contained instructions on how to complete the end-ofcourse test for life insurance certification. This is one example of the numerous publications
produced by USAFI in partnership with educators, industry, and publishers.405 The result of
these partnerships during WWII allowed tens of thousands of servicemembers to complete
correspondence courses and demonstrated to educators the value in distance learning and the
acquisition of knowledge outside the classroom. In one 1945–1946 study at the Ohio State
University, the Junior Dean of the College of Education found that 107 student veterans took
308 tests during the academic year; passing 249 tests ultimately saved $25,200 for the
veterans at the 1945–1946 tuition rates.406
USAFI introduced correspondence courses on an enormous scale, giving
servicemembers access to technical and educational material almost anywhere in the
world.407 By the 1950s, USAFI was offering courses through the Institute or by colleges
across America, providing learning opportunities to servicemembers stationed across the
globe. One of the benefits the military provided in testing and fielding programs with USAFI
was its large population. Because so many Americans participated in USAFI correspondence
studies, the benefit of distance education was validated as an effective method of learning.408
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The involvement of educators and Army personnel influenced the educational program in a
positive way and created new opportunities of educating and training in American society.409
Transition from USAFI to DANTES
USAFI did not end after the war and by 1955 had 45 colleges and universities
contracted as partners offering 6,400 courses available to servicemembers.410 The program
continued until 1974, when Congress stopped funding USAFI and the Army disbanded the
organization on May 31 of that year.411 No longer having the support USAFI provided, the
military services collaborated to develop the Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education
Support (DANTES). The armed services jointly established the organization in July 1974,
and its focus was to support voluntary educational programs across the Department of
Defense (DOD).412 DANTES provided support in areas such as the GED, college level
examinations, and certifications, while also assuming legacy duties such as maintaining the
records, tests, and study material from USAFI and issuing transcripts.413 From 1974 to 2000,
DANTES exams continued to provide college credit opportunities to servicemembers at little
to no cost. The DANTES organization continues today within the services, and the testing is
a joint effort between the DOD and a private company. In 2000, the private company
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Prometric acquired the exams developed and refined over time through educational
partnerships with the DOD and today provides the DANTES Subject Standardized Test
(DSST) to military and civilian personnel seeking to earn college course credit by
examination.414 While developers produced many of these examinations as part of USAFI to
assist military personnel as they pursued higher education, the legacy of the WWII
partnership between educators and the War Department lives on in American higher
education today.415
The GED Testing Program
Another benefit of the partnerships with educators was the GED testing program. No
understanding of the GED testing program can be complete without discussing the need for
literacy improvements in the US military. Several scholars have researched the problem of
illiteracy throughout the history of the United States. As a result, for the military, literacy
became a military operational necessity in the twentieth century. During WWI, literacy
became a requirement for military service.416 This was due to the explosion in technological
advancements and the military’s adoption of new equipment at the time that continued during
WWII and beyond.417 In 1918, the Army fielded an intelligence-testing program as a means
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to identify, train, and educate those inductees who had difficulty adjusting to military life and
performing their duties in a satisfactory manner. Clinton Anderson and Steve Kime
highlighted that during WWI, “the war department found that 30 percent of the 1.7 million
soldiers taking the Army Beta Test could not understand the form due to their lack of reading
skills.”418 As evidence has shown, during WWII, the screening of inductees and standardized
testing expanded to the point where local draft boards and induction stations could identify
slow learners, illiterates, and non-English speakers.419 This identification enabled the Army
to place recruits who were potentially unfit for service into specialized training units where
the Army taught them reading and writing to improve individual literacy.
Army literacy programs not only continued but expanded during WWII. During the
wartime screening, illiterate, slow learning, or non-English speaking recruits were sent for
extra training and education.420 Connecting the need for a trained and educated military
during both world wars, and the subsequent assessments and educational programs, led to the
American Council on Education endorsing the “general education curriculum and testing for
credit agenda within the military through the Joint Army and Navy committee on Welfare
and Recreation,” along with the War Department placing oversight on the supervision of
literacy training, and the maintenance of the curriculum, under the USAFI in May 1944.421
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Building on literacy testing and USAFI courses, in partnership with USAFI and the
American Council on Education, educators such as Ralph Tyler from the University of
Chicago constructed examinations designed to evaluate the knowledge servicemembers
gained based on the USAFI educational programs.422 The leaders within the American
Council on Education recommended that these examinations not only measure the outcomes
from the USAFI courses but apply them to all veterans to test whether they have achieved the
specific level of knowledge.423 The course examinations focused on measuring knowledge
and course outcomes at the university and high school levels.424 They included in the course
examinations, technical competence tests and an overall GED test.425 The GED test was of
significant interest since if passed and accepted by high schools and colleges,
servicemembers could pursue higher education without the need to return to high school if
they had left due to the war. The GED was announced in February 1944 as being available
for civilians to take the general educational development test, highlighting the success of the
USAFI program.426 Later, to standardize the administration of the GED test, in 1945, the
American Council on Education established the Veterans Testing Service, a precursor to the
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later GED testing service.427 Efforts such as these were a continuation of significant changes
in American post-secondary education resulting from the partnerships with and influence of
the military.
Contributors designed the GED test to assist veterans in documenting their
knowledge and to demonstrate their equivalency to a high school diploma. The goal of the
test was to assist veterans in taking advantage of higher education opportunities when they
returned from the war. The critical component behind developing the GED test was that it
would measure learning outcomes, or the knowledge of the average high school student upon
graduation.428 This was critical, as nearly eight million men served in the US Armed Forces
during the war, and approximately half of those did not possess a high school diploma.429
Providing academic credit based on either military service or knowledge gained from service
and nontraditional courses such as those provided by and through USAFI was a novel idea.
The need for the test was obvious; educational institutions could not simply provide the same
blanket accreditation to all servicemembers because their military and educational
experiences lacked uniformity. How to measure the knowledge based on four years of high
school was the question, and educators working with USAFI considered the GED exam a
potential answer.430
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Between 1910 and 1945, technological increases placed significant demands on the
US military. America needed servicemembers who were both literate and educated. Harold
Clark and Harold Sloan explained how the Industrial Revolution affected skills and the
“technological advances put a premium on knowledge, agile minds, quick responses, and
clear thinking.”431 While the progressive movement may have been overshadowed by WWI,
the needs identified while waging war created conditions under which efforts to help
American servicemembers during and after the war continued to spread across the country.
The long-term impact of the partnerships with USAFI and educational institutions during
WWII led to successes such as the identification of standard outcomes gained from four
years of secondary education. Today, the GED continues to provide opportunities in
America. As recent as the 2010s, more than half a million Americans took the GED
annually.432
Literacy and the Economy after World War II
Of course, other factors during WWII influenced society, politics, and the economy.
Arthur Herman’s Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World
War II provided an excellent perspective on how the American military-industrial complex
and the production capacity for manufacturing moved America from being a limited producer
of wartime products to a manufacturing powerhouse that supported multiple nations in their
efforts to defeat the Axis powers during WWII. Taking a business-focused approach to
research demonstrates how American wartime production, industrial leaders, and private
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enterprise were all a critical part of the successful outcome of the war.433 The demand for
skilled, literate, and educated men and women during the war created competition for labor
in the workforce.434 It was the military who focused on a solution by partnering with multiple
stakeholders to address the development of technical experts while improving the literacy of
men who would otherwise be underperformers or unacceptable in this new technological
age.435
While there is significant historiography on both world wars, analysis of how literacy
became an issue of national defense has been limited. Focusing on the expansion of
government, how the US military identified the need for a literate workforce, and the impact
on Americans after WWI enables historians to understand the impact from both a micro and
macro level. Focusing on taxpayer-funded post-secondary education programs that had their
inception during and after WWI may demonstrate how distinct groups of people came
together as federal money became available for local and state programs.
The financial impacts were a factor that affected the decisions of leaders on the
development and use of these educational programs and acceptance of these programs by
ordinary citizens. The demobilization at the end of WWII raised significant concerns by
civilian and military leaders regarding the American economy.436 In his biennial report to the
Secretary of War, United States Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall specifically
mentioned this demobilization concern by saying, “the disturbance to our national economy
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must be kept to the minimum.”437 American leaders understood that mobilizing a large army,
waging war for four years, and then returning millions of troops back into local communities
would have a significant effect on the lives of all American citizens. The concerns of a rapid
demobilization were so significant that the US Army developed a complicated points system
to establish the servicemember’s muster-out date at the end of WWII. Soldiers received
credit for length of time in the service, length of time overseas, number of dependent
children, and even awarded decorations. The goal of this process was to be fair in the
discharge of servicemembers while not overburdening the military, or return-to-civilian-life
programs, with too many servicemembers departing the military at once.
In late 1945, Army efficiency allowed the service to discharge soldiers within fortyeight hours of returning to an embarkation port. During the last two days before discharge,
administrative actions such as receiving briefings, paperwork, and a discharge certificate
were completed. What was both interesting and divergent from other wars is that the
servicemember received pamphlets on their rights as a veteran and the benefits provided by
specific agencies, offering information on topics such as employment assistance, musteringout payments, and the G.I. Bill of Rights.438 For a nation without a national military policy,
the effort of the US military in developing programs to benefit servicemembers and veterans
expanded significantly during and after WWII. Leaders such as General Marshall explained
the need for American political and military leaders to establish a detailed national military
policy outlining the organization of and support for a peacetime military in America.439 He
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was aware that America needed a plan to ensure the country would be ready for the next
conflict. Marshall considered that from an educational standpoint, the need for service
schools and facilities on camps, posts, and stations capable of training the citizen-soldier
must be part of a national military policy.440
In the twenty-first century American military, the legacy of providing educational
assistance to veterans and current military servicemembers continues. The current form of
what started as the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, or G.I. Bill of Rights, is now
Chapter 33, the post-9/11 G.I. Bill.441 Some might consider the Readjustment Act of 1944 as
a novel or revolutionary idea, but when viewing educational and training programs along
with the partnerships between the US Army and post-secondary education, the act was part
of an evolutionary process needed to fulfill the American labor requirements while providing
veterans the needed support to reintegrate into society after the war. This legislation
continued the partnership between the military and higher education in America. During
WWI, Congress created a system of veterans’ benefits that also included vocational
rehabilitation for the disabled. Building on the WWI example, WWII ideas expanded earlier
programs designed to help veterans and undoubtedly influenced the passing of the 1944 G.I.
Bill.
Impact of the G.I. Bill and Other Tuition Assistance
In addition to having a significant impact on education, the G.I. Bill was more than an
educational program. In its 1944 form, the WWII G.I. Bill allowed veterans to apply for a
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$500 stipend per semester while attending accredited training or educational programs; this
generated an unforeseen demand when over two million veterans entered higher education
programs.442 The 1944 Act also established hospitals, provided home loan guarantees, and
included unemployment compensation.443 While it is easy to appreciate the establishment of
hospitals creating conditions that required additional staff, those hospitals also increased the
need for programs to educate those workers needed in the medical community. At the same
time, unemployment compensation and home loan guarantees created conditions that made
pursuing higher education a possibility on a scale not seen before. The economy of the
United States played a part in the adoption of the G.I. Bill program; WWII demonstrated the
shortage of trained employees in many industrial fields.444 Factors such as the economy,
private industry demands, and the lobbying power of the American Legion helped to push the
proposal through Congress.445 While people affected by the G.I. Bill after WWII numbered
in the millions, the current descendent program of the G.I. Bill continues to affect several
hundred thousand veterans annually.446 The effect on colleges and universities is in the
billions of dollars, and economists can only speculate on the number of jobs the legislation
created.
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The creation of educational programs for servicemembers under the umbrella of the
G.I. Bill significantly changed societal views on higher education. The program became an
enabler to pursue higher education for many who would have never had the opportunity.
Research on the benefit of the G.I. Bill to education in America is rare. Searching
contemporary databases for sources on the subject provides few works that acknowledge the
major influence of the US military on higher education. Keith Olson demonstrated through
his research that many academics consider the G.I. Bill to be the most successful and
significant educational experiment in American history.447 While this may be a widely held
opinion, the evolution of programs such as the Citizens’ Military Training Camps, the SATC,
the ASTP, and even ROTC paved the way.
After the war, the G.I. Bill opened opportunities for the masses to attend postsecondary education in numbers never before seen.448 The G.I. Bill influenced urbanization
and suburbanization, social mobility, and many changes in educational institutions.449 Factors
such as class size, enrollment numbers, and student accommodations upset the cart for
traditional educational organizations. Before 1915, American colleges and universities were
mired in the status quo of the traditional student acceptance processes and instructional
methods. Those who designed and organized the G.I. Bill may have failed to anticipate the
long-term effects that America observed some fifteen to twenty years later. Anderson and
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Kime summed up the influence of educational programs within the US military quite
succinctly by saying, “The democratization of higher education and the emergence of what is
commonly referred to as adult and continuing education—owe much to the nation’s service
members and veterans.”450 Many consider the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 one
of the most influential pieces of legislation ever approved by Congress; it effectively created
the American middle class and was as significant as the passing of the legislative act itself.451
Before the First World War, many colleges were small private liberal arts
organizations that graduated a small number of attendees annually. Although there were
land-grant colleges, attending higher education was still limited to a small portion of
American society. Even graduating from high school was not a standard achievement prior to
the Second World War. With low literacy rates, programs such as those the Army provided
to prepare recruits by teaching them to read and write had an extraordinary impact on the
nation. With the passing of the G.I. Bill in 1944 and the war ending in 1945, by 1947 there
were more than a million veterans using G.I. Bill benefits in colleges across America. This
number was 49 percent of all college enrollments that year.452 The financial gains are evident
in the expansion of faculty at four-year colleges by comparing faculty members in 1942 to
those after the war. The total number of faculty members at four-year colleges in 1940 was
146,929 and in 1946, even after the G.I. Bill became law and the majority of servicemembers
were released from duty, that number was only 165,324.453 Since it took time for universities
to make the huge investments in the postwar era, the true demonstration of the influence of
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the G.I. Bill on universities is highlighted by 1948 faculty numbers: the number of faculty at
four-year universities was 223,660, an increase of about 60,000 new faculty in two years.454
To put the growth in perspective, the pre-war increases of faculty numbers over two years
were less than 10,000. The impact of the G.I. Bill on American higher education was
significant not only immediately after the war but continued as changes occurred over many
years.455
Recent data on beneficiaries currently using educational benefits from military
programs highlight the post-9/11 G.I. Bill as the most widely used educational benefit by
veterans today. In 2013, 754,229 beneficiaries utilized the post-9/11 G.I. Bill at a cost of over
$10 billion.456 The influx of funding dollars from military educational programs can have a
significant effect on educational organizations as well as on American businesses. Adding
$10 billion into educational programs increases the demand for educators, along with nonveterans pursuing higher education and training to remain competitive in the employment
market. Consider the one million Americans who reportedly used veterans’ educational
benefits in the year 2013; they influenced society by raising the level of education for skilled
workers, increased jobs in higher education, and created a demand for publishing and other
peripheral jobs as well.457 By improving the educational status of the veterans, the G.I. Bill
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educated veterans while creating employment competition as they entered the workforce with
a higher level of education.458
To understand the influence of veterans’ educational benefits on institutions, one only
needs to examine the media from any time in history. After WWII, federal funding through
the G.I. Bill led to organizations specifically marketing directly to veterans.459 This not only
included post-secondary institutions but also trade schools and nontraditional places of
instruction as well. Although post-secondary institutions sought veterans’ attendance, the
substantial number of veterans attending universities as a result of the G.I. Bill, was not
initially supported by all educators.460 From a business perspective, organizations may have
viewed veterans as prospective students who brought with them scholarships and, therefore,
guaranteed income to the organization. This influence affected decision-making similar to the
SATC and the ASTP.461 But there was also a positive contribution to the veterans attending
classroom courses. Over time, educators began to view veterans as more mature than the
traditional students arriving directly from high school, as veterans possessed increased
motivation and drive to complete assignments and represented the organization well as
alumni. These attitudes towards military students may be a result of the high volume of
veterans who appeared on the Dean’s List and honor rolls using the G.I. Bill after WWII.462
458

Richard M. Rose, A Summary of Voluntary Education in the Armed Forces, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, DC, May 1974, 3-13.
459

Inside Higher Ed, “Senators Introduce New Bill on Veterans and For-Profits,” February 17, 2012,
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2012/02/17/senators-introduce-new-bill-veterans-and-profits.
460

Keith W. Olson, “A Historical Analysis of the G.I. Bill and Its Relationship to Higher Education,”
Syracuse University Research Institute, 1968. 8-10. https://files.eric.ed.gov
/fulltext/ED024330.pdf.
461

American Council on Education, "Educational Lessons from Wartime Training: The General Report of
the Commission on Implications of Armed Services Educational Programs" (Washington, DC, 1948).; US
Army Service Forces, Army Specialized Training Division, “Essential Facts about the Army Specialized
Training Program”.
462

Olson, “The G.I. Bill and Higher Education,” 596–610.

207
There was an obvious financial benefit to educational organizations in relation to G.I.
Bill funding. By financing veterans’ educational pursuits, the program indirectly increased
the market from which colleges and universities might gather students. This increased desire
for higher education affected the demand for educators while also having the potential to
increase the influence of higher education within American society.463 While the G.I. Bill did
represent a significant contribution to American society, the military-related contributions to
the field of education are no less significant. Anderson and Kime connected WWII to the
changes in higher education after the war, saying, “Cyril Houle, one of America’s leading
adult educators, found that, through the very struggle for democracy during World War II,
adult education—a ‘new implement for democracy’—had been forged.”464 Even Peter
Drucker, the American management guru, believed that the G.I. Bill was the beginning of the
knowledge society in America today.465 While some may consider the change in higher
education a progressive victory, the capitalist economy and military demands for trained and
educated servicemembers had a more significant influence in moving America towards these
changes.
The colleges and universities were not the only financial beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill.
The veterans themselves discovered the monetary benefit of attending higher education by
utilizing the G.I. Bill—increasing their income by over 40 percent in the late 1940s. The
American government and the economy also reaped benefits. According to Anderson and
Kime, the increased personal income provided America a return on investment at a rate of
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“two to eight times as much in income taxes as it paid out in educational benefits.”466 The
increased income and improved veteran quality of life changed the country by supporting the
expansion of the middle class, while providing higher education with increased enrollments,
research opportunities, and revenue. The ability to use veterans’ benefits for vocational and
technical education in addition to colleges and universities provided the country with the
motivation to increase its investment in engineering and mechanical technologies.467
Ultimately, the long-term effects of the G.I. Bill program demonstrated to educators
that student veterans possessed increased maturity, initiative, and a wider variety of
experiences, thus adding to the learning of civilian educators and students alike. Prior to the
passage of the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, some educators such as James B.
Conant, president of Harvard University, and Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University
of Chicago, viewed the G.I. Bill as a threat to, and an unworkable problem for, the American
institution of education. Over time, these attitudes changed as the high volume of veterans
appeared on the Dean’s List and honor rolls.468
The higher performing veterans in many educational institutions benefited American
higher education in several ways. The increased drive of veterans to perform well in the
classroom raised the performance expectations of all students.469 Over half a century later,
the multiple variations of the G.I. Bill wield a significant influence on the financial success
of colleges, universities, and trade schools across America. In 2013, more than one million
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beneficiaries utilized veteran educational benefits, attending colleges, universities, and
technical programs resulting in the payment of over $12 billion in tuition during a single
year.470
The US military has a long history of providing education to its servicemembers.
From the very beginning, leaders such as General George Washington sought to address
illiteracy within the ranks. He assigned his chaplains to provide basic literacy instruction in
the hopes that his soldiers might find spiritual enrichment.471 Almost a century and a half
later, the US Congress formalized a tuition assistance program as part of the 1942
Appropriations Act.472 Educating and training military personnel to a specific baseline
standard is the goal of the US military, but education has influenced personal developmental
goals in the eyes of military leaders. As the tuition assistance program transformed over the
years, military personnel began to view educational achievement as a means to advance their
careers within the service.473 While the program began as a way to increase the
servicemembers’ knowledge and skills, in the twentieth century, promotions and assignments
became tied to vocational certificates and educational achievements.
Considering George Washington’s requirement that his chaplains educate and
improve the literacy of his soldiers, Anderson and Kime explained that Washington’s goal
was not to increase their educational ability from a military perspective, but to improve the
skills of enlisted men in Bible reading to enhance “spiritual enrichment and a better life for
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the future.”474 This approach related to Pershing’s thoughts on educating men during their
free time at the end of WWI. He saw an opportunity for them to be productive, and education
was a way to avoid the problems that sometimes arise when soldiers have idle time. Of
course, today there may be some gnashing of teeth and protesting as to the religious
involvement in the curriculum, but acknowledging the benefit the leaders sought to provide
reaches far beyond the organization itself. The lack of reform-minded leaders limited the
expansion of military training and educational programs for decades, but by WWII the
changes were in motion on what seemed like an unstoppable path.
With the passing of the G.I. Bill in 1944, the continued changes for active military
education expanded a few years later. The military had the USAFI program with its learning
opportunities, and by 1946 in-class off-duty education started to become an even more
attractive option for servicemembers.475 The military tuition assistance program became
formalized with the 1947 publication of War Department Memorandum 85-40-1, which
authorized servicemembers to enroll in civilian universities and colleges and attend classes
during their off-duty time.476 The design of the tuition assistance program generated a
demand for higher education educators beyond traditional campuses and daytime classes.
Before the adoption of tuition assistance during WWII, most American educators received
exposure to military personnel in the form of veterans who had exited the service and were
returning to higher education. While those veterans brought with them unique experiences,
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unless educators worked at a college or university located in proximity to an active military
installation, they missed the broadening opportunity of working with active-duty military
learners. The expanding opportunities for servicemembers to pursue higher education while
on active duty had a significant impact on post-secondary education. For example, the
University of Maryland was a traditional higher education institution at the end of WWII.
The majority of its students were full-time attendees of traditional age and attended courses
at the College Park and Baltimore campuses. After the war, the substantial number of
veterans had a significant impact on the student body of post-secondary education in
America. The University of Maryland was no exception. The considerable number of
enrollments from beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill included single, married, and even older men
who had postponed their education. To address the demand for education, the University of
Maryland established the College of Special and Continuation Studies under the College of
Education. The program began in 1947 and within the first few years expanded to more than
250 courses at twenty-five campus centers serving over 4,000 students.477 By 1949, the
University of Maryland had established an overseas presence in Germany in an effort to build
on its success with stateside off-campus programs.478 The University of Maryland’s
establishment of campus centers on military installations set the precedent that many colleges
and universities across America eventually followed. This provided an opportunity for
educators to engage with active-duty personnel and potentially return to their universities and
colleges with a better understanding of the military and its challenges. This also provided an
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employment opportunity for potential adjunct faculty and attendance by nonmilitary students
from the local community near these camps, posts, and stations. Another benefit was that
overseas faculty positions broadened the educators’ experience while providing an in-class
learning opportunity for servicemembers.
With today’s proliferation of both online distance education courses and technology
that supports both synchronous and asynchronous collaboration, a large number of activeduty military are able to attend courses with organizations, and with professors, that
previously would have been unavailable based on proximity to a college campus. Since the
tuition assistance program supports leader and personal development within the military, its
financial support for courses using multiple formats—such as traditional classes, distance
education, and self-directed learning—has influenced the field of education by creating
increasingly diverse opportunities for achieving educational goals. Allowing military
personnel to access and complete courses from anywhere in the world, distance education
helps the servicemember, other students, and educators. Without the tuition assistance
program, many servicemembers would be unable to enroll in these courses due to the
financial burden, providing funding increases as customers for colleges and universities. The
long-term influence of the military has changed the way educational programs provide
services.479
The tuition assistance program in the military had a significant effect on how
organizations presented and conducted classes. In the past, organizations conducted classes at
brick-and-mortar institutions, and some with the entrepreneurial spirit provided
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correspondence course study and even video courses.480 However, the influence on colleges,
universities, and technical schools by military educational programs has evolved over several
decades. Consider the classroom instruction on and near military installations. In today’s
technological society, encouraging accredited universities, colleges, and trade schools to
provide classes near and on military installations is commonplace.481 Clark and Sloan
explained that this practice was prolific sixty years ago.482 This expansion of the campus to
accommodate the military student was in both synchronous and asynchronous modalities.
While some may not see an obvious connection between the concept of providing education
away from the main campus today and military programs in the past, examining how the
tuition assistance program generated the demand for alternate locations of the classroom over
half a century ago provides an insightful perspective. Moving the classroom to the student
has been a military staple for decades.
The use of tuition assistance by military personnel has provided more than just a
benefit to the individual or the military. The use of tuition assistance by servicemembers
today influences the number of faculty on the payroll in hundreds of colleges and universities
across the country. Today, much of this is due to the ubiquitous nature of online classes.
Consider the number of attendees and education centers six decades ago, and one can see the
major influence of the program for more than half a century. Clark and Sloan documented
that during “the fiscal year 1957, there were over 100…Army educational centers in the
United States and over 200 overseas, employing some 275 civilian educational advisors and
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over 1600 civilian and military teachers.”483 This encouragement of the civilian institutions
of higher learning to operate on and near US military installations and provide classes has not
only benefited the military but also provides opportunities to the civilian populations that live
near these installations. This relationship generates additional broadening opportunities for
educators to teach under different circumstances than they usually encounter. In addition, the
locally offered programs provide opportunities for the local population to attend courses
while encouraging military personnel to continue to pursue higher education after completing
their service obligation.
One example is the city of Waynesville, Missouri, located just outside the military
installation of Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. With just over five thousand people in the city,
one may not expect to see Columbia College, Drury University, Lincoln University, Park
University, and Webster University, along with others, offer residential courses, due to the
small local population.484 Not only do military personnel and their families attend classes at
these colleges, but the programs welcome civilians from the surrounding community to
attend these same courses, most of which the colleges conduct on the military installation.
This is just one example of the widespread influence of the tuition assistance program.
Similar opportunities exist at other small or remote places such as Fort Polk, Louisiana, Fort
Irwin, California, and Fort Drum, New York. The benefits for civilians with no military
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affiliation seeking in-class post-secondary educational programs are apparent at US military
camps, posts, and stations across the globe.
As a forerunner in satellite campus creation, the University of Maryland led the way.
Clark and Sloan explained that the Armed Forces educational program, with members such
as the University of Maryland, had 400–500 full and part-time educators teaching overseas in
the early 1960s.485 Based on these numbers, the opportunities the tuition assistance program
provided for educators over the decades were tremendous. Today, the military tuition
assistance program helps to support the operations of the University of Maryland and its
satellite campuses that span over one hundred worldwide locations across more than a dozen
countries outside the United States.
It has been said that the more power a person achieves, the more they desire.486 The
same may be true for education. Since the military uses a deliberate approach to education
and training, military personnel spend anywhere from a few years to decades inculcating the
routines, ideals, and beliefs that continued personal development is crucial in preparing for
the civilian labor market. Since between 25 percent and 50 percent of all military skills have
some direct civilian correlation, the rich opportunities in technical, administrative, and
leadership positions in the military need only be coupled with formal certifications or
academic degrees to prepare military personnel for success in civilian life.487 Utilizing the
tuition assistance program while in the military provides an opportunity for servicemembers
to experience a formal post-secondary educational environment, even if they do not complete
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a degree. By completing a few classes towards either a technical or academic degree while in
the military, the program may increase the desire of the servicemember to utilize other
benefits such as the post-9/11 G.I. Bill upon separation from the service. The benefits of the
tuition assistance program affect the servicemember, educators, educational organizations,
and even civilian personnel with no military affiliation. The overarching influences on higher
education by the military tuition assistance program demonstrate its diverse lines of influence
and raise a curiosity as to exactly what financial return on investment it provides American
society.
During WWII, Army education and training continued to build on the successes of
programs such as the SATC of WWI, the ASTP of WWII, and literacy programs designed to
increase the number of men available to the Armed Forces in support of the war. The
combined efforts of the War Department and American educators led to the establishment of
USAFI. The work of key USAFI stakeholders on evaluating learning of servicemembers in
USAFI programs and developing course material assisted servicemembers in taking the
courses needed to improve their abilities and performance. The program also provided
servicemembers an opportunity to continue with their education by taking courses on topics
such as mathematics, engineering, and languages.488 This not only enhanced the
servicemembers’ abilities while on active duty, but it also prepared them for future civilian
employment. By providing university extension correspondence courses, self-teaching
courses, and off-duty classes, the program served as a benefit to servicemembers, educators,
and the military.
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To develop these programs, the military partnered with educational institutions such
as the University of Wisconsin, the University of Chicago, and others in developing curricula
for each course.489 Although the US military already had a relationship with a wide variety of
educational institutions as part of the ROTC program, new partnerships and organizations
bloomed with the Army creating the Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs
during WWII.490 During the war, not all partnerships with educators involved the educating
of servicemembers. The Office of Scientific Research and Development focused on
designing weapon systems and warfighting equipment. While each program provided
benefits as America waged war, USAFI created a decades-long legacy. At a time when
education in America was expanding at a rapid rate, the US military and its partners shaped
the delivery of training and educational materials for Americans both in and out of the US
military.491
As part of USAFI’s research, program leaders partnered with stakeholders,
developing testing products that identified the expected outcomes from a high school
graduate. This ultimately yielded the examination that became today’s GED test. While
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focusing on literacy in the military, the WWI intelligence testing program provided the
baseline for evidence-based testing, and the military provided the incentives, funding, and
needed test participants for the large-scale studies. Working with leaders in the field such as
Ralph Tyler, USAFI invested in testing veterans’ knowledge so they might continue with
their educational journey by acquiring a high school diploma equivalency accreditation
through this newly developed testing program. This Institute focused on measuring the
learner outcomes achieved during high school and developed testing procedures that led to
the creation of the GED test.492 The legacy of the partnerships between the military and
educators is that the GED continues to provide opportunities for the masses to acquire a
second chance at post-secondary education in America.493 This is just one example of how
the long-term relationship between educators and the US military benefits American society.
Efforts towards the end of WWII led to the passage of the Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act of 1944. While there were numerous proposals to provide a benefit to the
WWII veterans, few were backed with as much consensus as the G.I. Bill of Rights. The
support of the American Legion influenced the passage of the 1944 G.I. Bill prior to the end
of the war.494 Another influence was the need to address how to integrate the millions of men
returning to the American economy. The G.I. Bill opened opportunities for the masses of
veterans to attend post-secondary education in numbers for which many universities and
colleges were ill-prepared. The impact of the G.I. Bill was significant, and the veterans
showed their commitment to education, with many former servicemembers appearing on the
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Dean’s List and Honor Roll.495 While veterans may have benefited from increased personal
income after using the G.I. Bill, the government benefited from the increased tax base, and
institutions of higher education benefited financially and structurally from this influx of
veteran students.496
Summary of the Focus on Servicemember Education During and After WWII
The creation of educational programs for servicemembers and veterans such as the
G.I. Bill significantly changed societal views on higher education in America in the twentieth
century.497 Enabler programs such as these allowed the average American who previously
did not have the opportunity to attend college, to do so. This program changed the American
attitude towards higher education. By financing veterans’ educational pursuits, the program
increased the number of college and university customers and influenced an attitude change
in educational leaders such as the presidents of Harvard University and the University of
Chicago. These two leaders saw the G.I. Bill as a threat to the American institution of
education.498 Eventually, when they saw the performance of the veterans within their
organizations, they realized their concerns were unfounded. With veterans achieving many
academic accolades in their studies after WWII, the program proved its value. Ultimately,
leaders in their field such as Cyril Houle and Peter Drucker proposed that the program was of
more value than just educating veterans—it was a move towards a more educationally
democratic, knowledge society.499
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There were several byproducts that came about as a result of the focus on veteran and
servicemember education during and after WWII. One educational program with an
influence on higher education in America was the tuition assistance program. Although
aspects of the program have changed since its formalization in 1942, what remains constant
is the influence the tuition assistance program has yielded. In 1989, military personnel using
tuition assistance attended over 500,000 college courses. This influx of students and tuition
dollars has a marked influence on the way institutions of higher learning cater to military
customers. Twenty years later, in 2009, tuition assistance expenditures surpassed $500
million.500 The DOD leverages these numbers to gain compliance from organizations seeking
to educate military personnel while receiving federal funding.501 The standards created by the
servicemembers opportunity colleges agreement required organizations receiving tuition
assistance dollars meet the exacting standards established by the DOD.502 This influence on
American education is obvious. Post-secondary institutions not achieving and maintaining
the required standards are not eligible for payment, thus protecting veterans and
servicemembers while ensuring academic standards. This demonstrates the continued impact
of military programs on post-secondary education in America.
The military tuition assistance program also provides opportunities for educators.
There is a direct correlation between the program and the creation of classroom instruction
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on and near military installations. Financing military personnel to attend post-secondary
education programs generates a demand; institutions of higher education are aware of this
demand and seek ways to gain their market share. Colleges and universities providing
instructors in classrooms on military installations is nothing new; this practice saw its
beginning during WWII.503 Providing opportunities for military personnel to attend classes
locally can influence higher education with local employment opportunities for faculty
members. In addition, civilians with no military affiliation may also attend these courses,
providing educational opportunities for civilians as well.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
The contribution of the US military to American post-secondary education is more
complicated than simply the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 and the fact
that post-WWII veterans used the G.I. Bill to attain educational achievement. This study
illuminates how changing conditions throughout history led to significant influences by the US
military on American post-secondary education and that the G.I. Bill was only one of many steps
in the evolutionary process of military training and developmental needs. Moreover, this study
establishes the influence of the US military on higher education in America and demonstrates
how military programs established before the G.I. Bill, such as the WWI SATC and the WWII
ASTP, expanded federal influence on post-secondary education in America through the
successes brought about by these Army programs. The evidence shows that between 1910 and
1950, the US Army had a considerable influence on colleges and universities in America through
partnerships and programs resulting from the combination of changing technology, reformminded leaders coming into positions of power, and large military operations demanding large
numbers of recruits. Understanding these changes may allow American military and educational
leaders in the twenty-first century to consider partnerships that might benefit each group of
stakeholders.
Over time, few leaders proposed changes to training, operations, and education in the US
Army. Examining the American Civil War demonstrated the need for changes in the tactical and
operational application of the principles of war and highlighted that reform-minded leaders such
as Emory Upton faced significant barriers in changing the way the Union Army conducted
offensive operations. Even with the adoption of new technologies such as the rifled musket, the
Minie Ball, and the telegraph, it was surprising to find that Army leaders failed to recognize and
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adopt significant changes in servicemember development, even with the substantial number of
casualties while waging large military operations. Understanding the intransigent mindset of
military leaders during the American Civil War, as well as the limited changes proposed by
major leaders such as Sherman, provides a comparison to the significant changes that occurred
during the first half of the twentieth century. While researching to understand Army structure
and the development of servicemembers, it was surprising to find that after the American Civil
War there were a few reformers who began to influence change. Reform-minded leaders such as
Arthur Wagner sought to make changes at the beginning of the twentieth century. Aligning
Wagner’s ideas for change with others in powerful positions of authority such as Secretary of
War Elihu Root showed that the Army could implement change should a combination of major
factors present themselves. Technological changes were occurring within American industry, but
without major military operations and reform-minded leaders to use those factors as a means to
justify investment and modification, both legislators and military officers hesitated to provide
their support.
While the Army did put some effort into transforming itself and moving into the
twentieth century through the development of a War College in 1903, expansion of officer
education through the use of applied theory beyond the classroom, and the development of some
post-schools, it was not until the Punitive Expedition that major changes began happening within
the Army’s training and educational programs. Another unexpected and rarely discussed
program discovered while researching for this study began prior to the Punitive Expedition. In
1913, Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood campaigned his idea that America needed
Citizens’ Military Training Camps to engage college students in learning the distinct types of
military units and the soldierly application of warfighting. While this effort initially focused on

224
college students attending these camps in the summer, it later expanded to businessmen who
could afford to attend as well. Wood’s motivation for this program was the need for America to
train Army leaders prior to the outbreak of war. While the Citizens’ Military Training Camps did
eventually experience successes, the initial stages of these camps failed to consider that many of
the men who would do the fighting were farming fields and working in industry during the time
these camps occurred. Over time, these camps did expand, providing opportunities for a wider
variety of attendees. The long-term success of this program, which focused on the development
of officers to lead men, is that it set the foundation as a precursor to what later became the ROTC
program.
The Citizens’ Military Training Camps might have become a failed program had it not
been for the Punitive Expedition. Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico and the following
Punitive Expedition ultimately led to significant legislative changes as part of the 1916 National
Defense Act. While leading the Punitive Expedition, General Pershing fielded and commanded a
large number of military forces as they chased Villa into Mexico. Due to the small standing
active Army, and the considerable number of troops needed in northern Mexico, America had no
choice but to activate the National Guard. At the time, each state had its own training plan and
appointment process for National Guard soldiers and officers. As a result, the ability to perform
the required duties in the austere environment of northern Mexico and the American Southwest
placed significant challenges on Pershing’s forces. These challenges faced by Pershing and
communicated to legislators was one factor in the decision to include funding for state National
Guard troops within the 1916 national defense legislation. Acknowledging that Europe was at
war during this time, and American legislators recognizing that America may eventually become
a party in the conflict, the performance of American troops during the Punitive Expedition and
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challenges they faced were undoubtedly combined with the fears of legislators that America
would soon be at war. Researching for this study led to the expectation that major military
operations would have a significant impact on educational and training programs. What was
unexpected was the significance of the Punitive Expedition in motivating legislation and change
in the Army. While there are tens of thousands of books written on the American Civil War,
those focused on the Punitive Expedition only measure in the hundreds.
Not only did Pershing field a considerable number of troops and command them during
the Punitive Expedition, but he also utilized some equipment provided by modern technology for
the first time in any American military operation. The first use of aircraft occurred during the
Punitive Expedition and highlighted a wide variety of problems. The Army was ill-prepared for
fielding its limited number of aircraft; moreover, the American aircraft industry prioritized its
best aircraft for European powers. Not only was America not receiving the best quality aircraft to
use in the Punitive Expedition, but it also lacked the technological support needed from both the
Army and industry to effectively take advantage of these modern innovations. It was during the
Punitive Expedition that America first used motorized trucks in any significant capacity. Army
quartermasters purchased many of the trucks used during the Expedition shortly before or during
those military operations in 1916. As a result, Pershing’s forces conducted a significant amount
of on-the-job training and discovered that soldiers lacked not only the ability to maintain the
equipment, but literacy to read the technical manuals that occasionally arrived with them.
The Punitive Expedition and adoption of new technology during the operation influenced
in a large part the transformation of the US Army during WWI. The Army discovered the need
for literacy to read manuals and maintain equipment and the specific challenges faced when
implementing new equipment during the Punitive Expedition. This highlighted for leaders such
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as Pershing that the Army had to develop military education and training programs before and
during WWI. More than ten thousand American servicemembers were involved in the Punitive
Expedition, and the experience that Pershing and his forces gained during its operations provided
an opportunity for expansion of the US military. The transformation from a mule and wagon
organization to one that greatly expanded its mechanized force during WWI gave Army leaders a
better understanding of twentieth century logistics, maneuvers, and organizational structure. The
adoption of aircraft and illumination of the problems that the First Aero Squadron encountered
during the Punitive Expedition resulted in the US Congress providing funding to not only the
state National Guard, but also to the training of servicemembers in a large-scale capacity during
WWI. When the War Department ordered Pershing and his forces to leave Mexico in February
1917, significant change was just around the corner as those same forces prepared to fight in
WWI.
During WWI, numerous partnerships formed between the US military and postsecondary educational institutions. While the progressive movement had an advocate in
President Woodrow Wilson, the transformation of attitude in American society from one of
neutrality into a nationalistic view, where being American and supporting the war was critical,
essentially limited Wilson’s ability to promote the progressive agenda; luckily for Wilson and
the progressives, the Army needed literate servicemembers. During WWI the federal government
increased its power and influence in response to wartime needs. As a result of this expansion and
the military’s acquisition of mechanized equipment and other technology to fight the war, the
Army focused on the labor pool from which to choose potential servicemembers. The American
military needed to have literate troops who could read and use technical manuals to maintain this
new equipment in support of the war. As a result, literacy became a requirement for many in the
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military service. A surprising discovery was that the expansion of American literacy had a direct
connection to the needs of American military operations and the US Army. By connecting the
need for literate troops to the strategic goals of the government and the military, federal money
poured into analysis and the eventual creation of literacy programs for recruits. The War
Department began to examine literacy rates and partnered with educators in developing methods
of assessing both literacy and intelligence using what were called the Alpha and Beta Tests
during WWI. In an effort to speed up the process of identifying literacy rates and intelligence,
the Army appointed Robert Yerkes a major in the US Army Medical Corps and assigned him the
responsibility for recruit testing. This opportunity for widespread testing led to more than one
and a half million recruits and soldiers being given the Alpha and Beta Tests by the end of WWI.
While not everyone agreed with the value of the testing, since implementing it removed soldiers
from the importance of fighting the war, it did provide the Army an opportunity to place men in
positions where they were best suited, based on their level of intelligence and literacy rates.
After the war, military recruiters continued to administer these tests when they were
uncertain of a potential recruit’s literacy. The baseline from WWI and these tests ultimately were
further developed during WWII, with recruits who did not meet the baseline requirements of the
service attending special training units where both educators and Army personnel taught recruits
how to read and write. Efforts such as this had a significant impact on the desire for personal
improvement after the war. The Army continued its literacy program after the end of WWI, and
in December 1920 there were 4,500 illiterate soldiers receiving instruction on reading and
writing at recruit centers across America. The Army graduated about a thousand men every
month in this program and demonstrated that the legacy of the WWI literacy efforts continued
beyond the need for educating men to fight in the war.
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Not only did the Army focus on the literacy of potential recruits, it also focused on the
need for specialized training during WWI. The establishment of the SATC is an excellent
example of how the War Department provided opportunities at both ends of the spectrum. The
relationship between SMU and the War Department provided a unique perspective on how the
students, the Armed Forces, and the universities all benefited from this partnership. The SATC
demonstrated how the expertise of universities combined with the resources of the military, and
their demanding standards ultimately moved American post-secondary education forward during
the war. The ability to maximize the use of these post-secondary educational institutions to train
technical experts and officer candidates based on the needs of the military dwarfed any program
previously provided by ROTC or the Morrill Land-Grant Act. The Army’s partnership with these
educational institutions during WWI led to more than 140,000 soldiers completing the collegiate
or vocational training as part of the SATC program. Financially, this program was a windfall for
universities as well. The federal government paid for the attendance of soldiers in the SATC,
including overhead costs and tuition, resulting in roughly 50 percent of SMU’s revenue for the
1918–1919 school year coming from the SATC program.
Although the end of WWI created challenges with demobilization and long-term care of
soldiers with disabilities, it also demonstrated the expansion of veterans’ benefits with the
consolidation of numerous bureaus into what became the Department of Veterans Affairs. The
passage of legislation to provide War Risk Insurance, the promotion of vocational education for
both civilians and veterans, and the investment in the Soldier’s Rehabilitation Act of 1918 all
focused on continuing the changes America started during the war. One significant organization
that helped to support these changes was the American Legion. Developed after the First World
War, the American Legion had significant influence that continued to grow throughout the
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1920s. The World War Adjusted Compensation Act, which promised to pay WWI veterans a
“bonus” twenty years after the passage of the act, created significant problems politically for
Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Roosevelt. The resulting Bonus Army incident demonstrated
the need for American legislators to focus on veterans and take care of them even after the war.
After WWI, the Great Depression created conditions that made it even more difficult for
politicians. During the period between the world wars, Americans continued moving to urban
areas, faced high unemployment, and less than half of Americans completed high school. These
factors continued to influence the country into the Second World War. By 1940, advancing
technology demonstrated the need for an educated and trained workforce, and the drafting of
Americans to serve during the war only exacerbated the problem.
At the beginning of WWII, America was once again ill-prepared to fight. The country
had neither the needed equipment nor trained troops to wage war, just as the US Congress passed
the Selective Service Act and more than sixteen million people registered for the draft. By this
time, the Army required servicemembers to possess technical skills if they were to effectively
complete their duties. The Army did have induction centers where educators and trainers taught
recruits to read and write English to meet the established standard of literacy. While this may not
seem to have been a significant problem, the numbers tell a different story. Hundreds of
thousands of men were unable to sign their registration cards for the draft, as they could not write
at all. Early in the war, the Army continued its literacy classification policy and expanded it even
further throughout the war. The manpower needs of the Army required it to partner with
educators to implement additional testing such as the visual classification test. As the war
continued, the pressure on the American War Manpower Commission to ensure that both
industry and the military had the workforce needed to accomplish their assigned goals became
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even more of a pressure on America. To provide education to men inducted into the Army who
could not read or write at a level needed to perform assigned duties, the Army created special
training units and gave the men specialized instruction to improve their literacy rates. This was
no small accomplishment; between June 1943 and October 1944, the Army educated more than
180,000 men in reading and writing. This had a significant impact on the labor pool from which
the Army could draw military personnel. The training program allowed the Army to accept
recruits who failed to meet the service requirements and invest in those men, providing a shortterm benefit to the Army but a long-term benefit to the servicemember. The special training units
and literacy programs provided an uplifting opportunity for minorities and the poor, who arrived
unable to read and left the Army with this newfound skill.
In addition to focusing on those who lacked literacy, the Army also established a program
to ensure it would have trained specialists throughout the war. The largest of the three programs
established by the Armed Forces was the ASTP, which provided training and educational
opportunities throughout WWII by taking advantage of American colleges and universities
across America. Those institutions of higher education were more than happy to take on this
task, as their enrollment rates by 1942 had dropped by 40 percent compared to pre-war rates. The
development of the ASTP provided many universities an opportunity to maintain relevance in
supporting the war effort, along with financial security. Baylor University was an excellent
example of the difficulties of establishing a program but also provides an example of the benefits
yielded by the partnerships between the War Department and post-secondary education. Baylor
University leadership contacted legislators many times in an effort to establish an ASTP on its
campus during the war. By May 1943, the Army approved Baylor to establish a program, and the
university received the Army curriculum. The university operated its program for over six terms,
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enrolling almost 900 individual men in eighteen months. Graduating 351 men in six enrollment
terms, Baylor met the objectives of the program and provided an example of how these
partnerships could benefit multiple stakeholders.
During WWII, multiple other programs continued to build on previous successes and
expand partnerships throughout the war. USAFI was the most significant of these examples.
USAFI partnered with a wide variety of educators to develop four separate types of courses
through which servicemembers could enhance their skills both professionally and personally.
This long-term partnership yielded many noteworthy results, such as testing for college credit,
the GED, and demonstrated successful application of distance learning. USAFI provided
opportunities for educators to work within the military system with large numbers of soldiers to
pursue the goal of validating educational processes while benefiting large groups of people and
supporting the war effort simultaneously.
This study revealed several successes resulting from partnerships between the US
military and educators that deserve additional attention. The partnerships between multiple
stakeholders to publish War Department educational manuals would benefit from further study.
Examining the collaboration between educators, professional organizations, publishers, and
USAFI may yield additional insight into the benefits of USAFI to the organizations themselves.
This study examines the benefits the program brought to veterans and higher education;
undoubtedly, professional organizations, publishers, and stakeholder groups benefited as well.
The long-term benefit of the USAFI program demonstrates the legacy of the Army on
post-secondary education throughout the twentieth century. Programs such as the GED, tuition
assistance, and subject standardized testing not only benefited the military and veterans, but the
evidence also shows these programs continue to benefit higher education and American citizens
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today. The enormous number of servicemembers serving during WWII, and the fact that
approximately half of those did not possess a high school diploma, created an opportunity to
develop assessments such as the GED and streamline the process for adults to continue with their
education after the war. The demand for skilled, literate, and educated men and women during
WWII not only created competition for labor in the workforce but required solutions and
partnerships between the US military and multiple stakeholders, including educators, to develop
technical experts who were already educated, as well as to improve the literacy of men who
would otherwise be unemployable in this new technological age.
While many veteran groups supported the adoption of the G.I. Bill in 1944, and many
veterans were affected by its benefits, the creation of educational programs for servicemembers
is much more complex than this one single program. This study demonstrates that the literature
on these lesser-known programs is quite rare. By researching primary sources located in state
and university archives, evidence was found that shows a multitude of partnerships between the
US military and post-secondary education throughout history. As a result, this study
acknowledges that the Army had a significant impact on higher education, which should be
considered equally as important as the federal funding for the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of
1944. While the G.I. Bill did increase the number of faculty at colleges and universities across
America after the war and continues to add billions of dollars in higher education annually,
expanding the scope of analysis increases understanding of how US military programs
influenced post-secondary education in America throughout history.
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